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INTELLECTUALISM: VITALIS NORSTRÖM[1]

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NATURAL science enables us, it is supposed, first to know what science properly is. Other sciences—which purport to exhibit a radically divergent type—are either of doubtful authenticity and highly disputable value, or else humbug, which has long since become transparent. If now the humanists are to be compelled to practise science, they will have perforce, *nolentes volentes*, to take the natural sciences for their model and adopt their methods. *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus.* Under no circumstances is recognition extended to a distinctive humanistic type of science side by side with the type of natural science. The distinctions between scientific forms and methods of procedure, which are forthcoming, accordingly all turn out to constitute merely variations within natural science itself.

This now becomes the chief object for our present investigation. Does there exist an independent form of humanistic science, which does not, as long as it deserves the title, obviously or latently simply mimic natural science, but does in reality deal in problems of its own and proceed on lines of its own? In this way the main point of view for our criticism of intellectualism is explicitly presented.

There are two quite different ways of arriving at the distinction, real or merely imaginary, between natural science and humanistic science, or, as it is now often termed, moral science. Logic, as theory of categories, here points us in *one* direction, psychology in *another.* We propose to take up the psychological distinction, after we have first endeavoured to determine the logical or categorical distinction in some few sharp features.

[1] Professor of Philosophy at Gothenburg, Member of the Swedish Academy; died 1916. For a further account of him and his work the translator may refer to his volume of essays, *Discrimina Peregrinationis*, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1924, the first of which deals with Norström.

Were we to try to put in a nutshell the whole wealth of knowledge that the natural sciences shake into our lap out of their horn of plenty, we should collect all their gifts under the headings of *facts* and *laws* without fearing that we had left out of consideration anything of importance. But the characteristic feature consists scarcely of facts described and arranged, but far rather of the laws, to which the facts, included in their continuous variation, are subordinated. Matters of fact, properties, conditions, and relations we can become thoroughly familiar with, even outside the sciences proper, and with such we establish acquaintance within all sciences, of whatever kind they may be. But research, discovery and formulation of laws—behold, that is something which only pure science carries out, and which therefore belongs to it alone, to natural science in the first place.

But here we come now to an exceedingly important, indeed a fundamentally decisive point, and that is this: we must be careful to avoid the ugly old slip of *confusing laws with causes.* When science establishes laws, it does not properly allege any causes at all—quite simply for the reason that they are both entirely different things. Note well, there is no question of an imperceptible and mystic *power,* which supplies the energy for everything positive, which carries out work, which presses, weighs down, hurls, repels, attracts, and so forth. It is quite clearly understood that ideas of cause and causality, from the point of view of natural science, are merely useful anthropomorphisms and nothing more, while the fact, the law and the formula afford an accurate description for the case in point. Perhaps the problem of natural science can never be stated in a clearer and more concentrated light than by means of the following characterization: this type of science never has to answer—and cannot answer—the question *why,* but strictly speaking only the question *how.*

All the same—*after* all the work of the natural sciences, powerful and full of strong incentive to progress as it is, there always remains over a little residuum of wonder, a little unsatisfied curiosity, that makes one want to know just a little more. And this even about nature itself! This little "more" signifies merely all that is included in the question *why,* in the cause of all those various things that are and happen. Now one may reproach anybody, who pushes his inquiry over the horizon of the natural sciences, with failing to respect the limitations of man's cognitive faculties. Without raising any objections here to the legitimacy of this objection, we must still insist at once definitely, that anyone who is so inquisitive is most certainly not asking any further questions than scientific curiosity compels him to ask.

The natural sciences work with *law* as their highest category.

The humanistic sciences take *cause* quite seriously, seeing that they do not regard it merely as an economical subsidiary expression with a sort of anthropomorphic and popularizing suggestiveness about it, but actually as the very hammer for driving the nail in. If causality is not to be merely an empty word, but one capable of being endorsed with known and established experience, then we must inevitably accept that reference to ourselves as living and acting entities, which it indubitably implies, and which cannot be overlooked or misinterpreted without a certain obduracy of thought. It is only in man and his will that we encounter the archetype for all causality, it is only in man's inner experience of himself as active that causality, i.e. the relation between cause and effect, admits of being grasped in sheer activity. That inner experience constitutes the ultimate source of cognition for all causal explanations, whatever variety of colouring these may subsequently assume, according to whether we encounter the cause in the guise of an efficient cause alike preceding and leading up to the event, or in that of a purpose, which operates as a goal of attraction for what happens and is accomplished.

Let us now proceed to more psychological ways of looking at the matter. Intellectualism, with its bent towards natural science, seeks the centre of reality within the perceptual world of objects or data presented to it, thus decisively in something outside the spirit itself scientifically engaged. For if I do not understand from the outset that *consciousness, soul, spirit* are as meaningless as a square circle or a piece of wooden iron, should I be simple-minded enough to reckon them among objects—*for* consciousness, then I have about as much sense as a man running round a tree to catch himself. But there is nothing commoner even at the present day than to attempt this very feat and to believe that one has performed it successfully. More than this. Intellectualism understands truth to be a more or less fine or rough *copy* of reality, that is a kind of objectifying mode of presentation; it matters not whether the object presented have an empirical or a metaphysical origin, whether the presentation seeks to collect and reproduce earthly or heavenly things. The plastic ideas of Plato, Spinoza's substance, Leibniz's concept of God, the Hegelian thought machinery strictly speaking, foot the dance on the same polished boards as atoms and molecules, though they themselves never dream that they are doing so.

The psychological criticism of intellectualism advances in two main directions. First and foremost it points straight to a quite different setting for the humanistic type of science from that which the other type represented by physical science implies with its objectifying and copying methods. Further, it produces evidence that natural science itself, when it reaches a sufficient degree of maturity of judgment and self-criticism, breaks through its own

shell, and definitely in the name of scientific truth claims to pass over to a new way of researching and theorizing.

The investigation of life, consciousness, soul, and spirit can never denote the setting up of mirrors round a market-place to take pictures. For spirit wants to know about itself, but spirit is the actual mirror. Now a mirror does not reflect itself. Here no picture is of any use, for a picture always reproduces merely *something else.* Now the usual way, in which the investigation of spirit has been undertaken, has been first to make spirit into *something else,* that is to say externalize it, and next to fix the truth about this outward and alien object in the inward picture—just as one does when dealing with anything else. One might just as well try to get hold of the sun in the water as hunt for the original light in the shadows of the world of ideas.

What has been overlooked is the crucial difference between moral science, which logically works out the cohesion and unity among judgments of feeling and value, and natural science, which is merely concerned with judgments of perception. In the case of the first the outward fact taken by itself counts for nothing, but only matters in so far as it characterizes or symbolizes life.

What is essential in history cannot be presented, that is to say, brought into view, because it is personality and personal existence. Napoleon is not Corsica, in its setting of the France of 1790, that was heaving and cracking; he is not *something,* which I at second, third, or fourth hand smell, taste, see, or hear, but he is the more or less composite *feeling* which takes possession of me together with and by means of the pictures, which the historians of Napoleon display for me. This feeling is *my* Napoleon, but I am quite unable to make out why *my* man should not in essential features also be *yours.* That is to say I fail to grasp why a certain defined agreement should not subsist even in the sphere of feeling, and so offer a basis for scientific judgments. Starting-points for scientific investigation do subsist even in the life of feeling. No sufficient justification exists for disputing the scientific character of history on the ground that its proper subject-matter, the acting personality, does not reveal itself anywhere on the plane of perception. Even feelings can be generalized and imparted, provided only that appropriate means for doing so are employed.

No one will ever be able to say what inward and spiritual element in experience properly exists which does not proceed from feeling as the subject itself. I feel, therefore I am! Compared with this *cogito ergo sum* denotes something merely secondary. To tie the existence of the ego down to a *cogito* leads on to an infinite regress of presuppositions, which mirror one another, of which the first is *about* the second, and the second *about* the third, and so on; but hereby one

never reaches the subject or ego, for whom the concepts are. To seek to grasp the existence of the ego in thoughts is to operate with the sieve of the Danaids. The ego lies on another plane, that of feeling.

What, then, can truth be in the sphere of feeling? Here we must firmly apprehend and never overlook the point, that we are asking for *scientific* truth, but not for the private truths of Smith and Robinson. Therefore we must lay special stress on objectivity and universality, that is we must put forward a logical demand for what we have to regard as true. Never, I mean, can it enter our heads for a moment to seek to blur the clear, sharp contours of scientific form with the make-believe of our individual likes and dislikes, desires and interests. We shall not allow ourselves to be led away by anything savouring of subjectivism or obscurantism.

The problem of truth in the humanistic sciences may be stated as follows: *how can anything be established as universally valid in the domain of feeling?* With the answer to that question these sciences stand or fall as sciences.

How can people think alike on what is right and wrong, beautiful and ugly, on lower and higher ends, better and worse conditions in general, when the immediate pleasure and displeasure of the moment together with arbitrary calculations of utility obviously prove themselves more apt to separate than to attract and combine? How can there be universal ethical principles and aesthetic rules, common perceptions in regard to law and religion? How can certainty be imparted in these subjective domains, how can a scientific truth be established?

I know only one way of answering such questions, and it can be stated as follows: through the power of gifted personalities to attract. Therefore the truth of the moral sciences bears the name of *power*, while that of the physical sciences emerges as a *form of presentation* or *of thought*. Here the subject in quest of truth goes back to the innermost ground of its own being, and takes its stand on this ground, whether it may break or hold. It will *quake* and *break*, if it be never more than purely and simply individual; it will *hold*, if from out of it there spring forth values that can serve as ideals to attract nations, generations, and ages, i.e. values capable of function as criteria of progress along different lines of advance in spiritual and vital movement, so that within reasonable limits people may really be united as to their objective and as to the way of attaining it.

This holds good of both morality, law, and religion. It holds good also, and just as much, for aesthetic and history. No evolutionary biology and no physiological psychology will ever get a firm hold on the moral life, for here the point is first and foremost without demur to discover and elucidate a quality in one's own personal

life. But this quality can only become the object for scientific treatment when an ethical genius interprets his own inner experience, and that interpretation in virtue of elective affinity comes to be recognized as normative and decisive for a number of others. Then we get the external support and identity of content, which are indispensable for all science. It is the demand of ethics, that individual moral values shall be recognized as norms by others as well. Otherwise it remains mere mysticism and never attains the status of a science.

The title of historian of one type or another belongs to him and to him alone who discerns development in the form either of progress or of retrogression in an absolute sense. But anyone who sticks fast in the pathless morass of relativity does not really deserve to be called one; for in the last resort he has nothing more important to teach us than that Gustav Adolf's horse, for instance, in the battle of Leipzig went lame in its left hind leg, or that Rousseau's housekeeper was called Thérèse Levasseur and could not read print. As pure facts ultimately both are equally "scientific," for both alike are equally facts. But we really expect more of a historian than a variegated surface. We want a perspective; and we only get that from the ideal, which defines the end in view. If people refuse for every ideal admission to their "exact" science, then we must console ourselves with the reflection that our despised illusions still remain, when all has been said and done, as milestones on the way to a truth, without which the majority of the patent truths of empirical science, guaranteed to run for ten to fifteen years, might just as well be lies, as far as we are concerned.

Already the existence of a fully developed, undeniable, and irrefragable type of science differing in kind from physical science, including mathematics, refutes and demolishes the narrow limitations of intellectualism. The inward experience of the living spirit, its acts of self-observation, its certainty of the meaning of its own life, are able, in the case of a personality of genius, to rise up in the full light of consciousness and subsequently to be rounded off into a logical and scientific system; but in this system objectification, and therewith the configuration of the forms of actuality presented as it were to consciousness, only play the part of a symbolism, which embodies.

According to my view, then, Anti-Intellectualism ought to direct its criticism so as to take account of the dualism within the concept of truth, with which the consciousness of physical science itself operates. There is no longer need to go on criticizing, so to speak, from without: criticism ought instead to enter in to what is being criticized. This amounts to taking note of the essential development, which the consciousness of physical science at the same time *has*

in fact undergone and had *of necessity* logically to undergo. This development has regard to the very significance of that truth, the attainment of which is involved in the collected results of all science. Here accordingly the question is not of particular subject-matter or superficial formal distinctions, but of the actual nature of the problem, of what in the last resort it implies to ask and answer questions in science, of the means and possibility of advancing in it and attaining a result. No criticism can penetrate deeper than this in its attitude.

We are coming to perceive with increasing clearness that reality is *one* thing and scientific truth *another*. We are coming to understand that there is still a good and intelligible sense in letting the visible heavenly bodies be what they actually are, in confining space to what we perceive, in saying that grass *is* green in itself, and snow white, and so on repeatedly. We are coming, in other words, to have confidence in ourselves and believe once more in the old familiar objects, which our normal sense-perception, without asking permission from science, presents to us. What has been called "the world of the man in the street," that narrow little contemptible world, is beginning to come back into fashion, beginning likewise to be appreciated again, after having long been ousted by the ideal constructions which astronomers, mechanicians, physicists, chemists, physiologists, and other men of science have put in its place. We are beginning to get over our terror at the gloomy monstrosity of infinity and the endless senseless dance of the atoms, which recently posed as scientifically verified reality, in whatever direction we turned our gaze, and to go back to immediacy without blushing for shame at being old fogies.

I have no time to expatiate here with regard to the critical way of understanding truth in natural science—beyond what I have said already. I will just emphasize the point, that it is based on culture and cultural advance, but not on any imaginary copying of reality. What advances culture is true, all else is false. Long ago Goethe expressed the opinion: "Was fruchtbar ist, allein ist wahr." And he was right. To take this line is to bring scientific truth in general under the heading of work, and to make physical science itself approximate to life, the interests of which it essentially serves. It follows, that is to say, that it is only in relation to the purposes of life that talk about truth can have any relevance. Truth is not like a stone, that we can pick up from the ground, but it is a stamp, that we affix to our culture products, far more accordingly a thing that is made than a thing that is found. But along these lines it becomes also manifest how the innermost motive powers in the natural sciences, when they have later emerged into real transparence, carry them up beyond their own level and on into that of the cultural

and moral sciences. So there exists an immanent dialectic in the thought of physical science, a progressive self-criticism, which elicits the recognition of the principle, that the proper meaning of truth resides in the life of culture, but not in any sort of dead self-contained nature, which can be cut and dried once for all, and that the sciences dealing with this life consequently give the highest expression to *all* scientific truth.

I charge intellectualism with committing two deadly sins. The first is that it inevitably *leads to dogmatism*, the second is that it *sets itself up as a barrier to our spiritual freedom generally*. Both these two sins spring from the same root.

Intellectualism ties down our thought to a reality in the form of an object for investigation, which is to be essentially independent of our way of thinking. Intelligence can push that object nearer and nearer towards life, walk round it, and contemplate it from various sides, and so make clear the greater or less degree of thoroughness in our apprehension, which naturally varies considerably with different people and at different times. But the assumption is that the reality in question remains there stationary, as it were, right up in the midst of all that moves around, a fixed goal, to which one can approximate. On this given reality, then, the qualities of which are accurately determinable, intelligence is held to be itself in absolute dependence. It approximates to it more and more in proportion as it rightly and truly acquires for itself the image of the reality. On this assumption the aim set before intelligence in all its efforts is fixed once for all, whether it be matter or force or energy or figure or number or objective idea or thought or absolute substance or anything else, that we later like to consider as forming the essence of this reality.

The problem for intelligence is then supposed to be how to grasp reality in its unchangeable qualities, in a word to describe it, whether it be in the terms of physical science or in those of mathematics or in those of metaphysics. People fondly imagine that reality lies still and awaits the convenience of the investigator for him to come back and examine it once more. But reality is badly behaved. It will not stop as it is, but is perpetually renewing itself, as time and life go on. Anyone wanting to come again later will never recognize precisely the same object. It is for ever slipping out of the grasp of investigation and giving rise to endless new problems. It is not true that "there is nothing new under the sun." *All* that comes into existence is new, and just for the very reason that anything once was so, it never becomes so any more. So when intelligence cannot avoid directing its attention upon itself and its own activity, the consequence of the universal bias of the scientific point of view is that in order to know anything about itself, it must objectify itself

to a coarser or finer lump to be dissected and described. This is how there arise such objects for investigation as soul, spirit, free will, etc., more or less substantiated and arranged in real chains of association. But that is to commit the fatal error of wishing to claim spiritual properties for objects, which nevertheless, *as objects*, can never be anything else but nature. In other words, the presuppositions of physical science, more or less successfully disguised, are adopted in a sphere, the character of which from beginning to end is not to belong to nature but to something radically different. But really metaphysics in the form of distorted illegitimate physics is something which by this time we ought to have outgrown.

Against all dogmatism we raise a demand for *criticism*, which refuses to be put to silence. Do not go on blundering about with investigation and description of one object after another, but ask yourself first once for all, *what* you are doing when you investigate, what you want to achieve by it, and by what means and with what prospects of success. Of course a puppy jumps into deep water to fetch out a stick, without knowing beforehand whether he can swim or not. Fortunately he always can. But we are men; and alas such blind confidence in nature is not always advantageous.

Thinkers would have saved themselves a lot of trouble if they had understood from the very first that, for example, there is no such problem as that of the freedom of the will at all, so long as I maintain free will as an object in the strict sense of the word. For by doing so I have already conditioned or naturalized this will, i.e. inserted it in a physical context, which I am compelled to think of as determined, in so far as I really think of it at all. How, then, is it possible to ask oneself in the same breath: Can the will be free, i.e. independent of its determined physical context? We get into the same dogmatic blind alley equally with a large number of other metaphysical problems, some of the most important among them, if we do not begin by realizing very clearly in our own minds what we are asking and what it is reasonable for us to ask. The metaphysic of naturalism no less than that of supernaturalism conceals many traps for the unwary.

Just as intellectualism binds down the intelligence to a reality, which essentially and ultimately always presents itself as something opposed to the subject, so it further enslaves the will to the intelligence. *Knowledge counts* more for the intellectualist than anything else. To know here transcends everything else, strength of will battling and striving through life, the depth of feeling and the creations of imagination. Intellectualism has a far firmer faith in science than in man, who prosecutes science.

Yet what else in the world does this imply but to enslave life itself in its inmost essence to something external, to an object?

What else is it but what Kant calls the heteronomy of the will? What else is it but naturalism?

If we assume that there really exists a *nature on its own*, a *"pure experience,"* which gives a quite definite lead to our cognitive activity, and to which we are able gradually more and more to approximate with our concepts, although we seem to be unable ever to apprehend it completely, then each step forward on the way of knowledge must inevitably imply a curtailment of the possibilities of life and concurrently also a diminution of life itself. The victories of knowledge are then won at the cost of life. We find here a parallel to the famous operation which succeeded, although the patient died. The final result of intellectualism is the mechanizing of life and spiritual bondage.

There is only *one* way of rescuing spiritual freedom. That is to bring the whole of life under the heading not of "I know" but of "I believe, hope, dream of and will." Are people then still too blind to see, that in every case to tie down knowledge once for all to life as an object simply means to quench hope and to erect a barrier; too blind to see, that the inmost recess of the isolated self-satisfied understanding is a negation, opposed to everything bearing the name of human and spiritual life? Unhappy man, were he only able to live in virtue of his knowledge and for the purpose of getting to know more and more!

Do you reply perchance: "What you say may be true, or it may be false. Anyhow, with knowledge I stand or fall. If it lead me even to the gates of hell, I will knock to enter there"?

That was the opinion once expressed by the Swedish thinker Höijer.

Well, I think that this last rejoinder is just bluff. I can imagine anyone's pursuit of knowledge taking him over the threshold of annihilation, but not over the threshold of hell. No one in his right mind would choose to go to that length, however distinguished the company he might find there.

But let us drop the whole idea straight away as at any rate unnecessary. The understanding and science are negative and deadening, no doubt, when they bow their necks to absolute objects. But they only do this so long as they fail to know themselves, as they really are. Once they have grown a little beyond infancy, the nightmare of naturalism will cease to fascinate them. Then they will change their tune completely. Then they will no longer persist in slaving under dead objects, but forthwith revolt and pass over to offer their services freely to life, that unending life which never becomes rigid in points or stands still before barriers.

A SCHOLASTIC THEORY OF ART

VALMAI BURDWOOD EVANS

Pulchra dicuntur quae visa placent.—ST. THOMAS

THOSE philosophers who are interested in the contemporary philosophy of all countries have come to recognize the importance of the "neo-scholastic" or "neo-thomist" movement. This current of ideas is not least strong in France, owing much at the present time to the work of Jacques Maritain. In this essay I propose to consider neo-thomist ideas in the field of art, limiting myself somewhat arbitrarily to their expression by Maritain and their application to French art throughout the period in which thomism has appeared in "modern dress," i.e. since 1879, the date of the famous papal encyclical *Æterni Patris*. This limitation is arbitrary, since in the first place there are living thomists who do not agree entirely with Maritain's interpretation of St. Thomas,[1] and in the second place scholastic principles, if true, must from their nature apply to art as such—Greek, mediaeval, and modern, to say nothing of Oriental and primitive art.

The limitation may, however, be excused in so far as it is especially interesting to see how principles, supposedly extracted from the work of a mediaeval philosopher, apply to the most modern of modern worlds, and such a world that of French art may well claim to be. Those who do not admit that the French culture of the last fifty years is the most perfect flower of European civilization may yet grant that it is its most characteristic growth.

Maritain tells us that St. Thomas's theory of art, though never developed *ex professo*, is clearly implied by his philosophical system. When his scattered observations on art are pondered in the light of his general principles, we arrive at an illuminating theory of fine art. We must confront various passages on the metaphysics of beauty—the place of beauty in the scheme of things—with others on the nature of *good art* in general—including such arts as those of the shoemaker and the horseman.

If we do this, we find that, according to the scholastics, the intelligence has certain virtues—the speculative powers—of which the end is simply *to know*. Art, however, belongs to the realm of practice,

[1] Cf. De Munnynck, cited by Maritain. *L'esthétique de S. Thomas, S. Thomas d'Aquin*, 1923. Also De Wulf, *L'œuvre d'art et la Beauté*, p. 206. Maritain, *Art et Scolastique*, revised edition, 1927. Trans. *Philosophy of Art*, by Rev. J. O'Connor. *Frontières de la Poésie*, 1927.

although it is related to the intellect. Art implies something which is to be done or made. Now this realm of practice is to be divided into two distinct domains, of Action and of Making. The first is concerned with morality, with peculiarly human affairs; the second with the making of something in which we are interested for its own sake—the realm of art. "This action is what it should be, if it is good in its order, if it conforms to the rules and to the individual end of the work which is to be produced; and the effect at which it aims, if it is good, is that this work should be good in itself."[1] Its end is not human. "But if art is not human by its end, it is human, essentially human, by its mode of operation. It is man's work which has to be made, and the mark of man must be there—that of the rational animal. The work of art has been thought before being made, it has been moulded and prepared, formed, brooded over, ripened within a reason before passing into matter. And there it will always keep the colour and savour of the mind."[2] The formal element of the work of art—its specific nature—is its regulation by the intelligence.

Thus St. Thomas, according to Maritain, shows himself an intellectualist in aesthetics—he does not hesitate to describe the actual creative work of the artist as intellectual or rational. His ideal for art would therefore be what is usually called classical, in opposition to the romantic goal reached by feeling and inspiration. This is a point to which we must return.

The activity which makes such work as that of the artist possible, Maritain, following the scholastics, calls a *habitus*. It is a stable disposition of the practical intellect, a *virtue*, and it is necessary to the artist in a way that technical ability is not necessary, for art is entirely mental or spiritual.

Artistic activity, however, must not be confounded with moral activity—the artistic virtue is not that of right living, or, as the scholastics would say, of Prudence. The artist may make a beautiful work of art, and yet err as a man. "It matters little whether he is good-tempered or angry."[3] The artist "as such" is non-moral, and so is the work of art.

We see that the scholastics gave to the artist all the freedom he can possibly desire *as an artist*; this is the settlement of the dispute between artist and moralist. The artist has the right to consider nothing in his work but the beauty of the work, irrespective of its practical consequences. The moralist, however, necessarily claims an interest in *all* human activity, including that of the artist, in so far as that is the activity of a man realizing itself in the physical world, which is the *social* world. His approval or condemnation of the work does not touch it as art; it is relevant only to the work of a

[1] *Art et Scolastique*, p. 10. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 11.
[3] Maritain quotes *Sum. Theol.*, I, II, q. 57, a. 3.

man, among *men*. As a man, the artist has moral responsibilities like the rest of us, and sometimes there may be at least the appearance of conflict between his virtue as an artist and his virtue as a man.[1] If we hold that the world is a rational world, it is, however, impossible that beauty and morality should not be in harmony, for morality is only real as an aspect of the Good of which beauty is also an aspect. And in spite of the moralist, it is beauty which we can think to be more really a character of the ultimately real, for it is free from the taint of the *merely* human which affects all moral acts.

What is this beauty at which the artist aims? St. Thomas describes the beautiful as *id quod visum placet*.[2] "These four words say all that is necessary; a vision, that is to say, something *known intuitively*, and a *joy*."[3] Beauty is essentially the object of intelligence; but because human intelligence is not intuitive, whereas beauty must be perceived, for a human being the awareness of beauty naturally and usually involves the senses, which are related to their objects directly or by an intuition. And from the relation of beauty to the intelligence follow the three essential conditions of beauty according to St. Thomas: "*Ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem integritas, sive perfectio; quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio, sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas: unde quae habent colorem nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur.*"[4] The splendour of beauty is the splendour of *order* or *form*—the form being the principle of perfection in a thing, and therefore its essence, that which is intelligible. Maritain concludes that beauty for the scholastics is "a fulguration of intelligence upon a matter intelligently disposed."[5] But this form is seized in and through the senses—the appreciation of beauty is the very opposite of the grasping of scientific truth (which implies abstraction from that which is sensible).

Scholastic aesthetics clearly imply a rational world of which the matter is capable of intelligent exploitation, while such control of matter gives to mind a peculiar joy. Maritain therefore remarks that aesthetics must be both intellectualist and intuitivist. The artist as well as the critic, according to such a theory, must exercise his intellect in creation or appreciation of beauty which is not the object of any "blind" emotion.

We do not sufficiently recognize the part played by the intelligence, if we think that the perception of the beautiful is of that which is merely pleasing, without a "concept," says Maritain, nor

[1] *Frontières de la Poésie*, "Quand il sera un saint il fera tout ce qu'il voudra," p. 182; cf. p. 197.

[2] *Sum. Theol.*, I, q. 5, a. 1. [3] *Art et Scolastique*, p. 35.

[4] *Sum. Theol.*, q. 39, a. 8; quoted by Maritain, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

[5] *Op cit.*, p. 39.

even if we think that it is a confused conception of the perfection of a thing, or its conformity to an ideal type—these are the errors of Kant, Leibniz, and their followers. For in the work of art there is no line to be clearly drawn between concept and percept, intelligence and sense. The beauty of the object perceived cannot be expressed in a concept.

If beauty is thus perceived, is it subjective or objective? The scholastic answers the question in the only possible way, by the aid of distinctions and definitions. On the one hand, it is indeed subjective in the sense that without mind, beauty would not be; this much follows from the dependence of beauty upon intelligence. On the other hand, it is objective in the sense that it is real: so long as there is intelligence, human or divine, there is beauty, even if we imagine the world of sensible things destroyed, and a pure spirit only remaining, for beauty has been defined as *essentially* intellectual. While we are concerned with human beings, beauty is objective, not merely because it is intellectual, but because it is a quality of the physical world presented to the intelligence by the senses. It is the intelligible order—the "splendour"—of that material world, and it is as fully objective as that world.[1] The question, Is beauty subjective or objective? would hardly be asked except upon the assumption of a dualism of subject and object, and upon this assumption the reply of the scholastic is quite clear.

Although beauty is essentially intellectual, the perception of beauty is not a kind of knowledge, but a kind of good—it is "delight," although a delight which depends purely upon knowing.[2] The emotions which may follow upon this intellectual joy are not themselves aesthetic; to think that they are so is the error of Lipps's theory of *Einfühlung*.[3]

With "splendour" as characteristic of the work of art, the scholastic also recognizes "integrity." About this notion Maritain has some remarks to make which help a right attitude towards a work of art. There are thousands of ways, he says, in which integrity may be realized. "The absence of head or arms is a loss of integrity very noticeable in a woman, scarcely noticeable at all in a statue. . . . If a futurist likes to give only one eye, or the quarter of an eye, to the lady whom he portrays, nobody can contest his right to do so; we merely ask—and therein is the whole problem—that this quarter of an eye is exactly all that is necessary to the aforesaid lady *in this* given case."[4] There may be a type of natural beauty—that which characterizes a body perfectly adapted to its function. "But the

[1] Cf. De Wulf, *L'œuvre d'art et la beauté*, p. 7.
[2] *Art et Scolastique*, p. 258.
[3] Cf. De Wulf, *op. cit.*, p. 421, and Benda, *Belphégor*.
[4] *Art et Scolastique*, p. 43.

beauty of the work of art *not being that of the object represented*, Painting and Sculpture are by no means limited to the determination and the imitation of such a type."[1] The same has to be said of proportion or harmony, and also of the splendour or "clarity" of the form which is not to be confused with the easily understood—an error which leads to the "academic" in art.[2]

Beauty in Maritain's opinion belongs to the order of Transcendentals, "that is to say of concepts which are not limited by any genus or category, which cannot be confined in any class. . . . Thus everything is beautiful, as everything is good, at least in a certain relation."[3] "Beauty is one of the Divine Names."[4] It is characteristic of the work of "fine" art that its end is beauty itself; its own peculiar beauty which is more than merely human, and therefore resembles pure speculation; but unlike the latter, its activity does not remain purely spiritual; it is not only contemplation but *making*. The artist must work out his conception of the beautiful in the material world in order that it may be complete.

In his chapter upon the Rules of Art, Maritain reminds us that the "formal" element of art consists in its *regulation* of matter, and that according to the ancients, art essentially had definite rules. These are rules of *workmanship*, not only technique for dealing with materials, but more especially rules of the intelligence which enable the artist to reach his end—rules that, in so far as he aims at a particular unique effect, apply only to that unique work of art. They prevent the work from being a mere sensual mess by giving it the order of a certain state of the intelligence—the habitus or virtue which is art. In this sense, as Maritain rightly emphasizes, rules do not detract from the freedom of the artist; they are his tools. We may add that all difficulties, whether of working according to a rule once chosen, or of producing a work which has been commanded—a Virgin and Child for an altar-piece, a portrait for an unintelligent patron—may be utilized by the artist as part of his *material*, and may add to the triumph of the finished work.

> Oui, l'œuvre sort plus belle
> D'une forme au travail
> Rebelle, vers, marbre, onyx, émail.

Maritain blames the moderns for choosing the easy way. The public wants something easy to understand; the artist wants to produce beauty without learning the necessary technique—leaving all to inspiration. Inspiration is really the living virtue which enables him to interpret the rules of his art—without it there is only

[1] *Art et Scolastique*, p. 264. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 45.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 47–8. Contrast De Munnynck, *op. cit.*, and De Wulf, *op. cit.*, p. 206. [4] *Art et Scolastique*, p. 49.

"academic" art; but without the rules there is only a "natural gift" —that which has ceased to be, or that which is not yet art. "Thus art proceeds from a spontaneous instinct like love; while also it must, like friendship, be cultivated, for like friendship it is a virtue."[1]

Because of the importance of technique which can only be acquired with practice, Maritain regrets the lapse of the mediaeval custom of apprenticeship in the arts, thinking that it did at least maintain a fairly high level of culture among most artists and artisans, a level now attained only by the exceptionally gifted.

The scholastic intellectual theory of art implies the denial of the validity of a theory very popular these days—not only among philosophers but among critics and amateurs of art—namely, the theory that the work of art is beautiful if and in so far as it arouses a delirious emotion in us. This is very different from the Aristotelian view that art should purify the passions—the view that art is always logical, and that the appreciation of it is an act of judgment. In possessing an inner logical order the Greek temples, the Gothic cathedrals, and the houses of such an architect as M. Le Corbusier are alike; their beauty lies in their rationality and our intelligence appreciates this. The truth of this logical essence of beauty is more easily seen in architecture than in painting or sculpture, because in architecture we are not confused by any "resemblance" to the work of nature.[2] It is, however, equally true that the beauty of a painting or of a statue does not depend upon its exactitude in copying fruit and flowers or a beautiful woman. The aim of art is not illusion, else Plato's decree of banishment from the Republic would be amply justified. Its aim is to be sought, not in relation to something outside itself, but in its own coherence or harmony. Classical art is never lying.[3] One of the most valuable lessons of scholastic aesthetics is that art does not consist in making copies of natural objects; and in so far as it avoids illusion, Maritain has a good word to say for cubism. "Art as such does not consist in imitating, but in making, composing, or constructing, and that according to the very laws of the object which is to be realized (ship, house, carpet, coloured canvas, or carved block)."[4]

Yet art, because it is a joy of *knowing*, may make use of sounds, colour, etc., as signs of something not themselves, for in this way the meaning of the work of art, and therefore the knowledge which is

[1] *Art et Scolastique*, p. 68.

[2] Yet some theorists have gone so far as to claim that the beauty of a building lies in its resemblance to a mountain!

[3] "Le mot fameux de Moréas: que ces distinctions, de *classique* et de *romantique*, 'c'est de la blague,' est juste du point de vue esthéticien, mais du point de vue moral il aurait tort. Qui dit classique, dit véritable, et romantique, mensonge." Coulon, *Verlaine*, preface, p. 13.

[4] *Art et Scolastique*, p. 90.

aesthetic joy, may be increased. Therefore, Maritain tells us, the beauty of a picture or of a statue is "incomparably richer than that of a carpet, of a Venetian glass, or of a vase";[1] in this sense the fine arts imitate; but if this sense is grasped, we see that painting is no more imitative than music. Imitation, like technique, is one of the means, not itself the end, of art; for what is required is the splendour of a form, or *truth*. "The rigour of the truly classic is achieved by such a subordination of matter to the light of the form thus manifested, that no material element deriving from the things or the subject is admitted in the work unless it is strictly required as support or vehicle of that light. . . ."[2] And Maritain contrasts the music of a Gregorian chant or of Bach with that of Wagner. The vehicle of the light may for us include a certain imitation in order that we are able to understand the work. "When, in his horror of impressionism or naturalism, a cubist declares that a picture must remain *just* as beautiful turned upside down, like a cushion, he affirms a return, very curious, but very useful if rightly understood, to the laws of absolute coherence which constitute art in general; but he forgets the subjective conditions and the particular demands of beauty in painting."[3] Nevertheless, mere copying is no part of art—although, adds Maritain, it is difficult to think what *mere* copying could be—points of view are so various. What is usually understood by a copy, and this certainly has no place in art, is the work which is meant to create an illusion of another kind of reality —the *trompe-l'œil* which belongs not to the sphere of art but to a museum of waxworks. "Even in a portrait 'perfectly like,' for example, in Holbein's drawings, it is always a form engendered in the mind of the artist and veritably born in the mind which is expressed by the work, true portraits being nothing but 'the ideal reconstruction of individuals,'" writes Maritain,[4] quoting Baudelaire. "Artistic creation does not copy that of God, it continues it."[5] When a painter like Gauguin or Maurice Denis says the work of art is not a copy, he is thinking of the creative aspect of art; when a painter like Ingres or a sculptor like Rodin affirms that art is necessarily imitative, he is thinking of its foundation in nature.

A further corollary of the intellectual quality of the perception of beauty is that on the one hand the work of art must never *aim* at pleasing, or at rousing emotion. If the Symbolists in fact aim at exciting an emotional state, they confound a collateral result of the beautiful object with beauty itself, and their conception of the work of art is at fault; musicians sometimes make a similar mistake. On the other hand, the intellectual character of the work of art does

[1] *Art et Scolastique*, p. 97.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 93.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 101.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 103.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 104. Cf. *Frontières de la Poésie*, p. 153. Cf. p. 335.

not imply that it should have a "thesis" or point a moral. A "thesis" involves a break between the intelligence and the sensibility of the artist, whereas it is the union of these that is the peculiar characteristic of artistic work. Thus Christian art is not a *kind* of art; it is the art of Christian men designed for certain situations—whether a church or a palace. While the artist as such is occupied only with the work which he is making, he must as a man have an end in life—Maritain asserts—which is other than all works of art. It is as *human* work that the work of art enters the moral sphere; *human* creative activity forces it to appear in the material world. It can never fully satisfy a human being. Modern artists have asked too much of art—they have expected it to give them eternal life. They can only meet with disappointment. They are forgetting to be simply—good workmen. To increase the disaster, that modern world which in the Renaissance exalted the artist above all other human beings, will now scarcely allow him enough to live upon, for it has broken even with the degree of spirituality which is to be found in works of art; it has become mechanical and therefore inhuman. Art it finds "useless."[1] Yet "Leave the artist to his art, he serves the community better than the engineer and the merchant."[2]

II

The scholastic theory of art is worthy of the attention of students of aesthetics in the form in which Maritain expounds it; it is coherent and it yields an interpretation of the facts of art, which goes a long way towards showing the unity of the facts through the ages.

Consider Maritain's account of art as intellectual. This view reveals the necessity of an artistic aspect to a universe which is rational. It is the creative aspect of knowing which results in a quality of the object which we call beauty, a quality which gives us a peculiar kind of joy. The works of God which are pre-eminently beautiful are continued by the works of the human artist.

The scholastic theory offers solutions of several perennial problems, *e.g.* (*a*) that of the subjectivity or objectivity of beauty, and (*b*) that of the relation of art to morality. (*a*) We see that beauty is both the quality of an object and the activity of the subject, but even as dependent on the activity of a subject, it is never capricious, for it is rational and therefore social. Because it is objective, beauty should be embodied in a work of art capable of social appreciation; otherwise we may suspect the existence of an individual whim rather than of a rational intelligent activity. (*b*) While the artist

[1] *Art et Scolastique*, p. 60. Cf. Collingwood, *Speculum Mentis*, p. 16.
[2] *Art et Scholastic*, p. 124.

"as such" is non-moral, his duties as a human being pursue him even into the sphere of art.

Having established the possibility that Maritain's theory of art is one which applies to this world, it is natural to inquire how far it does in fact apply to the facts of art, especially to those of the present day in which we are vividly interested.

Ideally, a theory should be applicable to all facts of all periods; yet if the scholastic theory was based upon the facts of mediaeval art we may assume that it could be applied at least to them and would make these facts more clearly comprehensible—while if it could be applied with the same effect to contemporary art, this would help to establish it as a theory of universal value.

The quantity of material is too great for us to attempt to apply the theory to many particular instances; it is necessary therefore to attempt to discern some ruling tendency in modern art. This Maritain does when he says that his principles fit some artistic experiments of the present day often regarded as rash. For the scholastics, he declares, art consists not in making the spirit conform to the real, but rather the reverse; so that art, "considered apart and in its pure essence, only realizes all the perfection postulated by its nature by passing into pure Act. . . . Here is a metaphysical light cast upon the movement which bears, or which bore but yesterday, our epoch towards the research for *pure* music, *pure* painting, *pure* theatre, *pure* poetry. . . ."[1]

A few examples of this tendency may be given. What is intended by the work of Erik Satie in music? He wishes to compose a music existing for its own sake in pure and simple beauty, content with a meaning which is not conceptual or rather ideological, but—musical. This tendency clearly differentiates it from the programme-music of Wagner. The contemporary musician, who implicitly or explicitly agrees with the scholastic theory of art, sets Bach above even Beethoven.[2]

In painting, this modern tendency is particularly clear in the work of all those who assert that a painting has first of all to look like a painting. In an introduction to a collection of portraits of Maria Lani by different artists—a very interesting volume—Waldemar George writes: "Ce recueil est une contribution à la psycho-physiologie de l'art contemporain. Il prouve, une fois de plus, que le style et l'écriture d'une œuvre ne sont pas tributaires de la figuration et de l'observation, que l'art est une graphie mentale, qu'une volonté d'expression définie préexiste au travail mécanique de traduction et d'enregistrement de sensations visuelles."[3]

Maurice Denis, himself a painter, points out that a picture is a

[1] *Art et Scolastique*, p. 147.
[2] Cf. Cocteau, *Le Coq et l'Arlequin*, p. 51.
[3] *Maria Lani*, p. 20.

coloured surface before it is a woman or a warhorse or what not—a plane covered with colours assembled in a certain order.[1] A painting by Picasso, as Cocteau tells us, "is no mere decoration—an error into which the Cubists were liable to fall—but its resemblance to the objects to which it is related is of a purely pictorial kind. . . . For the *trompe-l'œil* he substitutes the *trompe l'esprit.* His picture is a picture. It lives by itself. It gives no information about anything else."[2] In the book of Portraits of Maria Lani we see to what different expressions the same object has given rise in the minds of various painters—Braque, Matisse, Cocteau, Papazoff, and many more, all painting portraits—not one of them gives a map with "one to one" relations to the original, but every one of them is "more true than the truth."[3]

In sculpture work of the same kind is being done, though on the whole sculptors have been slower than painters in getting away from the copy theory. But in such work as Zadkin's portrait bust of Maria Lani, and more clearly in certain pieces by Lipschitz, we find that subtle resemblance to the object of which Cocteau wrote. The not yet dead craze for the primitive—as shown in negro sculpture—is a witness to the same tendency. Negro sculpture shows—perhaps because the sculptor's tools were not fine enough to coerce his material—a sympathy for its limitations as well as its possibilities. Wood was not forced to look like flesh, even so far as this may be done. The modern sculptor has realized that his more efficient tools, his perfected technique, has betrayed the wood and stone on which he used them, and in betraying the material had killed the true spirit of the work of art and substituted for it the spirit of a waxworks show, appealing not to our intelligence, arousing not aesthetic emotion, but something different, at worst a sheerly sensuous pleasure properly belonging to the world of the original, at best an appreciation of skill such as we might accord to a clever cardsharper. The modern sculptor now seeks not to imitate but to create. In the work of Maillol, for example, by means of selection from nature, the "re-creation" of what he has observed "according to the law of just equilibrium and the expression of his proper genius," we discover "the classic process," claims Pierre Como.[4] The same has been said of that devoted sculptor of animals, François Pompon, whose Polar Bear is remembered by every visitor to the Luxembourg. He is classic, writes Des Courières; "linking up with the great tradition, the art of Pompon is distinctly architectural. . . . To read (his animals) is always easy and rational."[5] And the mere *claim* to be classic demonstrates an important tendency in this direction.

[1] *Théories.* [2] *Le Secret Professionnel,* p. 33. [3] Cf. *Ibid.,* p. 7.
[4] *Aristide Maillol.* [5] *François Pompon,* p. 6.

From sculpture the transition to architecture is easy. Much contemporary architecture does not deserve to be called "modern," for it is only a copy of older work in which too often principles are neglected and the outside only is forced into a superficial resemblance to the antique. The truly modern work has also the better claim to the title "classical," for in the spirit of the classic workers it is built according to principles implied by the purpose of the building and the nature of the material employed—from the inside to the outside. One of its best exponents writes: "It is Architecture to establish by means of brute materials, relations which arouse emotion."[1] It is order and harmony, it is the poetry which is over and above mere utility, but it is not to be mistaken for mere decoration.[2] The period in which all new churches in England and France are necessarily built at least to *look* like Gothic is passing away; newer harmonies, more comprehensible because arising from the problems of our own age, are born of new solutions. We are beginning to hate falsity and pretence, to delight in truth, and to realize that truth unadorned has its own beauty. This is a rediscovery of the classic secret which the mere copyists of Greek temples have yet to learn.

Contemporary prose and poetry exemplify the same return to the classic. It is difficult to decide which names should be mentioned as typical. Let us choose Paul Valéry, who is conscious of his art. Speaking of his poems, he is reported to have said: "I didn't write them—I tapped them out on my machine."[3] And one feels that he expects a conclusion to be drawn from this fact. The aspiration to order and clarity is well expressed in one of Paul Reverdy's *Poème en Prose*: "Une éclaircie avec du bleu dans le ciel, dans la forêt des clairières toutes vertes; mais dans la ville où le dessin nous emprisonne, l'arc du cercle du porche, les carrés des fenêtres et les losanges des toits. Des lignes, rien que des lignes, pour la commodité des bâtisses humaines. Dans ma tête des lignes, rien que des lignes; si je pouvais y mettre un peu d'ordre seulement." Max Jacob, himself a poet, equates form, power, reason, beauty.[4] And Cocteau, who is thinker, poet, and painter, writes more than once, "L'art, c'est la science faite chair."[5] "Form must be the form of mind."[6] "Not by the way of saying things, but by the way of thinking them, does it arise."[7] Men too often forget intelligence when they think of genius, he points out. "Now, in my opinion, intelligence does no harm to anything. Stendhal, Nietzsche, are of the type of intelligent genius."[8] And, finally, the key to all classic work—"The sense of hierarchy alone permits of healthy judgment."[9]

[1] Le Corbusier, *Vers une Architecture*, p. ix.
[2] *L'art décoratif d'aujourdhui, passim.*
[3] *La Renaissance*, décembre 1930, p. 360.
[4] Cf. *Art Poétique*, p. 50.
[5] *Le Coq et l'Arlequin*, p. 11.
[6] *Le Secret Professionnel*, p. 71.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 76.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 34.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

The perfection of modern French prose is found in the work of Raymond Radiguet.[1] Guillaume Apollinaire is both poet and prose writer of classic tendency; the poet Péguy should not be forgotten, nor the large group of poets influenced by Mallarmé and known as the Symbolists. The defenders of the classic may claim the support of most of these writers, although the poets who carry the desire to "create an emotion in the soul"—and that only—trample on the intelligence in a way which the classic spirit does not allow. This example may well, however, be called both modern and classic:—

À la fin tu es las de ce monde ancien
Bergère ô tour Eiffel le troupeau des ponts bêle ce matin
Tu en as assez de vivre dans l'antiquité presque romaine
La nuit s'éloigne aussi qu'une belle Métive
C'est Ferdine la fausse ou Léa l'attentive
Et tu bois cet alcool brûlant comme ta vie
Ta vie que tu bois comme une eau-de-vie.[2]

Classic, too, the quotation made above from the work of Reverdy; but is not this, although by the same writer, too emotionally disturbing without touching the intelligence?

La lueur plus loin que la tête
le saut du cœur
Sur la pente où l'air route sa voix
les rayons de la roue
le soleil dans l'ornière.

Au carrefour
près du talus
une prière
Quelques mots que l'on n'entend pas
Plus près du ciel

Et sur ses pas
le dernier carré de lumière.[3]

The Symbolists, says V. E. Michelet,[4] desire their words to wake in the soul of reader or listener a manifold and infinite sentiment. "They claim to unchain the latent powers of the Word." Is this "classic"? To refer for a moment to Gertrude Stein, who surely is aiming at the same thing, the pages on *Italians* rouse feelings *and* remain intelligible; they could thus claim to be classic; but many other pages, *e.g.* on *France*, sacrifice intelligibility for the sake of the emotional force of words.[5]

The theatre offers another field for investigation: Maeterlinck,

[1] *Le Bal du Comte Orgèle.*
[2] Apollinaire, *Alcools*, p. 15.
[3] Poem entitled *Adieu.*
[4] *La Poésie Symboliste* (1908).
[5] *Geography and Plays*, p. 46 and p. 32.

Claudel, Ghéon, Cocteau—none of these names suggests great innovation in the technique of the theatre as such, apart from the value of poetry or thought. The cinematograph was developing a peculiar art which has perhaps been temporarily checked by the appearance of the "talkies," which have once more assimilated it to the stage. A competent critic might indicate the classic development of a "movie"; another might conceivably argue that yet another art, dancing, had never been anything but classic.

Perhaps enough has been said to show that Maritain has grounds for affirming that there is a classic tendency in modern art. His opponents may, however, argue that it is not characteristically modern; not only has there *always* been a classic tendency, even in the nineteenth century, but also there is at the present time a romantic tendency. It would take too long to go into this even to the extent followed in the search for the classic; but one or two witnesses may be quoted: Julien Benda writes in *Belphégor* that in art modern French society looks for "the occasion of an emotion" instead of a "pleasure of the mind (*esprit*)." It has a passion for mysticism and a "horror of the rational," which was evident before the war, and—he thinks—has not lessened.[1] He mentions as artists belonging to this group Péguy and Rolland, as its thinker, Bergson. Impressionism and futurism are romantic—even cubism can be considered a romanticism of reason. Verlaine, Barrès, Baudelaire are romantics. Modern aesthetics are made for women, who like emotional literature; only Anatole France has not given way to them, and his reputation has consequently suffered. The so-called classicism of Charles Maurras is not really classic, for it is affected and false. And these aesthetics of emotion will, in Benda's opinion, continue—"This without denying the probability of some return shock of violent "classicism," which will itself be a mode and indeed a particular form . . . of the need for excess."[2] The work of Maritain and of the artists admired by him would probably be regarded by Benda as examples of this mode of being excessive.[3]

In Bremond's work, again, and in the work of those writers who write "poésie pure" in his sense of the words, we find a romantic school unashamed of being romantic. Poetry *is* romanticism. And Bremond claims that "the great romantics are admired more than ever, but they are baptized classic."[4] And he claims as enemies of rationalism Plato, St. Thomas, Bergson, and Maritain, who might be surprised to find themselves grouped together. But just what is meant by "rationalism"? Bremond himself says: "The music of a strophe or of a period is a *pleasure of the mind*, much more than of

[1] *Op. cit.*, preface, and p. 1. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 174.
[3] Cf. P. M. Jones, *Tradition and Barbarism, passim.*
[4] *Pour le romantisme*, p. viii.

the senses. . . ."[1] Whereas Maurice Denis, who should be on the side of Maritain, writes like a romantic that the end of the work of art is to rouse an emotion in the soul.[2]

This confusion is enough to make a philosopher wary in his use of the terms "classic" and "romantic." Yet like many other standards around which battle has waged for years, it is hard to do without them. The confusion has to be removed by a definition. The definition by Marcel Coulon, which gives the victory at least in words straightway to classicism, is perhaps too summary. The classic, he asserts, is the "veritable," the romantic, the "lying."[3] But the victory is better worth gaining and scarcely less speedily gained if with Maritain we consider the classic as that which on account of its harmony and proportion appeals to the intellect and delights it. For such a definition of the classic is at the same time a definition of beauty, which, according to St. Thomas, on being seen pleases by reason of its order, integrity, splendour, or clarity.

Real art is, if Maritain be right, classic art. The real art of any period including the present—in which he descries much worthy of the name—is classic; the romantic is not art; it tickles the senses without stirring the intelligence.

The thomist theory of art does not therefore imply a return to the Middle Ages. Its principles can be realized in any period. Maritain is encouraged by the contemporary emphasis on the importance of workmanship made by such painters as Renoir and Blanche; this was characteristic also of the Middle Ages, and judging from the work, seems to have been characteristic also of Greek art. It shows a sympathy for the material of the work of art, and this leads to serenity in development and to artistic "truth"; the mind of the beholder is not dazzled by a mere *tour de force* such as the famous Laocoon in its marble contortion; all is logical and logically fit for its position as in the architecture of the Parthenon or of the latest skyscraper by Le Corbusier. The old Greek and mediaeval conception of *function* has been revived by modern artists. Art is no longer "for art's sake," except in the negative sense, that, *e.g.*, a poem or a painting does not exist in order to tell a story or preach a moral maxim. It is aware of its place in the community. The art of to-day aims at being logical and therefore is essentially intellectual; it reacts against emotion and sentimentalism and the external interests which often make for romantic inspiration. But the intellectual content, the *idea* of the work of art is an artistic idea, not necessarily something which can be stated in words, or expressed in any way other than that chosen by the artist. Hence excessive rationalism is avoided; and the work of art is not a copy; its essence

[1] *Pour le romantisme*, p. 87. [2] *Nouvelles Théories*, p. 180.
[3] *Au cœur de Verlaine et de Rimbaud*, preface, p. 13.

is not representational—art is the only creation possible to man, his means of continuing God's work.

Our conclusion may be briefly stated: If we assume that the world is a rational world, one in which there are eternal principles variously exemplified, then the scholastic theory of art as expounded by Maritain is at least possibly true. More than that, it has been shown to apply to all classical art, and indeed to all art; for romanticism, so far as it is art, is also "classical." The romantic is a misinterpretation of the classic. Therefore the scholastic theory of art must be considered a contemporary theory.

THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC

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It is well known to readers of the *Republic* that, according to Plato's representation, a casual meeting of several friends develops into a *sederunt* for the express purpose of finding a solution to the question, what is justice? The question has its origin in the remark of the aged Cephalus, quoting Pindar, that whoever lives a life of justice and holiness,

> Sweet hope, the nourisher of age, his heart
> Delighting, with him lives; which most of all
> Governs the many veering thoughts of man.

The subsequent argument and treatment of the problem have been so frequently and ably discussed as to make any further discussion seem commonplace and superfluous. The only plea that can be offered here for returning to a well-worn theme is that the *Republic* is so stimulating and provocative of thought that it will always repay effort expended upon it. The discussion carried on in the *Republic* is many-sided in its nature and strikes different minds in various ways.

The point which is to be considered here is a limited one; and though at first sight it seems a minor one, yet when carefully examined it will be seen to be much more significant in its relevance. The *Republic*, like many other of the Platonic dialogues, introduces analogies from the arts; and this is particularly marked in the case of the first and part of the second books. What, then, is to be considered here is the bearing of these analogies from the arts upon the course of the argument and finally upon the solution offered concerning the nature of justice. The aim of the present paper is to show that in the *Republic* the course of the argument leads away from the conception of justice as an art, that conception being indefensible and based upon a misunderstanding of the question at issue, and, instead, proceeds towards the elucidation and defence of the view that justice is the principle which co-ordinates different arts.

The method of discussion employed is well known. Definitions of justice are proffered, and they are taken by Socrates and carefully analysed in order that their tenability may be found. When one is found indefensible, it is rejected. Though the result is thus negative,

the discussion has not been fruitless, for, besides conducing to intellectual clearness, the course of the analysis serves to suggest a fresh possible solution. Nevertheless, the preliminary part of the inquiry ends negatively, for no satisfactory answer to the question has been found. That justice is truth-speaking or payment of debts, that it is the giving to each man his due, or doing good to friends and injury to enemies, that justice is the interest of the stronger or of the ruler, that justice is something artificial or conventional—all such views are untenable.

The impression which the *Republic* is apt to make upon many readers at first is unfavourable. The procedure of Socrates is felt to be somehow unsatisfactory. They have a secret, if not openly expressed, sympathy with Thrasymachus in his outburst against Socrates. Their attitude is quite well stated in the sixth book by Adeimantus. "Indeed, Socrates, no one is able to contradict you as to these things; but all who hear you at any time advancing what you do at present, are somehow affected in this manner. Being led off a little by your reasoning on each question, through their inexperience in this method of question and answer, when all these littles are collected together, at the close of your reasonings, they reckon that the mistake appears considerable, and the contrary of their first concessions; and like those who play at talus with such as are dexterous, but are themselves unskilful, they are in the end shut up, and can do no more."

It is also true that Socrates seems to readers of the *Republic* at first to fall into a serious contradiction. He is at great pains to refute the doctrine of Thrasymachus that justice is the rule of the stronger for their own advantage, and that hence rulers rule in their own interest, while later in the *Republic* he declares that the source of all instability in the community lies in the fact that rulers who have families or who are owners of property tend to think first of their own family or property interests. In consequence of this a communistic scheme is formulated whereby the source of disorder in the State will be eliminated. The behaviour of the rulers in looking after their own interests is stated by Socrates as a fact evidenced by experience; and it is this experienced fact on which Thrasymachus undoubtedly bases his own theory of justice.

It is quite easy, however, to clear Socrates of the charge of contradiction. He can quite well admit that, as a matter of fact, rulers do govern for their own advantage, and yet refuse to accept the definition of Thrasymachus. One point that might be, and is in fact one of the important points, raised and discussed is the meaning to be attached to the phrase "their own advantage." What is a person's own advantage? Wherein does it lie? A second point, and one immediately relevant to the purpose of the present paper, is that

for Socrates the experienced matter of fact is a fact of *mis*government and thus of *injustice*; and what he is maintaining is that justice cannot be defined by reference to instances which are really cases of injustice. The fulfilment of a function cannot be equated to the non-fulfilment of the function in question. And Thrasymachus has fallen into this confusion.

The refutation of the view of Thrasymachus, as well as the refutation of the other definitions of justice, is effected by means of analogies from the arts—the art of medicine, the art of the shepherd, the art of navigation, and so on. They are used to elucidate the validity of successive definitions of justice. Their use gives to the argument a certain character, one almost of quibbling, with which the average modern reader is impatient. But this impatience arises from a failure to appreciate properly the level on which the argument is conducted.

In the first place, the definitions of justice propounded and examined are all ordinary commonplaces of unenlightened and unreflective current moral opinion. The exception to this, it might be held, is the doctrine put forward by Thrasymachus and the theory formulated by Glaucon. These two views may be considered as laying claim to being scientific and philosophical, seeing that they were maintained and defended in Sophistic circles. But, on the other hand, if, as has been held, the power of the Sophists and the appeal which they made to the mass of the people were due to the fact that they were astute enough to gauge mass-opinion and to restate that opinion, though in a more attractive rhetorical form, to the multitude, then there is no special reason to differentiate between the views. The argument is conducted by Socrates upon the basis of the prevalent assumptions associated with these definitions. The use of analogies from the arts is quite in accordance with these assumptions; and it is significant that none of the audience, not even Thrasymachus, calls in question their use. There is no evidence that Socrates himself really believes in the usefulness of these analogies for a finally satisfactory solution of the question concerning the nature of justice. It is true that he does make use of them, but in doing so he is meeting his opponents on their own ground and by arguments which are comprehensible by them. He is confounding them out of their own mouth.

In the second place, while it is possible that the tone of the discussion is determined by considerations of literary presentation, the intention being to show the skill of Socrates in refuting opponents, yet it is more probable that the discussion has the definitely serious purpose of overthrowing prevalent conceptions and of preparing the way for a truer conception and a more adequate statement of its nature. As is shown in the case of the definition

suggested by Thrasymachus, the analogy used can be turned right round and made to refute the view of justice which it was intended to support. The arts of the shepherd, of the medical man, of the pilot, are shown to imply that persons fulfilling these functions, and hence persons fulfilling the function of government, seek not their own advantage but the advantage of those on whom their skill is directed. It is true that Thrasymachus tries to rule out any reference to "what ought to be"; but Socrates insists on tying him down to his own expressed principle that *function* must be considered strictly in terms of function. The skill involved in, and necessary to, the pursuit of an art is, further, neutral in regard to the use to which it is put; the efficient medical man, while skilled for the purpose of healing the body, can equally use that skill for effecting the death of a patient, and may thus prove the most efficient murderer. Now, it was a prevalent view that politics or government was an art; and consequently the careful, and what seems to many the tedious, examination of these analogies shows that something is lacking in the generally accepted conception of politics; for if it is so understood, government can be equally just and unjust, this implying that government and misgovernment are one and the same thing.

In the third place, the nature of the discussion is limited by the intellectual level of the members present at the debate. They show no comprehension of the real nature of the question at issue, and are not aware of the kind of answer required. Thrasymachus falls into error and is unable to stand up to Socrates because he, equally with the others, fails in this respect. Socrates, on the other hand, understands the problem fully and conceives it in a totally different manner from the others; and it is because he does so and is aware of the formal characteristics which the answer must possess that he is able to play with the various proffered solutions and to throw his opponents into intellectual confusion. This is really the most vital feature of the preliminary discussion in the *Republic*, and it is this which accounts for the helplessness of those taking part in the examination of the problem.

The type of question asked, namely, what is justice? is similar to that of questions raised in other dialogues. It is analogous to the question, what is knowledge? raised and considered in the *Theaetetus*. In the latter dialogue Theaetetus at first misunderstands the question, just as the various characters do in the *Republic* concerning justice. He gives the answer that "geometry and all the things you spoke of just now—and also cobblery and the other craftsmen's arts, each and all of these are nothing else but knowledge." But Socrates draws his attention to the fact that he was asked for one thing and that he has stated a variety of things. "The question, Theaetetus, was not

to what knowledge belongs, nor how many the forms of knowledge are; for we do not wish to number them, but to find out what knowledge itself really is. . . . If any one should ask us about some common everyday thing, for instance, what clay is, and we should reply that it is the potters' clay and the oven-makers' clay and the brickmakers' clay, should we not be ridiculous?" Theaetetus is brought to see what exactly is asked, being helped by the study of problems and the search for solutions in the course of his own mathematical investigations.

In the *Republic* the nature of the question at issue and the kind of answer required are not explicitly raised and discussed as they are in the *Theaetetus*. The reason why they are not raised, when by so doing Socrates could have clarified the discussion, cannot be stated. It may be a matter of literary presentation or of expository method, or, more probably, it may be that the point would have been too difficult for the comprehension of the hearers and the procedure is adapted to their intelligence. It has to be remembered, on the other hand, that Theaetetus is represented as a brilliant young mathematician, and that Socrates considers his ability such as to enable him to appreciate and understand the point raised. Socrates never points out that the definitions offered concerning justice are not answers to the real question asked, even though they are on a level with, and as ridiculous as, the answer at first volunteered by Theaetetus to the question asked him. To say that justice is paying one's debts, or that it is doing good to one's friends and injury to one's enemies, is on a level with saying that clay is potters' clay. The proffered definitions are all instances of justice. The answer amounts to nothing else than that to pay one's debts is just or to do good to one's friends and injury to one's enemies is just, and carries one no nearer to a conception of the nature of justice. Even if it is admitted that the instances cited are really instances of justice, there still remains the question as to what is the nature of this *justness* which makes the payment of one's debts just. There are many specific acts which can be called just; but what is wanted is an answer to the question, what is the nature of that quality which they all possess and in virtue of which they are said to be just? Because of this misconception of the question at issue, Socrates directs his criticism mainly to showing that the instance is not an instance of justice or that it is not the sole instance or that it is an instance only in a partial sense; and, by doing so, he makes clear the inadequacy of any answer which consists of a definition by means of instances.

This misunderstanding of the question shows itself in the tendency to regard justice as an art. In view of prevalent conceptions, it is the easiest and most natural way of viewing the matter. The question, what is justice? is accordingly regarded as being identical with the

question, what is the just life? and the answer to the latter question is considered to be that it is an art; and as such it is held to be characterizable in terms of specific acts or activities. This is the line along which the minds of those taking part in the discussion move. It is quite otherwise, however, with Socrates, for whom the two questions are distinct. He is not seeking primarily an answer to the question, what is the just life? What he is seeking to discover is the nature of the *just* inherent in the just life. Hence, analogies from the arts are of no avail in this connection; for a similar question can be raised regarding each art. In all cases the question is one concerning the principle of the art, not the principle of an art in general but of each specific art. Each art has necessarily its own distinctive principle, in virtue of which it is a distinct art. The just life, conceived as an art, has its distinctive principle; and this principle is justice. The use of analogies from other arts obviously, therefore, will not serve to elucidate this principle called justice. The problem of justice is analogous to the problem of the nature of the principle of any other art. Justice is not analogous to an art but to the principle of an art. In the same way as the art of medicine is the fulfilment of the function of healing, and this function has to be understood by reference to the conception of health, so the just life has to be considered as the fulfilment of the function of being just, and this function has to be understood by reference to the conception of justice. For Socrates, in contrast to the others, justice is the principle of a life that is just. In Platonic terminology justice is a Form, and the task is to apprehend the Form of the just life or that which makes a life a just life or informs it with justice. As there is only one way of discovering the nature of an art or function, namely, by analysis of the art or function in question, so there is only one way of discovering the nature of justice, namely, by an analysis of life, that is, of the individual life and of social life.

Accordingly, in the *Republic*, the discussion drops the notion that the question can be satisfactorily answered on the basis of analogies from the arts, and proceeds to an analysis of human and social life. This does not mean that analogies are no longer used, for resort is frequently made to one analogy or another. What it does mean is that the problem of justice is freed from the confusion arising from the mistaken identification of justice with an art, while analogies continue to be used in so far as they help towards a solution by clarifying the issue.

Life is resolved into three main types of functions, the fulfilment of each of which constitutes an art. Life thus manifests itself as a series of arts, and each of them has its distinctive principle. The manner in which the virtues are treated on the basis of this analysis seems at first peculiar. Wisdom is declared to be the virtue of the

administrative or governing class; and this means that the function of knowing is distinctive of that class. Nevertheless, the productive arts, which are followed by the third or labour-class, cannot be carried on without knowledge, and some form of knowledge must be assigned to the artisans. This, of course, is recognized in the *Republic*, where the knowledge or wisdom embodied in the administrators is expressly distinguished from the kind of knowledge requisite for the artisan. Something similar can be said regarding the virtue of courage which is characteristic of the soldier-class, for some kind of courage must be possessed also by the artisans. The virtues which are discussed are relative to the various functions, not in their technical but in their social aspect. What is being examined is the sense in which a *city* can be said to be wise or courageous or temperate.

The method of analysis is always faced with the danger of leading to a number of distinct elements which come to be regarded as isolated and independent. The *Republic* never falls into this error. The analysis is so carried out as to emphasize the fact that the several classes are social classes or classes composing the city, and that the various functions are varying ways in which the life of the city is manifested. The significance of the virtues depends wholly upon the fact of specialization of function; and, from the side of the individual, upon the threefold division of human nature. Difficulties, of course, may be felt with regard to the completeness of the analogy between the city and the individual, for while the individual is held to be tri-functional, he is, as a member of the city, treated as uni-functional. The point, however, which is important is that the virtues are to be understood only on the basis of the division of labour and specialization of function.

Wisdom is definitely stated to be the virtue of a special class. This might suggest that the class was to be identified with the art of knowledge; but the *Republic* does not make any such identification, although it might occur to one that there would be required a class whose specialty was scientific and philosophic research. The highest class is identified with the art of statesmanship, and the wisdom in question is the knowledge requisite for the exercise of this art. Considered in this light this wisdom is a technical affair, just as technical as is the knowledge required by any productive artisan. The same applies to courage, which is the virtue of another special class. It is otherwise with temperance, for "its operation is unlike that of courage and wisdom, which residing in separate parts respectively made the city, the one wise and the other brave. That is not the way of temperance, for it extends literally throughout the entire gamut. . . . So that we should be quite right in affirming this unanimity to be temperance, the concord of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the

individual." Temperance is thus not a virtue of a distinct art or of a social class; its significance lies in its expressing a relation between different social classes and their different functions. The meaning of temperance, which, as discussed in the *Republic*, has been felt by many students to be with difficulty distinguishable from justice, thus presupposes the distinction of functions into higher and lower, and is to be expressed as the subordination of the lower to the higher, based on the recognition by each class that such subordination is right. Temperance in the same sense is held to apply to the individual, although here it is impossible to speak of appetite agreeing with reason in the belief that the higher ought to rule, in any sense analogous to that in which the members of two social classes can agree in a common belief. Nevertheless, in spite of difficulties of detail, the meaning of the doctrine is clear, namely, that the satisfactions of appetite should be sought within the limits of the laws or principles formulated by reason.

Justice, as described in the *Republic*, though different from temperance, has certain features in common with it. There is no special class, whose virtue is justice or whose art is the just art. The theory of justice and the theory of temperance both alike imply that there is no distinct art of justice or of temperance. A just man is not to be understood as one who follows the just art, as a shepherd is understood as one who follows the shepherd's art and a medical man as one who follows the medical art. There is no specific art, the virtue of which is justice, in a way analogous to that in which courage is a virtue identified with the art of war or the soldier's art. Hence it is not merely impossible to define justice in terms of art and not enough to point out that such definition involves a confusion between an art and the principle of an art; it now appears that justice cannot be defined as the principle of any distinct and specific art. Justice is essentially relational in character. If the nature of man were utterly simple, or if there were only one social class or one function, there would be no such thing as justice. In this respect justice is like temperance; but, unlike it, it does not rest upon any distinction between higher and lower functions. What the conception of justice implies is that the nature of each art is capable of being defined and the boundaries of each art delimited, that the members of each class are capable of understanding this definition and delimitation, and that they recognize and accept the duty of devoting themselves to activities within these limits. When a man and a class so devote themselves, there is justice within the city. When the various parts of a man's nature fulfil each its distinctive function within the limits prescribed by reason in virtue of its knowledge and insight, that man is just.

The wisdom which is spoken of in the *Republic* as a virtue, while in

one sense it is the technical knowledge of the statesman's art, is primarily the knowledge which is necessary for the organization of the different arts or social functions into an harmoniously working system. Justice may be described as the spirit in which each art is carried on; and, while it is distinct from the arts in their technical aspects, yet it is a feature of them in so far as they have social significance. The conception of justice is designed to emphasize the fact that each art or function has a social value in addition to its purely technical character of efficiency; or, if the term efficiency is to be used, justice may be described as social efficiency, expressed by way of every man "minding his own business." In one respect justice does mean increased technical efficiency; but in another and more important respect it means social efficiency in the form of social stability and welfare.

In Platonic terminology justice is a Form in which each class or each art participates when it carries on or is carried on under the conditions which serve to define justice. But it is a Form which is transcendent to any class or any specific art. It is a Form in which the city participates. Along with wisdom, courage, and temperance, it is a component of goodness; and hence in its turn participates in the Form of the Good.

In several of Plato's dialogues there is a discussion as to whether goodness or virtue is teachable—a discussion which involves the doctrine, associated with the name of Socrates, that virtue is knowledge. The treatment of the question will be confined to the subordinate point, whether and in what sense justice is teachable. It is obvious, as a result of the preceding discussion, that the matter needs clarification. Justice may be taken to mean the Form of justice or the principle of just acts. It is about justice in this sense that the *Republic* is concerned. Justice may, however, be taken to mean a just life; and the question is then whether men can be taught to live justly. In the light of what has been already said a just life is not a specific art and hence cannot be taught in the sense in which any specific art, can be taught. The claim, for instance, made by Sophists, to teach virtue, was based upon the analogy between virtue and the arts. The departure from this analogy in the *Republic* and the advance to another view of justice requires the reconsideration of the question from another angle. Yet the *Republic* very definitely expresses the belief that justice in the sense of a Form or principle can be taught, for this is the aim of the educational curriculum; and though it cannot be taught to or apprehended by all, yet there are a select few to or by whom it can be so. This implies that in regard to the multitude justice is not teachable. The many cannot be taught the principles underlying virtuous conduct; and hence, even if the just life is considered as an art, which can be taught

only in the sense that a man is instructed in the principles of the art, the just life cannot be taught to the many.

In the light of this, accordingly, if virtue in the full and perfect sense is the characteristic quality of that life lived in accordance with the knowledge of, and insight into, the principles which underlie virtuous action, or, in other words, consciously moulded by the Forms of justice, temperance, and so on, then virtue in that sense is realizable only in the lives of philosophers; and the virtue characteristic of the other classes is something falling short of this perfection. The distinction between the two is that between a virtue that is knowledge and a virtue that is belief or opinion or faith. This distinction, of course, rests upon the consideration whether the individual does or does not possess knowledge; and in the latter case the individual has to live his life within the framework prescribed by those philosophic individuals who do possess the knowledge. If the matter is considered, on the other hand, from the side of the city as a whole in contrast to the merely individual aspect, then, since the framework is the embodiment of wisdom or knowledge, the virtue of the artisan or of the artisan class, as well as of the soldier and the soldier class, is knowledge, not of course directly of the individuals or classes concerned, but indirectly of the administrative class. Hence the virtue of the city is the knowledge or wisdom of the city.

VALUES AND THEIR RELATIONS

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I

(1) The meaning of the word philosophy, "love of wisdom," the dominant interest of Socrates, the developments of Greek philosophy in Epicureanism and Stoicism, Kant's reliance on the practical reason as a clue to reality—all justify the direction of attention in this essay from the abstract theoretical to the concrete practical aspects of thought. Not that the two can or ought to be separated from, or opposed to one another; for human personality is a unity, and theory and practice must act and react the one on the other. The familiar saying: "More harm is wrought for want of thought than even want of heart," indicates that in moral activity understanding of consequences is no less necessary than goodness of intention or motive. The preacher who declared that he was an Agnostic in mind, and a Christian in heart, if he really knew himself and was not deceiving himself with a rhetorical phrase, was in a perilous and unsatisfactory state of mental equilibrium. The need of mutual adjustment is expressed in Tennyson's well-known lines:

> Let knowledge grow from more to more,
> But more of reverence in us dwell;
> That mind and soul according well,
> May make one music as before.

As truth is reckoned as an ideal, one of the values, and truthfulness in the pursuit or the communication of knowledge is recognized as a virtue, the closeness of the connection is evident. A man must think truly to live rightly; and conversely I believe that a man must live rightly to think truly. It may be that in the sciences, a man may observe facts, discover causes, trace laws accurately and correctly, irrespective of his character; but in philosophy, the solution of the problem of reality, his moral and religious discernment is no less potent an influence than mental acuteness. It is true, at least as concerns the values, that if a man will do the will, he will know the doctrine. Here the "selective interest," the "personal equation" cannot be ignored. To think truly in the conduct of life is the virtue of wisdom, the discernment of the good ends, from which we may distinguish prudence as the discovery of the right means to those ends. Knowledge and thought cannot be excluded from the guidance of life, the direction of conduct, the formation of character. So also

in vindicating the claim of the values—truth, beauty, goodness—for full and due consideration in any world-view, any metaphysic, we must not isolate them from actuality, facts, causes, laws as science may know and understand them. It is not as ignoring, nor depreciating the contribution of the inquiring intellect, that I here turn to the manifold interests and activities of human personality.

(2) When in 1899 I published my book on *The Ritschlian Theology*, one of the features of that theology which was being most fiercely assailed, because most thoroughly misunderstood, and which I had to defend, and I think effectively defended by simply expounding, was the theory of *value-judgments*. Into that controversy it is not necessary for my present purpose to enter; I mention the fact only as indicating the starting-point of my interest in and investigation of the conception of value. A fuller subsequent study of the subject appeared in my book, *The Christian Certainty amid the Modern Perplexity*, pp. 230–278; and some facts from this may here be quoted. Otto Ritschl, the son of the founder of the school, Albrecht Ritschl, in a historical survey "traces the idea of value-judgments to Luther, but the name to Kant. In Luther's view, what distinguished religious from all other knowledge was the incomparable interest of the objects of faith for the religious subject. . . . Kant made a distinction between 'relative value, that is, a price,' and 'inner values, that is, worthiness.' " To character alone Kant assigned this objective value, and to beauty only a subjective as "simply pleasing." He did not coin the phrase value-judgment, but a similar one in aesthetics, *taste-judgment*. Herbart distinguished 'theoretical representations,' the subject of which is regarded as an indifferent one, from 'aesthetic judgments,' expressing 'spontaneous involuntary preference or rejection.' De Wette, in developing the ideas of Kant, recognized this process of valuation as a motive to action, distinguished different stages of it from the sensuous to the spiritual, and practically identified religious faith with 'the highest and purest feeling of value.' He does not, however, use the term value-judgments. "Lotze has rendered the greatest service in the development of the theory. He affirms that the value or the valuelessness cannot belong to things in themselves, but exists only in the form of a feeling of pleasure or pain, experienced by a spirit capable of feeling; that in this capacity of valuation by the feelings the subject has 'as authoritative a revelation of the purpose of the world' as the laws of reasoning afford, an indispensable instrument of experience; that the world of forms is to be distinguished from the world of values, which may be identified with the world of ends." Further we need not trace this history.

(3) The statement of Lotze's view raises a question which must be dealt with before we can look more closely at the values themselves,

a problem in epistemology. Lotze's identification of the sense of value, not with objective fact but subjective feeling, would seem to forbid our regarding the sense of value as a clue to reality; but he himself removes this prohibition when he affirms that we have here an "authoritative revelation of the purpose of the world." The value which in a judgment of value the subject assigns to the object is not merely subjective; it is objective in so far as it reveals the teleological significance of reality. "Truth, beauty, goodness" are included in the purpose of the world. In Ritschl's use of the value-judgment there was this objective reference. When he stated that Christian faith by a value-judgment affirmed the divinity of Christ, he was not playing with words; he was not denying that for such faith Christ was really divine, but only that we can apprehend that divinity because He has for us the value of God, is to us and does for us what God alone can be and do. Without pursuing this epistemological inquiry any further, I may state that for thirty years as a teacher of philosophy I have maintained that the aesthetic, the moral, and the religious valuations are as necessary and legitimate avenues of approach to reality, the ultimate nature of the Universe, as is the speculative reason or scientific understanding. Facts, causes, laws are apprehended by the human mind; and I do not see any good reason for assigning an exclusive authority to the detached mind and for denying a like authority to the whole personality.

II

It is usual to identify the values with the ideals—truth, beauty, goodness; but it seems to me that on the one hand an extension of the recognised values, and on the other a unification of them, are desirable, and I shall endeavour to show some reasons for these proposals. (1) It is surely throughout the whole range of human personality that values may be recognized. The old practical dualism of body and soul has been generally abandoned, even where a difference of soul from body is still theoretically maintained. The maxim *mens sana in corpore sano* is increasingly becoming the guiding principle of not only morals, but legislation and administration. The adequate and appropriate satisfaction of the physical necessities, the complete protection as far as can be of the organism against disease, the preservation of life from accident or any form of premature death—these are being recognized as social obligations. The dependence of mental capacity, and even moral conduct and character on the conditions of the body, are being insisted on by physiology and psychology. That personality may realize its ideals, there are organic conditions to be fulfilled. Sick bodies have sometimes been tenanted (if the metaphor, which is no dogma, may be allowed) by

saintly souls; and great and good men have sometimes come out of the slums; but these exceptional cases are not now regarded as a justification for the neglect of health and housing. While there can be no rigid rules about food, clothing, shelter—the material bases of human life—and individual need, taste, and means must be taken into account, does not our increasing knowledge of what man as a living organism needs, and our growing sense of social responsibility, justify the demand that a *minimum* standard of physical well-being, as high as the available resources allow, shall be recognised as a primary moral obligation by any community making pretensions to be civilised?

(*a*) Accordingly I should like to include *utility* among the values to be recognized. Croce places economics alongside of but *subordinate* to ethics as the forms of expression of the practical reason. But I should not dream of handing over the value of utility to the "tender mercies" of *economics*, as that science has hitherto been pursued. From the standpoint of utility in the sense here given to it, the science has come up for judgment and sentence. The principles which it has enunciated, and the practices it has sanctioned, have brought industry and commerce to an *impasse*, out of which the economists are at their wit's end to find a way of escape. I can imagine an economics which could take its place alongside of aesthetics, ethics, and logic as a normative science, as a guidance to the realization of this value of *utility*. It is because the science has been guided by a false conception of the end, that this disaster has come upon the world. Not the maximum production of wealth with the minimum employment of labour is the goal toward which the course of industry should be directed; but the optimum division of wealth for the optimum enjoyment of life is the value to be realized. Selfishness as motive, and strife as method—that is the plain English of the description of our society as acquisitive and competitive. It is the conception and estimate of human personality as a whole in all relations which must prescribe to *economics* the end, for which it must seek to discover the means.

(*b*) We must once for all repudiate the claim sometimes made for economics as for politics of *autonomy*. In industry, the application of human labour to natural resources to meet human needs, we are primarily concerned with the motives, purposes, interests, and activities of human beings—and nothing man is or does can claim exemption from the judgment of morality; and thus industry no less than government must recognize ends of human life of supreme and universal authority. Nor can this challenge be evaded by what seems to me one of the most foolish and futile objections, that there are economic laws as rigid as the natural which must be obeyed. This argument, which I have heard fall from the lips of a bishop,

shows a misunderstanding of what is meant by natural laws; these are not commands which physical phenomena obey (it is a poetic licence to describe the stars as virtuously continuing in their prescribed orbits), but descriptions of narrower or wider uniformities in the necessary sequences or co-existences of phenomena. Should we be able to determine the end to which industry should be directed, and should economics then be able to determine the ways in which all industrial activities should be directed so that these may serve as means to that end, then should we have laws in the proper sense to be obeyed, but these laws could not be independent of the material which is adapted by labour for human needs, nor of the human agents in the production of wealth. There are limits to the fertility of the soil; a bad harvest affects the grain available; the habits of industry or thrift of a people have a bearing on its industrial efficiency. I have not yet found, nor can there be, an economic law, which hangs as it were in mid-air, between nature and man; and a close scrutiny shows that these laws are either quantitative conditions in the material, or qualitative conditions in man, needs, motives, interests. As I have pursued this subject into greater detail elsewhere, I am content here to urge a twofold conclusion, that utility here defined should be more fully recognized as a value, and that the normative science of economics should be revised with this enlarged conception of utility as its guiding principle.

(2) If we regard the recognized value of *goodness* as including the quality of *social relations* as well as the quality of *individual* conduct, then the proposal I have to submit falls to the ground; but it does seem to me that we can distinguish between the quality of individual conduct in social relations and the quality of social relations as so constituted. We need not commit ourselves to any assumption of the common soul of a society as above and beyond the individual souls which constitute it, and yet maintain that something new does *emerge* in social relations as a society becomes more fully a community of interests, activities, and institutions, just as new qualities emerge in water which had not been known in the gases composing it. If a society is more than a sum of individuals, if these individuals become more in themselves as they widen and deepen their social relations, if there is an *esprit de corps*, a loyalty, a patriotism, a devotion, in which individual lives experience their unity—surely we may here recognize a value, and seek a name for it. And what fitter name for it can be chosen than *love*? It has long seemed to me that to treat love as one of the forms of goodness in conduct or character is to give it too poor a content. As I think it should be conceived, it is the whole human personality giving itself to and finding itself in another. There is a judgment of the value of the other as human personality even as the lover values himself.

There is a sentiment of interest in another, which makes the weal or woe, the unworthiness or worth of that other a sorrow or a joy as one's very own. And consequently there will be action for the good of the other corresponding to that value, and measured by that interest. A society realizes the ideal of community, of common life fulfilled in common good, as love is the bond binding the members to one another. One hesitates about suggesting that the normative science for a society, so constituted by love, should be *politics*, because the actuality of politics seems the contradiction of such an ideal, because it is doubtful whether we have any such body of principle in this sphere as could be dignified by the title science, and because the word suggests *government* as its sphere. However necessary and important the State is for the regulation of the manifold interests and activities which compose the life of a society, for the harmonizing of their competing and even conflicting claims, yet in the measure that the society realized its ideal would the function of government as coercion fall into the background. Augustine's title, *The City of God*, might be cited as a reason for trying to redeem politics from sordid interests, and restoring it to worthy ideals. Whatever name might be chosen, it seems to me that love as the social bond should be recognized as a distinctive value, and that there must be a normative science to elucidate its particular content. The term sociology is a verbal hybrid; it is so closely associated in many minds with a *positivist* tendency in the interpretation of social phenomena, and it is so much a newcomer that it appeals to me less than the term politics, which is of more ancient lineage.

(3) But human personality has a wider range of relationship than to nature, on which it organically depends, or to society, in which personality finds a wider and fuller realization than individual life allows. The ideals of truth, beauty, and goodness, with the august authority which they claim over human life, point to a reality above and beyond any measure in which mankind has so far succeeded in their realization. And from the beginning religion has been directing man towards that which is above and beyond him—the divine. Even if religion began in a sense of the *mysterium tremendum*, yet *fascinans*, it has in the course of its long varied history been brought into close relation to the other functions of human personality and has been rationalized and moralized. Men have found in it a *conservation of values*, and faith has found confirmation in those values. Some conception of ultimate reality, the source, the explanation, and the goal of all things belongs to religion in any form; and the object of religious belief has been commonly the divine, conceived as mysterious powers, spirits, gods, or God. Whether the modern substitutes which are being proposed as such an object can or will satisfy mankind generally seems to me a question to which the past

history justifies the answer No. It is not necessary for my purpose now to discuss this matter; all I want now to affirm is that while religion is not an ideal to be realized, but a relation to ideal reality, because of what it has been and still is, not only for itself, but in its relation to the ideals, it may be regarded as bringing to mankind the supreme value.

III

(1) The separation of values, though convenient for closer scrutiny and fuller analysis, has something arbitrary about it, for as human personality is a unity, all its functions are interrelated. (*a*) Truth and Goodness cannot be separated from one another. There are intellectual virtues to be exercised in the pursuit and communication of truth, such as sincerity, impartiality, concentration, accuracy on the one hand, and truthfulness, candour, proper reserve, consideration on the other. In the conduct of life there must be regard to reality. Goodness must, as it were, see with the eyes of truth. Such discernment is the virtue of wisdom. Moralists have not, as far as I know, worked out in the same way the aesthetic virtues in the appreciation or the creation of beauty, nor adequately in relation to utility, although prudence, industry, thrift, honesty have been recognized as virtues; and if, as I have tried to show, utility is a value to be recognized, these virtues, sometimes placed on a lower level than others, should not be depreciated.

(*b*) If we bring religion into the list of values, there are religious virtues also to be recognized, such as humility, penitence, dependence, submission, faith, hope, love towards God; and if the world be regarded as under the rule of God, the whole range of reality becomes the sphere of duty; nature has its rights that its resources be not mishandled, and that its beauty be not marred; and the lower animals have a claim for generous consideration, and any cruelty must be regarded as wrong. Justice in respecting the *rights* of others, which correspond with our *claims* on others, is the distinctively social virtue; but it is so impossible to isolate the individual from society, that even if we do not go so far as some moralists as to insist that there are no duties a man owes to himself, yet what have been called self-regarding virtues have all their social reference; what a man makes of himself in good or bad character is inevitably a benefit or an injury to society, for no man liveth unto himself, however self-regarding or self-sufficient he may think himself to be. Justice, however, is not the distinctive social value; it must be transcended, but not abolished in love, as the perfect social bond.

(*c*) Thus the world and life show this tendency to *holism*, of which General Smuts has written. The unifying principle cannot be the individual personality, although it is the goal of self-development

to bring all functions, interests, and activities into unity of "self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control." Nor can it be humanity, as Comte thought, for humanity is dependent on nature, and it is in connection with this dependence—the possession, exploitation, use and enjoyment of the resources of nature—that the divisions among the nations become most acute. Despite an outward unification of mankind in industry, commerce, civilization, culture, it does not now appear as if humanity had within itself the motive potent enough to overcome all divisive tendencies. Not only does there seem to me to be the need of a very much higher degree of moralization, but the unifying principle must be not in the human race, but in the total reality, in which it has a place, and plays a part, that is, in *religion* as access thereto; man must become consciously and voluntarily in his realization of his ideals an agent of the unifying principle of the whole—God. It is within the *Kingdom of God* that mankind must live, strive, and achieve as subject, citizen, worker.

(2) This leads me in concluding to raise a problem which has not been adequately considered. If there are utilitarian, aesthetic, intellectual, self-regarding and other regarding and religious virtues, does morality embrace all human activity, and is the ideal of goodness inclusive of all? (*a*) It seems to me possible to make a distinction, which I had already made in my own thinking, when I was gratified to find it made also in the posthumous volume entitled *Ethik und Pädagogik*, of a German philosopher, Leonard Nelson, who is not as well known in England as he ought to be, the distinction between *ideal* and *duty* (Pflicht). The ideals are set before men as ultimate goals; but as all men are not equally endowed, equally favoured in circumstance, so the realization of the ideals must be gradual, conditioned by general culture, social relations, individual interests and capacities; the immediate, complete realization of any of these ideals cannot be regarded as an individual duty. Not every man is fitted by his talents, or allowed by his position in society, to give himself to the pursuit of truth, or the appreciation or creation of beauty, desirable as it may be that that possibility were opened to a much larger number than at present. A man must not be regarded as having morally failed, because he is neither thinker nor artist. In an ideal society there would be no outward hindrances to such attainments; and as the productivity of machinery reduces the need of labour, and hours of toil are shortened, there is the hope that, with proper education, these goals will be included in the course of interest and activity possible to all.

(*b*) Each man has a personal course in social relations to run; his *duty* is the next step he can and ought to take, if he is to keep along his course. A man's vocation and his situation prescribe his obligations, and also limit his obligations in regard to the realization of

the ideals. It might be well if we could limit the term *goodness* to this realm of duty, the obligations which vocation and situation impose on man's conduct and character. If the pursuit of truth or its communication be his vocation, then the intellectual virtues are necessary to him as a moral agent; so the aesthetic, if art be his calling. On the other hand, the vocation and the situation should not be allowed to become restrictive. A tradesman is a man; and there are interests and activities as man, and relations to others which are necessary to him, and so far as possible obligatory consistently with his vocation. The vocation and the situation may be a fixed centre of a widening circumference of human interest and activity. In an ideal society both would be made as little restrictive as possible, although individual differences would always impose limitations. As I include the relation to God in every man's situation just as his relation to his fellow-men, I should not exclude from any man's duty the obligation either to recognize that relation, or to give good reasons for its denial. The term *perfection* might be used to express the ultimate goal—the realization of all the ideals. Whatever progress mankind may make, and whatever changes in society may be secured to give the individual fuller opportunity for being his most and best, the individual limitations mentioned above will remain. But these need not detract from the perfection of the whole. For as in the body there are many organs of varied function, so a uniformity of personal perfection need not be demanded, but a variety which gives fuller content to the unity of the whole. In an ideal society goodness would not be exactly the same in all, each man would do his duty to society, as he became the best man that it was in him to be. Whether such an ideal of perfection for humanity can ever be realized on earth at all, or whether the conditions of earthly life forbid it, is a question which belongs to the region of personal religion, into which in this Journal I shall not venture to trespass. Still less can I discuss the question whether, if not on earth, yet somewhen, somewhere, somehow, the dream will gain substance. I have been bold enough to indulge in such dreams so far, as I believe that for man's progress it is desirable to project the lines of his endeavour and achievement into the ideal, which we can at least conceive, whether we have a reason or right to expect its realization. The dream is not altogether idle, the endeavour to realize the ideals which it inspires not altogether a vain hope, if "faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the test of things unseen."

NIETZSCHE AND EPICUREAN PHILOSOPHY

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NIETZSCHE'S opinions on philosophy and aesthetics developed under strong and lasting impulses from classical antiquity. These were not always the same, for at various periods in his life Nietzsche placed Heraclitus, Empedocles, Aeschylus, and even Socrates and Plato on the highest summit of wisdom. In his so-called first stage of development the pre-Socratics (especially Heraclitus) were generally his favourite thinkers, and in the third and last stage these same figures tend to come into prominence again. On the other hand, in the works of Nietzsche's second, rationalistic period, when he was particularly influenced by Comte, Voltaire, and Darwin, Socrates and Plato—usually so hated and despised—are mentioned with affection, with gratitude or even with warm enthusiasm; and so, over and over again, is Epicurus.

Two out of Nietzsche's many critics have discussed the connection between him and Epicurus with some care,[1] but the relationship is closer than one would realize from what these critics have said. It is my intention here to investigate first the spiritual kinship of the two philosophers, then the formal and material coincidence of their theories; and I propose to begin by quoting (in my own translation) some of the more important passages in which Nietzsche in his various works speaks of Epicurus and Epicureanism.

The first is from *Menschliches Allzumenschliches.*[2] Nietzsche is here discussing the question whether any connection necessarily exists ("as the world believes") between the truth of a philosophical system and its success; and he refers to Epicureanism as an example of an unsuccessful, rejected system, which nevertheless contains far more truth than Christianity, which overthrew it. "To this day," he says, "many scholars believe that the triumph of Christianity over Greek philosophy is a proof of the greater truth of the former—although in this case it is only that the ruder and more violent has conquered the more intellectual and delicate. How it stands with the greater truth is to be seen from the fact that the dawning sciences have made contact at point after point with the philosophy of Epicurus, but in point after point have rejected Christianity." That is to say, he has here nothing but praise for Epicurus; and it is

[1] Charles Andler, in *Nietzsche, sa vie et sa pensee*, 6 vols., Paris, 1920–1931; and Friedrich Muckle, in *Nietzsche und der Zusammenbruch der Kultur*, Vol. I, pp. 137 ff., Munich, 1920.

[2] Aphorism 68.

moreover of special importance to notice that he bases his proof of the value of Epicureanism upon the testimony of natural science: for at this period of his intellectual development, though at no other, he rates natural science very highly, even placing it above all the other achievements of the human intellect.

In the second part of *Menschliches Allzumenschliches* we find four more aphorisms which are of importance in this connection. The first is number 7. This is typical of this second period of Nietzsche's work, running as follows: "Two means of finding consolation—Epicurus, the calmer of souls in late antiquity, had the wonderful insight, which even at the present time is so rarely to be found, to observe that for the calming of the mind a solution of the last and most extreme questions is not in the least necessary. It was thus enough for him to say to those who were tormented by 'the fear of the gods': 'If there are gods, they do not concern themselves with us,' instead of disputing, fruitlessly and from a great distance, about the ultimate question, whether there exist gods at all. The former position is much more favourable and more effective. . . . Anyone, therefore, who wishes to distribute consolation . . . should remember the two famous turns of Epicurus, which may be applied to very many questions . . . first: supposing that things are so, it does not concern us; second: it may be so, but it may also be otherwise."

Apart from the fact that Nietzsche here definitely sets out to commend the principles of Epicureanism, he describes that system, with fair accuracy, as almost identical with his own momentary Weltanschauung: for it was at this period his own opinion that the insoluble problems of existence should not only not be touched, but that the philosopher should and must remain quite indifferent in face of them. This can be seen in almost every sentence, every aphorism of *Menschliches Allzumenschliches:* one will find everywhere that Nietzsche recommends, praises, and all but commands this attitude of indifference.

The second relevant passage from the same book is in Aphorism 192. "The philosopher of luxury (Üppigkeit). . . . A small garden, figs, little cheeses, and in addition three or four good friends—that was the luxury of Epicurus." Again, then, a favourable criticism, and moreover the expression of an ideal from which in these years Nietzsche is himself not far removed. Similar is number 227. Fourthly we must look at number 295. But before we do so, it might be as well to give a concise picture of the ideal life, as it then appeared in Nietzsche's eyes, taken from Aphorism 332, and to compare with this the quotation, directly concerning Epicurus, alluded to above. "The Good Three"—runs number 332—"Greatness, rest, sunlight—these three comprise everything which a thinker wishes and demands of himself, his hopes and duties, his demands in intellectual and moral

spheres. . . . To these things correspond in the first place elevating thoughts, in the second *calming*, in the third *enlightening*, but in the fourth place thoughts which have a share in all these three qualities, in which everything earthly finds its transfiguration: that is the kingdom in which the great *Trinity of Joy* reigns." We shall see, in considering the Epicurean system, that such ideals are very similar to those of Epicurus.

With this, then, we should compare Aphorism 295, "Et in Arcadia ego." "I looked down"—so it runs—"over rolling hills, towards a milk-white lake, through firs and pines grave with age: rock-fragments of all sorts around me, the ground bright with flowers and grasses. A herd was moving, straggling, and extending itself before my eyes; single cows and groups further away, in the sharpest evening light, beside the fir-woods; others nearer; everything in peace and contentment. . . . On the left rocky slopes and snow-fields . . . on the right two enormous ice-clad peaks, high above me, floating in the veil of sun-haze. Everything great, calm, and bright. The beauty of the whole scene aroused awe and dumb adoration of the moment of its revelation; involuntarily, as if there could be nothing more natural, one *placed* oneself in this pure sharp world of light and of Greek heroes; one could not help feeling both heroic and idyllic. And so have some few men *lived* too, have so continually *felt* themselves in the world and the world in them, and among them one of the greatest men, the inventor of a heroic-idyllic way of philosophising: Epicurus." The intimate relationship of this passage and that last quoted needs no emphasis. Moreover, the scene which Nietzsche here describes is typical of that which he praises and loves during this, his second period of thought: so that it appears that the philosophy of Epicurus, as Nietzsche then conceived it, played a considerable rôle in *Menschliches Allzumenschliches* at least.

In *Morgenröte* we find one passage in which Nietzsche expresses an opinion about Epicureanism. This is Aphorism 72, "Das Nach-dem-Tode." "Christianity found the idea of punishment in hell existing in the whole of the Roman Empire. . . . Epicurus had believed that he could do nothing greater for his fellow-men than to tear up the roots of *this* belief: his triumph . . . came too early: Christianity took into its special protection the belief in terrors under the earth, which was already withering, and acted cleverly in doing so! . . . It is only science that has been able since then to establish again the belief in death as final, and it could only do so by denying every other conception of death and every idea of an after-life. We have lost an interest: the 'Life-after-death' no longer concerns us! —an indescribable benefaction, which is still too recent to be felt as such far and wide. *And Epicurus triumphs afresh!*"

Thus we find that Nietzsche's own mission, which was partly to

destroy belief in another world, in another life, in sin and guilt, has a close connection with that of Epicurus; and that Nietzsche admits the connection. This he does with justice, for, as we shall later see, the main ideas of Epicurus in this respect are practically identical with his own.

In *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft* there are similarly to be found four relevant passages. The title of Aphorism 45 is "Epicurus," and the piece runs as follows: "Yes, I am proud to conceive the character of Epicurus in a different way, perhaps, from anyone else, and I am proud that in everything which I hear and read of him I enjoy the happiness of the afternoon of antiquity. . . . Such a happiness can only have been discovered by one who continually suffered, . . . before whom the sea of existence has grown calm, and who now cannot have enough of gazing at its surface . . . : never before was there such modesty of sensual pleasure." The reference to "one who continually suffered" (especially at this, the very worst period of Nietzsche's health) arouses a lively suspicion that Nietzsche is hinting at an inspiration or impregnation of his own work by means of Epicurean ideas. He understands Epicurus as a man like himself, a man sickly and therefore compelled to avoid action and excitement, and to live in the enjoyment of mere contemplation, a man, therefore, with the same love for calm happiness and natural beauty of which this book is full.

Until nearly the end of this book we find nothing more of the same sort. Then we have Aphorism 306, "Stoics and Epicureans," in which Nietzsche emphatically praises the Epicurean mode of life, as against the Stoic, especially for the intellectual man, who "realizes to some extent that fate has long threads to spin for him," and who could least of all men afford "to lose his fine sensitiveness and to get in exchange the hard skin of the Stoic with its hedgehog spines."

In Aphorism 370 an alteration of tone is perceptible, for here Nietzsche professes to have discovered a similarity between Epicureanism and Christianity, and therefore he no longer expresses himself in favourable terms. This is characteristic of this particular stage of his intellectual development, since he is now beginning to turn his back on his second, positivist period, in order to prepare for Zarathustra and his final scheme of things. Speaking, in the above-mentioned aphorism, of the contrast between "Dionysiac" pessimism and Christian pessimism, he says: "The most suffering, most poor in life, would most need mildness, peacefulness, kindness . . . in a word, a certain warm, fright-repelling narrowness and inclosure in optimistic horizons. In this way I gradually came to understand Epicurus, the contrast with a Dionysiac pessimist, and similarly the 'Christian,' who is in fact only a sort of Epicurean and, like him, essentially a Romanticist. . . ." There is nothing surprising in the expression of

such an opinion at this moment. Nietzsche will never again uphold the comparatively passive scientific ideals of *Menschliches Allzumenschliches*; he is now in process of becoming a prophet, a preacher, Zarathustra-Dionysus. So then it is characteristic of his present state of mind that he makes a comparison of Epicureanism, which he has hitherto admired, with Christianity, which he has always hated, with the natural result of proceeding henceforward to condemn and reject Epicureanism too. There seems little doubt that in making such a comparison he is wholly misguided and unfair. The philosophy of Epicurus is not one which is founded, as Nietzsche here asserts, on fear and timid optimism: it is rather one which tells men that they must *not* be afraid of God, Punishment, "Afterworld"; and it derives this advice primarily from an investigation of the nature of the physical world, which seems to the Epicurean to prove its mechanistic nature. It appears, then, that Nietzsche is beginning (perhaps deliberately) to misunderstand or misrepresent the nature of the system.

There is, however, yet one more relevant passage in *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft,* namely, Aphorism 375, "Why we appear to be Epicureans." This is a long section, and much of its detail is unimportant: we only need to notice that it consists of a discussion of "the cautiousness of modern men, of *us* modern men, in avoiding final convictions," and of a description of the "almost Epicurean instinct to try to find out the truth, which will not heedlessly accept the question-mark-character of things, along with which goes a dislike of the great moral words and gestures. . . ."

Nothing more is to be found in this book, nor does Nietzsche mention Epicurus's name again until *Jenseits von Gut und Böse,* where he refers three times to Epicurean philosophy. In the intervening book, *Also sprach Zarathustra,* there is at first sight nothing that could be connected with Epicureanism, although even there there are some points which seem to show a relationship. For the moment, however, we will go on to *Jenseits,* where in Aphorism 25—although Epicurus's name is not mentioned—there are a number of sentiments which seem to be inspired by Epicurean precedent. In this book such feelings are rather unexpected; and we should do well to ask whether they represent the true and genuine opinions of the writer at this point of time.

In the seventh aphorism of the same book we again find an example of Nietzsche's conception of Epicurus. "Epicurus," he says, "the old schoolmaster of Samos, who sat hidden in his garden in Athens, and wrote three hundred books: who knows—perhaps out of fury and rivalry against Plato? It took a hundred years for Greece to discover who this garden-god Epicurus had been. Did Greece discover it?" Similar is number 61: "Religion and the religious import of life . . . have an effect such as an Epicurean philosophy is wont to

have on sufferers of a higher type, refreshing, making more delicate,[1] so to speak exploiting the suffering, finally actually sanctifying and justifying it."[2]

There is also something in *Zur Genealogie der Moral.* In the 6th Aphorism of the third part we find among other reproaches levelled against Schopenhauer the quotation of a favourable remark that he is said to have made about the gods of Epicurus: from this we seem justified in concluding that Nietzsche's former admiration for Epicurus is now markedly on the ebb. In almost the same way the philosopher discusses, in the 17th Aphorism, the religious ideal of salvation. He understands this in the sense of a Buddhist Nirvana, as, he says, Epicurus did too.

Only two further passages need concern us, both from *Der Antichrist.* The first (Aphorism 30) entirely contradicts all that has been said previously. "The Instinct-hatred towards Reality. . . . The Instinct-exclusion of everything antipathetic, of everything hostile, of all boundaries and distances in the feelings. . . . These are the two physiological realities upon which, out of which the Salvation-doctrine has grown. . . . Next in relationship to it, although with a great addition of Greek vitality and nerve-force, remains Epicureanism, the Salvation-doctrine of Heathendom. Epicurus a typical decadent: first recognized as such by me."

But the second passage in this book contradicts this latter. Here the philosopher speaks of Christianity, which he abuses in his usual blustering way. In the midst of the bluster, which he here bases upon the alleged destruction of the "noble" Roman Empire by Christianity, he brings forward Epicureanism as the opponent of Christianity, and says that for this reason it has earned the highest praise. "That (Christianity) became Lord over Rome, the same kind of religion on which in its pre-existence-form Epicurus had already made war. One should read Lucretius to understand that which Epicurus combated; not Heathendom, but 'Christendom,' by which I mean the corruption of souls by the conception of guilt, of punishment, and of immortality. He fought against the *subterranean* cults, the whole latent Christianity—to deny immortality was at that time already a true *Salvation.* And Epicurus had conquered, every soul worthy of respect in the Roman Empire was an Epicurean, when *Paul appeared. . . .*"

It has emerged from these quotations that the connection between Nietzsche and Epicurus was closer than has commonly been assumed, that Nietzsche, above all in his middle period, harboured a warm

[1] This Nietzsche always says of Epicureanism that it is a view of life which makes men more sensitive and more intelligent.

[2] This seems as if it must have reference to the period of suffering through which Nietzsche himself had now passed.

interest in Epicureanism, which he never completely lost. In both thinkers there is the interest in an ideal of peaceful, scholarly, enjoyable rest in a beautiful environment, in friendship, in the society of the Few, who are able to give the philosopher all that he ever requires. Still more certain, more lasting, and more important, is Nietzsche's interest in Epicureanism as a system which sought to save the human spirit from the dread of a future existence, of a Divine justice or injustice, of the existence of a relevant God. In this respect he often believes that Epicurus has been his predecessor: he sometimes assumes the position of a successor who follows in his footsteps and hopes to complete his work, almost destroyed by Christianity. Thirdly, it is evident that neither Epicurus nor Nietzsche believes in a universally binding code of ethics; and perhaps we might be permitted to suppose that the German philosopher was influenced in this respect by the Greek. Nietzsche never remains faithful for long to his various estimates of the value of Epicurean philosophy; but he never loses his interest in it entirely, and, remarkable to say, he never speaks really ill or contemptuously of it. The least favourable judgment that he ever pronounces is mitigated by a word of praise for the Greek clarity and coolness of Epicurus.

But that is not all. If we compare the two philosophies briefly and systematically with each other, we shall notice that their similarity is even stronger than we could have supposed from the passages quoted above. This comparison will concern (1) ethics, (2) theory of natural science, and (3) theology, but we will begin with a few words about general principles.

Epicurean philosophy has many of the same fundamental principles as Nietzsche's. Epicurus defines philosophy as "a daily occupation of discourse and thought *in order to attain a blissful life.*"[1] It is a practical affair, and it concerns the health of the soul. Epicurus wishes to make mankind better, stronger, and happier, of course in his own sense of the words; he wishes his philosophy to be accessible to all who are interested in it, or can extract an advantage from it; he regards the ordinary daily education of his time with indifference, and he despises, like Nietzsche, the mere erudition of the scholar. His sole desire was to help men to a peaceful life, and he troubled himself only about his end, never, or seldom, about his means. All this bears a similarity to the work and aims of Nietzsche, for Nietzsche too aims almost exclusively at educating men, making them happy, civilizing them. In addition, the individualist tendencies of the two thinkers are very similar. "Many philosophers and founders of religion," says R. D. Hicks,[2] "have aimed at emancipation,

[1] Usener, *Epicurea*, Fragment 219.

[2] R. D. Hicks, *Stoic and Epicurean*, p. 153. (London, 1911.)

deliverance—in a word, freedom. Seldom has the world seen one who went to the same lengths in this direction as Epicurus. In the extreme individualism of his ethical no less than of his physical doctrine, and his refusal to base the co-operation of his units on anything else but voluntary consent, he would seem to anticipate the principles professed by modern anarchists, when these latter pride themselves on their distinction from collectivist socialists." That is as true of Nietzsche as of Epicurus.

After these general remarks, let us now turn to the closer systematic consideration.

I. For Epicurus, Ethics is the most important, indeed, the only important, part of philosophy. Like Nietzsche, he wishes to make men happy, and, like Nietzsche, he believes that the first and most necessary step towards this goal is to free man from fear. Therefore the doctrines and dogmas of the "Hinterweltler,"[1] as Nietzsche calls them, must at all cost be refuted, so that people need no longer suffer from superstitious and groundless terrors. In order to reach this goal, and only for this purpose, does Epicurus trouble himself about a theory of natural science. He chose precisely the theory, the Atomistic theory, which in this respect seemed to him the most serviceable, a theory which he had not discovered himself and to which he added nothing valuable. And actually he interested himself in this theory only in so far as it was useful to the study of Ethics. The discoveries in physics which he made during his nature studies were fortuitous: it did not matter to him whether he made pure scientific discoveries or not. In the investigation of a natural phenomenon, the cause of which is unknown, he even leaves off as a matter of principle, as soon as he comes upon several possible causes, of which any one seems to him capable of bringing about the result to be investigated, without calling in a supernatural explanation. "If then we believe," he says, "that an event could come about in one way or another out of many ways which leave undisturbed our soul's tranquillity (that is, which do not cause us to believe in the supernatural), we shall be just as calm and undisturbed, if we become aware that it may in fact become about in more than one way, as we should be if we knew that it came about only in one particular way."[2] "It can be so," says Nietzsche, "but it can also be otherwise." And Nietzsche believes, like Epicurus, that such an uncertainty—assuming that the supernatural is excluded—is not only useful but necessary to man.[3]

[1] *I.e.*, those who do not take a materialist view of the world, who seek for another reality behind phenomena. [2] *Epicurea*, paragraphs 79, 80.

[3] Here in the case of both philosophers we have to do with a form of pluralism, which proceeds from the scientific positivist thought of epochs akin to one another. See Muckle, *op. cit.*, pp. 137 ff.

That is an essential introduction to the Epicurean doctrine of morality, the study of which, for Epicurus as for Nietzsche,[1] is the proper task of the philosopher. In individual ethical principles, too, certain similarities are found.

Epicurus answers the question as to the aims and objects of existence with a statement which as early as his time was not new. Man is meant to be happy, and happiness consists in pleasure. Pleasure must always be good, and pain bad; but it does not follow that pleasure is at all times to be chosen and pain avoided. For we know already (he says) from our experience that certain pleasurable sensations bring painful consequences in their train, while certain pains have pleasant consequences. Hence it becomes necessary to weigh these later consequences one against the other before we act. From this Epicurus comes to the conclusion that our goal is the attainment of a sort of Nirvana, in which we can rest without pain, without desire, and without activity. Thus the highest enjoyment is only the removal of all vivid sensations. That is a sort of Schopenhauerian philosophy, similar to Nietzsche's earliest views, but diametrically opposed to his later. In these ideas Epicurus was without doubt influenced by the ethical doctrine of Democritus; the latter, too, maintained that happiness consists essentially in cheerfulness and well-being, and that intellectual pleasures are higher than physical. With him, too, ignorance, fear, foolishness, and superstition are the chief obstacles which stand in the way of a peaceful life. So thought Epicurus, and so, too, did Nietzsche. We know also that Nietzsche admired Democritus; perhaps he was even actually influenced by him.[2]

Pleasure is thus the real aim of life. This is best attained in a sort of Nirvana. But if we cannot yet attain this complete final state of not-being and being-nothing, what are we to choose as the highest joy in this life? Epicurus gives a very good and clear answer to this in the famous letter to Menoeceus:[3]

"If we say then, that joy is for us aim and object, we do not mean by that the joys of the extravagant or of the sensual, as some interpret us by reason of ignorance or prejudice or wilful misunderstanding. By joy we understand the absence of pain from the body and unrest from the soul. It is not an uninterrupted sequence of festivities . . . not sexual love, not the enjoyment of a luxurious dinner-table: it is sober reason, which seeks the ground of every choice and every avoidance, and banishes those principles by virtue of which

[1] It seems to me scarcely necessary to bring forward any evidence that Nietzsche was above all a moral philosopher, that he valued and cultivated Ethics above all other parts of philosophy, and that the non-ethical portions of his work are the least valuable.

[2] Cf., *e.g.*, Nietzsche, *Philologica*, p. 329 f.

[3] *Epicurea*, pp. 59 ff.

the greatest disturbances gain the mastery of the soul. And of all these, prudence is the beginning and the greatest good."

At first glance, such a moral doctrine has little similarity to that which Nietzsche finally professed. Only the "instinct-hatred towards religion" immediately seems like him. But Neitzsche also lays great stress on "Pleasure" (compare, for example, what he says at the beginning of the Birth of Tragedy about the worship of Dionysus[1]), but he and Epicurus do not always understand the same thing by pleasure.[2] But one other thing we find in this Epicurean letter, which seems to indicate a deep affinity with Nietzsche, namely, the almost religious enthusiasm with which, not especially the extract quoted above, but many of the most important passages are presented. This fervour reminds us at once of Zarathustra's discourses. "The practical exordium," says Hicks,[3] "the dogmatic inculcation of moral precepts, the almost apostolic fervour and seriousness of tone find their nearest counterpart in the writings of religious teachers. We are reminded by turns of the Proverbs of Solomon and of the Epistles of St. Paul."[4] It is also perhaps of importance in this respect that, on account of the Master's extraordinary organizing talent, the School of Epicurus never crumbled away, and never remodelled its doctrines, and that scarcely any Epicurean ever went over to another School.[5] Epicurus's scholars and disciples looked upon the great Master as a divine Saviour, up to the time of Lucretius, who said that he repeated oracles which were holier and much surer than those of the Pythian Prophetess. This veneration of the Epicureans for the character and doctrine of their Master reminds us of Nietzsche and Zarathustra. Zarathustra leaves his isolation to serve mankind, like the sun, which would be useless and unworthy of gratitude, if it had not given light to those to whom it could; and from men Zarathustra, like Nietzsche himself, demands pupils and worshippers.

Further points from Epicurus' sethical doctrines which are akin to Nietzsche's views are: (1) We have only duties towards ourselves. Nature compels us to choose that which increases our joys, and to avoid that which diminishes them.

(2) It is therefore not easy to adduce the reasons for which we are in any place or at any time to act unselfishly. Epicurus believes, indeed, that in organized society, as it exists, "the righteous man enjoys the highest tranquillity of soul, while the unrighteous suffers the most extreme unrest,"[6] but he says also that unrighteousness is

[1] And also passages like the Midnight-song in Zarathustra.

[2] Except in Nietzsche's middle works.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 173.

[4] By this it is not meant or suggested that Zarathustra's style was influenced by the style of the Epicurean letter.

[5] The not uncommon school-forming power of ethical pathos.

[6] *Epicurea*, p. 75, sect. 3.

not in itself an evil. Thus it becomes necessary for him to say that the only conceivable motive that can restrain man from unrighteousness is self-interest, for the wise and prudent man will always avoid exposing himself to the danger that he may be caught in unrighteousness. "Natural righteousness," it is thus stated, "is a contract of expediency, in order that men shall be restrained from injuring one another."[1] It is clear that this belief is hardly to be distinguished from the Nietzschean conception of morality. For Nietzsche there is no morality of universal applicability. All is usage and custom, and nothing is founded on reason or (and here he goes a few steps further than Epicurus) on the real advantage of men. In a sense, Epicurus is just as far beyond Good and Evil as Nietzsche, when, for example, he says: "If the objects which arouse enjoyment in vicious persons really freed them from spiritual unrest, . . . if they taught them further to limit their desires, we should have no reason for blaming such persons, for they would then be filled on all sides to overflowing with pleasure and be withdrawn from all pain, as well of body as of soul."[2]

(3) For the wise man politics are a torture, and he will never trouble himself with them. The best form of government is an absolute monarchy, for under such the peaceful citizens, which the wise always wish to be, are much safer than under any other. Here, too, Nietzsche certainly does not draw the Epicurean conclusion, but he has the same political principle. He had a genuine horror of political questions and disputes, and always professed to be a good European and non-political German.

(4) Since the Epicurean system, like that of Nietzsche, begins with self-love, and since on that account it condemns *a priori* every unselfish action, one would not have expected Epicurus to make any place for friendship. However, like Nietzsche in this respect too, he extols friendship as one of the very highest blessings. "Of all things that wisdom offers for the blessing of a lifetime, the acquisition of friendship is by far the greatest."[3] He traces this belief to self-interest, for he thinks the harvest of a friendship is a rich reward for all that we may have sacrificed to it. Moreover, he says: "To do good is not only nobler, but also pleasanter than to receive good." This last statement is, of course, not in the Nietzschean spirit, but the first, and above all the importance which Epicurus attaches to friendship, has an astonishingly close affinity with many significant utterances of Nietzsche. Of course, Nietzsche's fate in this respect (as in many others) was different from that of Epicurus, for Nietzsche never enjoyed the friendships for which he longed.

II. In the domain of scientific theories, further parallels with Nietzsche's ideas can be drawn.

[1] *Epicurea*, p. 78, sect. 8. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 72. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 77, sect. 11.

1. The Epicurean system is based on a proposition, which is also an important component of Nietzsche's philosophy, namely, that the senses do not lie. "The senses do not lie at all," says Nietzsche, although he, like the Greek philosopher, maintains that it is not possible to gain an exact knowledge of the outer world. But it is nevertheless true and necessary that all natural science must be built up on the assumption that we may trust the evidence of our senses; and exactly thus Epicurus built up his system in contrast to the Eleatics, who maintained: (1) Movement without a void is impossible. (2) There is no void. (3) Therefore there is no movement. (4) Thus the whole world of appearances, of change, and of movement is nothing but a deceptive visionary world. On the other hand the Atomists and Epicurus said: (1) Movement is impossible without a void. (2) There is movement, *for we perceive it through the senses.* (3) Therefore there is a void. Therefore they come to the conclusion that the whole cosmos consists of void and atoms. The method by which they have arrived at this result is exactly like the methods which Nietzsche constantly employs.

2. The study of natural science has in itself no other purpose than the reassurance of the mind. Because this fact is so important in itself, I emphasize once more that the purpose of Epicurus as of Nietzsche is never anything but this, to make men happier and (in his own sense of the word) better, and that the first and most necessary step to this end is to remove all superstition and all fear of the supernatural. Only in so far as the study of natural science serves this end is it to be pursued. "This fear, then, and this darkness of the spirit," says Lucretius,[1] "must be dispelled, not by the rays of the sun and the gleaming spears of the day, but by the survey and the law of Nature. . . . Fear holds all mortals under its spell, because they see so many processes take place in Heaven and on Earth the causes of which they can in no wise understand; and therefore they believe they are performed by divine might. . . ." The motive leading to the Epicurean scientific theories is thus just that which induces Nietzsche, as, for example, in the *Twilight of the Gods* and in the *Antichrist,* to take up arms against Christianity: and it is also typical of Nietzsche that he never praises or reverences natural science[2] for its own sake.

3. Like Nietzsche, Epicurus was an iconoclast. Like Nietzsche, he condemned the whole manner of the education of his day in the sharpest terms. Poetry, Literature, and Mathematics received like treatment from him, and it is noteworthy that he anathematized Mathematics as an *unreal* science, which (he said) rested on false

[1] *De Rerum Natura,* I, 146 *seq.*

[2] Except at the time while he was undergoing a reaction against Wagner.

premises, so that it could in no way lead to true results. Nietzsche, too, never occupied himself with Mathematics. His mathematical studies at school were very unsuccessful. He lacked the turn of mind for mathematical knowledge and mathematical methods in a way that is extraordinary in a modern philosopher. This lack is also detrimental to many passages in his work, as, for example, his proof (in *Der Wille zur Macht*) of the theory of the Eternal Recurrence. His attitude is based partly on an inherent incapacity, partly on a genuinely Epicurean contempt for the truth and utility of mathematics.

4. I have already mentioned the aphorism in which Nietzsche praises Epicurus for having invented the expression "it can be so, but it can also be otherwise," and for having applied it to practical life. This attitude of indifference or caution has a close connection with Epicurus's repugnance to mathematics. Astronomy in particular he regarded as a mass of inconsistent and often wild theories. Therefore it was natural and praiseworthy discretion or prudence to enshroud oneself in a silent distrust. That is a standpoint for practical life which has its starting-point in science; it is even possible that it redounds much more to Epicurus's glory than would a hasty disposition to set up this or that dogma as the only possible truth. We see, too, that Nietzsche regards this attitude as reassuring and worthy; but we note that, as soon as he again takes things really seriously, he immediately forgets Epicurus's advice, for in the later works, that is, in and after Zarathustra, we miss this prudence almost entirely.

5. Although the characteristically Epicurean theory, the Atomistic Theory, in so far as it is purely scientific, does not appear in Nietzsche's philosophy, we find a development of it (a specifically Epicurean one, for the fundamental ideas of the theory are derived from Democritus), which again suggests a close parallelism with Nietzsche. I refer here to the introduction into the purely mechanistic system of Democritus of the idea of spontaneity or free will.[1] That this idea in the same form occurs in Nietzsche's works no one, of course, would suggest, but fundamentally his philosophy (above all his social, ethical, and political system) rests on the same principle, on the possibility, or rather on the domination of free will.

6. The soul is something physical. It consists of the very finest atoms, but qualitatively it is not different from the body. That again is in the very closest connection with several of Nietzsche's utterances concerning the soul, which for him also can be nothing fundamentally different from the body, even if he is of the opinion that it has some sort of separate existence.

[1] Namely, in the deviation of the atoms from the straight line: compare passages such as *Lucretius*, II, 216 *seq.*

7. Nature, the whole cosmos, says Epicurus, is without plan: there is nothing in it that can be traced back to supernatural powers or divine intention. "We are forced to believe[1] that in the sky revolutions, solstices, eclipses, risings, settings, and things of that sort take place without the interference or the command, either now or in the future, of any Being that at the same time enjoys complete bliss and immortality. . . ." This agrees with Nietzsche's saying that it is impossible to believe in any divine plan in the cosmos, just as it is impossible to believe in a creation by an Almighty God; from this Nietzsche seeks to show that it is not only conceivable but essential that the cosmos shall keep on following the same recurrent course—which the moderate Epicurus would never have been able to argue or believe.

III. The Theology of Epicurus is probably the strangest part of his system. A strictly logical development of his atomistic theory would have led to the result that there were and could be no gods. But Democritus, the real founder of this theory, had supposed that the popular belief in gods and daimons—demi-gods—is a proof that these really exist, although they must be different from what most men imagine them to be. They are, according to Democritus, a kind of Supermen, who live in the air. They are strictly natural in quality and character, that is, they consist of atoms, and therefore they are not immortal; but they live much longer than men, because they are so much larger and more powerful, and like men they possess understanding and reason. Some are well disposed towards men, but others ill disposed.

But Epicurus has altered this belief. According to him there are not these mortal although mighty "daimons," but gods who are in no way compatible with the principles of atomistic science. These are distinguished in three ways from the gods of Democritus. (1) They do not live in this or in any world, but in the intermundia, the spaces between the worlds. (2) They are not divided into well-disposed and evil daimons, but they are indifferent to all human affairs. (3) They are not only long-lived, but indestructible and immortal. That means, taken logically, that they do not consist of atoms. Here again it is shown how little Epicurus troubled himself about logic, and how, when it pleased him, he, like Nietzsche, indulged in the wildest speculations, although, as we have seen—again like Nietzsche—he could occasionally proceed in a strictly logical and precise manner. Yet another similarity is shown by this belief in gods, for Nietzsche too is both the greatest atheist, the unrelenting foe of the gods, and the man in whom "the God-making instinct now and then becomes active out of season." He recognizes more than once that he is akin to the hated and derided priests

[1] *Epicurea*, paragraphs 76, 77.

(which was true in more than one sense); he seeks his life long to drive away the Christian or Jewish God, and—to set another God in his place. He is the enemy of the gods, like Epicurus, who nevertheless, even when it is unnecessary, fashions and worships others of his own.

Otherwise the Epicurean theology has little similarity to the views and principles of Nietzsche. For the Epicurean gods, although they lead an Epicurean life, have little in common with the fiery Dionysus. Epicurus supposes that because the belief in the existence of the gods is universally disseminated, they must exist; that is to say, he makes the people the last and final judges of our ideas, in which matter he appears as unlike Nietzsche as possible. But like Nietzsche he will not worship these gods, except in the sense that we may envy them for their blissful and untroubled existence. They were not the creators of the world, they do not interfere in its course, they do not make, they do not destroy, they do not trouble themselves; and therefore it would not merely be foolish, but actually immoral to believe that we can be harmed or frightened by their anger. A hell there is not, but probably there is on this earth a heaven, which the wise man, like Zarathustra, can attain without great difficulty, if he has the clear vision to throw away immediate advantages for the sake of lasting gain. It is religion which has degraded men and made slaves of them, in order to serve its own contemptible ends; and it is above all against religion, a detestable superstition, that the Epicurean, like the follower of Nietzsche, is urged to fight. "Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum" is the basic creed of Epicurus, and of Nietzsche too.

POETRY AND TRUTH

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I

THE vitalizing effect, spoken of somewhere by Graham Wallas, which one University "subject" may have upon another if the traditional division of compartments can be broken down, has nowhere been better illustrated of late years than by the life brought into the English school at Cambridge through the teaching of Dr. I. A. Richards, who came out of the school of Mental and Moral Science. Not only his students, but contemporaries and elders as remote as myself, are grateful for the stimulus he has given; and not least grateful for the necessity imposed upon them of making clearer to their own minds the grounds upon which at various points they find themselves in disagreement with him, and the positive suggestions which they would wish to substitute for his. Their final task must be to try to make those suggestions in some language which both sides may agree to use; barring out, therefore, a good many terms which Dr. Richards regards as standing for "evident fictions"—"fictions such as universals, essences, concepts, causes."[1]

The following paper has grown out of such an attempt. It concerns a problem which recurs in almost all Dr. Richards's books, and for which at various times he has offered different forms of solution. I am sure he has not finished with it yet, but it is conveniently and briefly dealt with in an article, "Belief," which he published in the American journal, *The Symposium*, in October 1930. My quotations will be taken from this article unless another reference is given; and I hope that their fullness will enable readers to follow the discussion sufficiently even without access to the journal itself.

The question, put briefly, is, "In what sense, if any, to appreciate serious poetry must the reader share the beliefs of the poet?" "There are many great poems," writes Dr. Richards, "which seem to have sprung from and to embody beliefs. Can we understand them without ourselves accepting and holding these beliefs? . . . Either answer, yes or no, to this question brings in great difficulties." The one view limits us narrowly; the other "easily turns into a barren aestheticism." "There is something a little ridiculous, at

[1] I. A. Richards, *Mencius on the Mind*, 1932, p. 62. The author's chief earlier books are *Principles of Literary Criticism*, 1924; *Science and Poetry*, 1926; and *Practical Criticism*, 1929.

least, in admiring only the rhythms and 'word-harmonies' of an author who is writing about the salvation of his soul."

Can we distinguish two senses of belief, the writer goes on to ask, which would save us from the dilemma? "It is not very difficult to think of several pairs of meanings which might do this for us. On the other hand, I have found it very difficult indeed to get anyone to accept and use the pair of meanings I suggest."

The plan starts from William James's criterion of belief, the "readiness to act as if. . . ." "I suggest," says Dr. Richards, "that difference in the form of action prompted . . . and in the backwash effect of success and failure . . . is enough to give us two quite distinct meanings of belief." "If I have the view that my train leaves at three minutes to three, and actually it leaves at two minutes to two, the failure of my action in trying to catch it at once changes my view. In contrast to this, philosophical and religious beliefs do not and, I think, cannot come into this kind of close testing contact with what actually happens. . . . Such belief, it is true, may be successful or unsuccessful, and so be said to be tested by experience. But the success will be in ordering the growth of the personality or in aiding the good life. It will not be success in meeting definite situations, and failure to order the personality will not discredit the view in the way that failure to correspond with a definite situation disproves an everyday or scientific belief. By distinguishing these two kinds of belief—let me call them *verifiable belief* and *imaginative assent*—I think it is possible to clear up the literary dilemma. Only imaginative assent is needed, or, as a rule, possible in reading the poem."

"Imaginative assent" is a good term, and I should like to use it, but I cannot think that Dr. Richards is justified in stretching the meaning of "belief" to cover the process he describes. I should be willing to bring in the notion of *assumption*. We can accept what is told us of the fortunes of King Lear either in the sense of believing or in the sense of assuming. [If we have any imagination, our feeling in the two cases may be much the same in quality, but pure assumption-feeling will not stir the springs of bodily action.[1]] Even without belief, we are not confined to Shakespeare's rhythms or word-harmonies; we can respond also to the whole complex world he puts before us (or makes us put before ourselves) unless our natural response is thrown out of gear by irrelevant reminders that "this is not historical." To respond, we need collected attention, though illusion or self-deception is emphatically not needed. And no doubt we have an additional bar against such distraction in the fact that it is usually impossible to bring any quick disproof of the

[1] It is Meinong's *Scheingefühl*, and related to ordinary feeling as sense-imagery is related to sense-perception.

things that poets say. So far but no farther I could come to meet Dr. Richards's suggestion. I am not sure whether he would regard it as coming to meet him at all.

I think that assumption, thus used, gives us part of the answer to our problem. The poet constructs and presents to us, or stimulates us to construct and present to ourselves, something splendid or tragic or pitiful, and we respond in feeling. It may be held that this is enough, since the feeling can be the same in quality even where the poet is believing something that the reader can only assume for poetry's sake. But so far as assumption is pure assumption, of an object insulated from the actual world, the responsive feeling also should be insulated at its root. It is not clear why, if assumption were all, the reading of great poetry should have an effect on the growth of our personality and the ordering of our life. We must look further, or more closely. It may be that our assent to such poetry never is pure assumption, but that we are meeting with something that has a footing in both worlds.

II

Let us look again at fiction. I remember a serious-minded farmer telling me that he liked reading biography, which told him truth, but that fiction gave you "nothing but another man's thoughts." How should we answer this for ourselves, about *Othello* or *King Lear*? I can find no answer except that through his fictions Shakespeare is giving us something not well to be called fiction. *That which we see* through *Othello*—do we believe or disbelieve that it exists? We seem to be brought up against an obscurity in "existence." Do love and jealousy and human nature exist? They exist in particular embodiments on the stage of time and space; they "enter into" the situation; and when we read *Othello* we find them entering into a different time and space; and having made further acquaintance with them there we shall know more of them when we meet them on other stages. And in particular, now that they have struck home to us, now that we have seen such splendour and pitifulness in them, the general ordering of our time-and-space life may well be different, since with opened eyes we may go on seeing and may respond.

This, then, is one point: that through the medium of fiction, and similarly through the medium even of what we think to be error, we may see and respond to values which in actual life with opened eyes we may meet and see again. We shall not say for a moment that the value of poetry is conditional on this: I hope I need hardly guard against such misapprehension. The seeing and worshipping in the poem-experience was itself of course a piece of

actual life; a moment of great living in itself, even though nothing else had ever grown from it. But if it is education as well as achievement—if something else does grow from it—we may as well be thankful.

I must press this further, I think, because not all of poetry's bearing on actual life seems to be covered by the showing of values in the more ordinary sense of that word. (I am not sure about the artist's use of it.) A great poem seems sometimes centrally to be showing us the full measure and nature of some aspect of the actual world. With or without the help of fiction, and with or without some detail which the poet may have taken to be fact while we reject it, it is saying to us, or causing us to say to ourselves, "Look, *this is so.*" That phrase is the expression of an attitude, of our surprised acceptance. It is not intended to suggest that what we see can be given in some simple statement, or exhausted in any number of statements; what has happened is that we see some part or aspect of reality [as we might see a landscape or a friend's character] as we never saw it before. And this may happen intensely and solidly while yet we feel "Some correction is needed; this wording is not quite accurate." Something very important is showing through.

Let me turn first not to a poem but to a recent article on scientific progress, for the sake of its final sentence. (The italics are mine.)

"Four years ago Professor Dirac of Cambridge published a famous paper in which he attempted to show that protons could be reduced to an aspect of the ordinary electrons. He attempted to conceive protons as . . . places where electrons were absent. He showed by calculations in the quantum mechanics that such holes would exhibit some of the properties of particles of positive electricity. . . . Thus a particle of positive electricity may be conceived as a moving absence of negative electricity. There was a serious difficulty in Professor Dirac's calculations. They showed that a moving hole must behave as if it had the same mass as an electron. Now the proton is nearly two thousand times heavier than a negative electron, so the protons could not be these holes. Dirac's research seemed to have failed, but its peculiar property left the impression *that there must be something in it somehow.*"[1]

Though they are nothing but a bare starting-point, I offer these thoughts as a necessary orientation in work upon the problem in hand. When a poet tells us what we believe to be erroneous, and when the telling moves us nevertheless as the teller was moved, it is partly because we apprehend that there still is *something in it.* We may be unable to extract that something or to put it into other

[1] J. G. Crowther on the "Positive Electron," *New Statesman*, February 25, 1933.

words, and the attempt to do so will take us beyond poetry. But I would extend Dr. Richards's phrase of "imaginative assent" to our acceptance of the poem meanwhile in the lump: adapting ourselves to look the way the poet looked, partly for the sake of something he shows us which is real for us as for him.

It will include on the one hand our acceptance of his creation [or submitting to his stimulus to create for ourselves], and, on the other hand, our favourably expectant suspense of judgment on that which he did not knowingly create—that which laid necessity upon him. It was not real, we think, in just the form he described, but something within it was real, and remains real. We say, "I am ready to behave as if this presentation in essentials were true, because I think that somehow the essential in it is true."

Dr. Richards himself has referred to recent work in physics. "We must remember," he says, "that in an ordinary scientific belief at its juncture with reality only a small part of it is actually verified. It nearly always contains a great deal of imaginative material, scaffolding, metaphysics, theoretical constructions, and interpretations which are not tested and are not involved in the correspondence. Physicists seem to be coming to a remarkable agreement upon this point . . . that what is actually established or able to be established is only a small part of the whole picture they use in thinking over their problems. And many of them are prepared to admit that the rest of their world-picture is not a picture of anything, but only a piece of intellectual machinery." Now physicists, like other people, may become confused about their own processes, and I will urge boldly that those who are mentioned in the last sentence are wrong. In the days when, as one of my teachers said, a physicist used the corpuscular theory of light on Monday and Wednesday and the wave theory on Tuesday and Saturday, it was because he believed that there was something in both—that light somehow was in some ways like corpuscles and in other ways like waves, and that therefore each picture was worth using on the way to its own correction. "It seems to me very likely," says Dr. Richards, "that nearly all the rest of our views, metaphysical, philosophical, ethical, psychological, will have to be treated in the same way." I agree, on my own interpretation of what that way is. Our metaphysics and the rest are explorations scarcely begun; dim seeings through a mist; tentative statements in process of alteration; but we go on because we believe there is something in them somehow.

Scientific machinery means then, [I suggest], "I think what is going on must be something like this, though it can't be exactly this. Try tackling it on these lines." Philosophic machinery may mean, "It is somehow like this, though I know these words won't really do; at present they are the best I can get." The maker of

poetic drama in an analytic moment may feel, "I am setting forth something solid and important, something rooted in the real world, though I have invented the story which embodies it, and though I could not set it forth in any other way." The reader of a poem may feel, "Every word here as it stands is ephemeral, yet it is pregnant with something that endures."

In following up the "something" we shall be reaching after truth and fact, however difficult it may be to discern, and however much our language may fail to achieve literalness, and even rest on a bold non-literalness, the shimmer of paradox or of ambiguity, as the best attainable showing at present of the thing that we need to show. "Imaginative assents," says Dr. Richards, "unlike verifiable beliefs, are not subject to the laws of thought. . . . I think it is relevant to remark here how often religions and philosophies present us with self-contradictions as their central secrets." We may allow this, if we hold to the point that the self-contradictory words are an attempt, good or bad, to get a truth stated; or to indicate something seen as real which no set of statements will present completely.

Poetry, then, is causing us to *see*; and part of what we see may be a part of actuality, showing itself by means of any fiction that is present and in spite of any error. In reading "A slumber did my spirit seal," we are not moved to look for Lucy's grave in any valley on the map. But, being moved to create in thought and to look at and through the creation, we see a further aspect of the old truth that a girl can die. Different readers, seeing different backgrounds, may find different statements to indicate the highlight in what they see; to a friend whom I asked, the poem had meant chiefly the gathering up of a small being into one larger and more peaceful, while to me it had meant chiefly that so live a thing could be merged into alien company and be stone-dead. But any such statements will be indicatory only, not exhaustive. On the other hand, they may serve to indicate some essential part of the aspect which remains in spite of change of mind elsewhere as between the poet and his reader. Suns set and return, said Catullus, but we fall asleep for ever. Let us suppose that he meant his words to be taken literally and scientifically, and suppose we believe in immortality and think he was mistaken.[1] Does not the point of the lines remain nevertheless?—that he has only one life for kissing Lesbia.

> O Thou who Satan heardst in Job's sick day
> Hear thyself now, for thou in us dost pray.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Hear us, weak echoes, O thou ear, and cry.

[1] The instance comes from Mr. Middleton Murry's essay in *The Symposium* (October 1930).

It is possible to disbelieve in Job and in Satan and a good deal more beside, and yet to enter into this. But *if* we enter into it, we cannot, I urge, be judging that for us, as contrasted with Donne, there is nothing in it.

III

The possible extreme of difficulty in sketching the "something" by means of words other than the poet's can hardly be overstated. The necessity laid upon an artist or a prophet comes in a concrete shape—"When I came near Lichfield," said George Fox, "I saw three steeples, and they struck at my life"—and one supposes that the same thing happened to Shakespeare when he looked into Plutarch, or read an old play, and answered with a play that was different. Attempts at analysis must grapple with excess in the content which cannot be merely pruned away, and they must grapple also with defect, or rather foldedness, in the content.[1] Is the writer seeing, and showing us through Hamlet's eyes, just the dreadfulness of such deeds as Gertrude's, or is it the dreadfulness of something bigger, some formless body of evil which presses menacing through her shadowy form? A folded presentation, or a subtle colouring in that presentation, may tell on feeling, far ahead of the power of clear, cognitive analysis. Yet the point of poetry is not merely to stir feeling, but to direct it *towards* something, *in respect* of something, however mistily discerned.[2]

Then, beside the difficulty of analysis, there stands the difficulty of words. We must allow an indefinitely extensive margin for the incompleteness of language. With the infinity of details and shades and complexities awaiting our discernment in the reality around us, we cannot expect to find ready-made words for more than a few. Often the best we can hope is that a superabundance of words may exist for the more obvious parts of reality, so that some may be transferred to those which are later attended to—as psychology has borrowed from physics. "Sometimes the metaphorical expression is a convenience only; . . . but sometimes the metaphor is *irreducible* . . . no literal expression seems to be a satisfactory substitute."[3] There *are*, in fact, no words that we can find. Dr. Richards's latest book gives admirable descriptions of the difficulties in our way, for to analyse poetry by means of prose is certainly not easier than to negotiate between the English language and the Chinese. But when

[1] Cf. T. S. Eliot's *Essay on Hamlet.*

[2] From conversation with Dr. Richards, I understand that he agrees with this. I am still troubled by certain expressions in his writings which seem inconsistent with it. *E.g.*, *Mencius*, pp. 82–83: "Cognition, the concept of knowledge, is the category that 'response' psychology has made most shaky."

[3] *Mencius*, p. 114.

from the sentence just quoted he continues, "It then becomes doubtful whether the expression has a sense at all," we may find a better comment on an earlier page of the same book: "There is another possibility . . . that a thought is present whose structure and content are not suited to available formulations, that these successive, perhaps incompatible, statements partly represent, partly misrepresent, an idea independent of them, which none the less has its own order and coherent reference."[1]

IV

Perhaps one other caution may be needed. When to the best of our limited power we have stated some truth drawn out of a poem, this is no substitute for poetry. Firstly, our statement will not exhaust what we have been led to see. Secondly, we may well not have gained the most important content, for, even apart from all our difficulties, it is conceivable that what the poet *made* was more important than what was laid upon him. And, at any rate, it is the poet and not we who can present that content in such a context and in such an order and in such an aspect that its full value may tell. Naked doctrinal thought, that makes no show, is beside verses but a kind of ghost. The essential of what moved Donne in his Judgment Day sonnet, and can still move us, was probably not the ritual at the corners of the earth;[2] but what that sonnet *has in it* is likely to be more effectively said in that way than in any barely accurate way that we can find.

Let me conclude in metaphor. A painter looked, as I looked this April, across a grassy space at a hedge just beyond his range of clear vision. In the glance allowed as he walked rapidly by he could not identify or even localize what he saw; the presentation amounted to, "Thereabouts is blue." Partly from memory, partly from illusion, partly with deliberate creation, he made a sketch afterwards for a friend who used to visit that hedge. All the localities of those blue touches were changed, and even the tint itself was somewhat altered, for he had got it into his head that the flowers were periwinkles. You might say that every statement in the picture taken literally was false. A third party, who knew there could not be periwinkles, went later and looked close, and drew a pen-and-ink map (the best he could do), and put the botanical name for violets underneath, and he also added, disconnected and in large latters, the word "BLUE."

Let us hope that the two together helped each other a little in conveying, to the one out of sight of it, the truth of that spring day.

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

[2] An instance taken from *Practical Criticism.*

CUDWORTH AND DESCARTES

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RALPH CUDWORTH, Doctor of Divinity, Master of Christ's College at Cambridge, and philosophical chieftain of the Cambridge Platonists, published *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* in 1678 to disprove "the fatal necessity of all actions and events." This disproof would destroy the various atheisms founded upon such "fatal necessity"; it would also correct those Christians who mistakenly honoured God by subjecting men to a divinely administered fate. Cudworth, with a constant eye on Hobbes, whom he did not name, struck at atheism by establishing a "true intellectual system" and by arguing away its principle of fate. His design swelled as he worked to meet the various versions of "fatal necessity" with the various atheisms founded upon them, to establish the true doctrine, and to accommodate his own copious learning, and it swelled too much for the published work to be more than a first instalment of his whole design.

This major work was amplified in various manuscripts, and one of these was published in 1731, forty-three years after Cudworth's death, by Chandler, Bishop of Durham, under the title *A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*. This treatise, which was much less stuffed with learning than the *Intellectual System*, was a valuable appendix to the larger work, and the two writings convey, as Martineau said, a distinct and powerful impression of Cudworth's philosophy and its relations to the chief systems of thought in all times. A study of Cudworth's massive treatise and its sequel provides an effective survey of many trends in seventeenth-century thinking, of their connections with the past, and of their preparations for the future.

Sir William Pepperel of New England was a compelling person if, as Emerson said, wherever he was he commanded, and whatever he willed happened. Julius Cæsar was a compelling person if, as Plutarch said, when he was captured by pirates he forced them to listen to his poems or speeches, and, when he captured them in their turn, he crucified the whole crew. Compelling concepts descend upon thought, as compelling persons descend upon affairs. A compelling concept had seized the seventeenth-century mind, and the pages of the *Intellectual System*, when Cudworth aimed most vigorously at the "Democritical Fate" because it was most dangerous and, at the moment, most infectious. It was most infectious then

because the "atomic physiology," on which the "Democritical Fate" was based, had carried the seventeenth-century mind by storm.

Cudworth described this "atomic physiology" too often and insistently for any reader not to understand it. He constantly repeated its primary principle that body is only extended bulk with the included attributes of magnitude, figure, position, and motion or rest, and that matter consists of insensible parts. No reader could fail to understand that the physical world as conceived by the "atomic physiology" was a great atomic or corpuscular clock, whose moving or resting parts were invisible atoms, or corpuscles, with their sizes, shapes, and positions.

Cartesius had recently restored this "atomical hypothesis" of Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus. Though Cudworth observed that this "peculiar physiological hypothesis" was variously called the mechanical or atomic or corpuscular, he invariably used such phrases as "*atom*ical" or "*atom*ology." As the seventeenth century ran out, the Cartesian corpuscle, which was always, at least in principle, deformable and divisible, was stiffened into an indestructible atom. The stabilities of nature required this stiffening: if quicksilver remained quicksilver through all the vicissitudes of chemical changes, then, as Hartsoeker said, its particles did not alter; if water always retained the properties of water, then, as Sir Isaac Newton said, its constituent particles did not wear nor break. Cudworth's habitual phraseology ignored this distinction between the divisible and deformable Cartesian corpuscle and the indestructible Democritean or Newtonian atom, but this ignoring, whether it were deliberate, inadvertent or through ignorance, was unimportant for his purposes.

Epicurus had incorporated into his philosophy the reconsidered Atomism of Leucippus and Democritus. Then Lucretius clothed the Epicurean Atomism in the splendour of poetry, but the ancient world did not welcome atoms—either before or after Lucretius tried to sing them into favour. Philosophy frowned on Atomism after Galen had accumulated arguments against it in the second century, and atoms were relentlessly exiled till the seventeenth century dawned. Then Descartes completed a steady maturation by restoring the old Atomism as the Cartesian Corpuscular Mechanism.

Cudworth summarized these vicissitudes of "atomology" for his readers. The "old physiology" so quickly "sunk again" after its revival "by Epicurus," that only fragments of the "voluminous treatises of Epicurus" were preserved by Diogenes Laertius, and only Lucretius Carus transmitted an "atomical" system. Thus "the world was generally seized with a deep and profound oblivion of this physiology, there being only some obscure footsteps and dark intimations of it now and then found in the writings of some learned

authors." Though Cudworth obscured the distinction between the Cartesian corpuscle and the Democritean atom, and though he omitted the preparatory steps to the Cartesian consummation, he rightly referred the revival of the "atomology" to "Cartesius," for after the death of Descartes in 1650 the Cartesian Corpuscular Mechanism swept irresistibly into thought.

The deflection and determination of thought by that sweep are reflected in the "atomical" understructure of the "intellectual system of the universe." Cudworth's adopted "atomology" is one testimony to the power of the invading concepts, for the conjunction in one system of "the mechanical or corpuscular philosophy" and the following of "Plato, and even the later Platonists," that Birch ascribed to him, is striking if not startling. History did perhaps present one of its reconstructed repetitions: Plato himself did include a "geometrical atomism" in one part of the *Timæus*.

From time to time Cudworth remembered that weights can crush toes, or that atoms could bump, by defining the atomical notion of a body as "a thing *impenetrably* extended" with size, shape, site, rest, and motion. The Cartesian physics had to recognize impenetrability, and according to Rohault, in 1672, it was presupposed, like figure or divisibility, by the essential quality of extension. Cudworth himself was convinced that the material world was a highly diversified collection of atoms, as a language is a highly diversified collection of variously disposed letters. As the anagram transposed letters, so the changes of the corporeal world constantly anagrammatized its parts.

The "glassy prisme," the rainbow, and other "experiments" seemed to Cudworth to confirm the restored atomology. Light was intelligibly a transmitted push through lines of fine "globulous particles," as in a long line of marbles a finger-thrust on the rear marble is transmitted to the foremost. If the propelled front marble struck a hard wall it was reflected back. The globulous particles were similarly reflected from the small hard polite particles of a *white* body. "Polite" meant "smooth," not "courteous." Bodies were black when the globulous particles of the light sank into them, as balls sink into sand. Flame was intelligibly a violent agitation of the small particles in the flaming body. Equally intelligibly, this internal tumult was stirred in the flaming body by the sweeping "subtle matter." The subtle matters, swift streams of fine particles that swept other particles along like sand-grains in a mill-race, were the characteristic driving agents of the Cartesian physics. Cudworth reflects the convincingness of the Cartesian Corpuscular Mechanism by its provision of conceptual grip upon physical phenomena. He himself, however, was sparing of such "experimental" confirmations, for he had another source of certainty.

Boyle, writing in 1667, thought that the world probably consisted of "singly insensible Corpuscles, endow'd with their own Sizes, Shapes, and Motions." *Probably*: the hesitancy of the experimental Boyle before the obvious deductive gap between ostensible phenomena and the presumed internal mechanism contrasts with the assurance of the philosopher Cudworth. According to Cudworth, the "atomic physiology" was "unquestionably true": mechanism, since it was clearly understood, made the "corporeal world intelligible"; since nothing else could be "clearly and distinctly" conceived in bodies, "sensible things" were only intelligible through this "atomical or mechanical" "physiology." This distinctness of notion, and wholly intelligible nature of the atomic mechanism, were inevitably convincing to anyone who believed, as Cudworth did, that every clear and distinct perception is an entity or truth, or that the entity of all theoretical truth is clear intelligibility. It was natural, in the century of Descartes, to rely on clearness or distinctness of notion, and on the wholly intelligible character of the atomic mechanism. So the atomical, or corpuscular, philosophy seemed to Cudworth to solve the phenomena of the corporeal world by the intelligible principles of magnitude, figure, position, rest or motion, as the implicates of impenetrably extended matter, and Democritean Atomism, strange as the spectacle may appear, included the Platonist Cudworth among its prey, among its wholly acquiescent prey, as it descended upon the seventeenth century with all the irresistible power of one of the most invasive and compelling concepts that has ever gripped thinking minds.

Strange host as the Platonist may seem, at first sight, for Atomism, it seems stranger still for Cudworth, who was attacking Democritic atheism, to welcome so warmly the atomical physiology on which it was based. Cudworth accused the atomical atheism of deriving all things from senseless matter, of educing life and even intelligence itself from merely corporeal atoms, so frequently, so insistently, and often so vituperatively that his enthusiasm for the atomic mechanism seems eccentric and misplaced. He had, however, a method that was no madness.

Hybrid philosophies might be expected from the invasion of thought by Cartesianism. When Rohault, for instance, took his general notions for establishing the principles of natural things from Aristotle, and his systematic physics from Descartes, a hybrid product might be expected. There were adjustments, but Rohault secured a flowing connection without awkward juxtaposition. The Aristotelian form, for example, was successfully merged in corpuscular dispositions or movements: Rohault identified the form of hot bodies with the movements of their smallest parts, as Boyle, who deferred less to Aristotle, also transformed the "Forme" from "a

kind of Soule" into the corpuscular stamp on the matter of a natural body. There was no awkward connection where the atomology made its impact upon Cudworth's Platonism, for Atomism was both warmly welcomed and successfully incorporated into *The True Intellectual System of the Universe.*

Cudworth distinguished between an enlightened and an unenlightened "atomic physiology." Any atomology, unenlightened or enlightened, solved corporeal phenomena too clearly and intelligibly to be false. An enlightened atomology also, by effectively settling the distinct notion of body, clearly defined how far matter, or corporeal substance, went and where incorporeal substance began: cogitation, for example, could neither be an affection of solely spatial matter nor generated from it. This sharp dividing line, drawn by an enlightened atomology, between obviously corporeal and obviously incorporeal substance was fundamental in Cudworth's system. The atomic physiology, by clearly disclosing the nature of corporeal substance, provided a firmly secured ontological stepping-stone to the intellectual order of being.

The Cambridge Platonists called natural insight the "Candle of the Lord," and Culverwel explained that the "Light of reason is a candle, not a comet." The natural discernment of the human mind, and the complete intelligibility of the atomic mechanism convinced Cudworth that an enlightened atomology had been an early growth. He devoted his vast learning to accusing Leucippus and Democritus of stripping an older philosophy into a naked Atomism, and of atheizing it by the stripping. No learning could conceal that Plato was "more addicted to ideas than to atoms," nor transform Aristotle into an atomist, but there had been enlightened "physiologers" before Plato, and the old "Moschical Philosophy," which was much older than either Plato or Pythagoras, had discerningly united incorporealism and theology with its atomology. Though a more critical scholarship has handled many of Cudworth's learned arguments severely, and the "Moschical Philosophy" has joined the great company of myths, his own "intellectual system" can be detached from his learned efforts to disclose many ancient anticipations of his own enlightened Atomism.

Quite intelligibly matter was impenetrably extended bulk; equally intelligibly it was only this. It was too passive to move itself; it could never drop into an ordered world by an Epicurean fortuitous concourse of atoms; by common consent angels or demons did not contrive the regularities of nature; God's dignity forbad him to handle the atomic mechanism, and the gradual steps of nature were incompatible with the immediate action of Omnipotence. The Plastic Nature introduced by Cudworth to direct the atoms, subordinately to God, was one variant of a very pervasive idea.

Herbert Read discovers by "dipping audit" in Swift's prose style a "constant level of inspired expression." Another "dipping audit" discovers the Plastic Nature type of concept at almost every point in the stream of human thinking. One dip into the earlier third century secures from Diogenes Laertius the Stoic view of nature as "an artistically working fire." The phrase was probably vogue, for in the first century B.C., in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*, it was applied to the belief of Zeno, the father of Stoicism. Many concepts converged upon this phrase, many diverged from it, and "an artistically working fire" packed much thought into a formula. The core of the concept, or bunch of concepts, was the notion of a pervasive disposing power. This power, in Stoic thought, held the world together and fashioned its items. It was powerful like fire; it was regulative like a craftsman. This pervasive concept of a regulative agent, apparently modelled doubly on physical efficacy and mental directiveness, which had appeared in the Stoic "nature," and was to appear again in the Shavian "Life Force," made one of its many appearances in the Plastic Nature of Cudworth and his fellow Cambridge Platonists.

Cudworth's Plastic Nature, so far as an epitomizing sentence can describe it, was a mind deprived of express consciousness, but left with directive power over matter. It was the lowest of all lives, comparable to the unconscious though regulative life of the plant. This incorporeal drudge, under divine determination and supervision, handled the corporeal mechanism as a carpenter uses his tools. It drudged for God by maintaining the same quantity of motion in the universe, by dispensing corporeal motions, by making them follow laws, and by contriving the ordered fabric of the world. It drudged for God by acting immediately on matter, like an art incorporated in it. It operated like a divinely impressed habit or instinct. It went on in one unrepenting tenor, without deliberating, without choice or discretion, and it executed the designs of God without understanding what it was doing. When matter was recalcitrant, or it was at fault, God remedied its defects. Whether there was only one great Plastic Nature of the universe, or whether there were also a small handful of minor natures, it drudged for God by manipulating matter.

Descartes left the corporeal world too remote from God, when the divine hand had started it on its way, for many pious minds. Boyle insisted that when the Deity had contrived the corpuscular mechanism, as a clock is contrived to go, he still reserved his right to intervene, and exercised it. Boyle's clock-like corpuscular mechanism was still too automatic for Cudworth. So the Plastic Nature was installed, and Descartes' error still further corrected.

The Plastic Nature of Cambridge Platonism, reconsidered, re-

christened, and restricted to the domain of life, is recognizable in the *vital force* of early nineteenth-century chemistry, or in the later *entelechy* of Driesch. Vitalism restricted a cosmic regulative agent to organic existence. The presumed vitalistic agent wrought plants and animals into individuated wholes. Coleridge, in the early nineteenth century, defined life "as the principle of individuation, or the power which unites a given *all* into a *whole* that is presupposed by all its parts." He also rejected "the arbitrary division . . . into things with life, and things without life," for life could "be equally affirmed of every form of being" that tended "to preserve itself" or to resist, within the limits of its power, anything incompatible with "its particular state for the time being." Modern Holism, following Coleridge closely, again reconstructs the fundamental notion, and returns the agency to its former cosmic scope, for a tendency in the universe to organize its items into wholes, either minor wholes like electrons or major wholes like human beings ringed round by their own individualities, as cities by their walls, belongs to the same order of concept as Cudworth's Plastic Nature. The Plastic Nature type of concept combines the notions of efficacy and directiveness, whether an agent drudges for God, as Cudworth thought, or whether a tendency operates in the cosmos, as Holism supposes.

Cudworth's learning was not likely to omit two important ancient analogues of his Plastic Nature. The "artistically working fire" of the Stoics was, applying a term from Cudworth himself, an *autokinetic* stuff that was both former and formed, both craftsman and material. There was a distinct tendency in Stoic thought to separate the passive material from the determining cause, Reason or God: Matter lies sluggish, wrote Seneca, and Reason, which is God, moulds it. This separation of an autokinetic stuff into passive material and active agent had occurred when Empedocles, as Zeller remarked, first separated the moving forces from matter. When Cudworth identified the Empedoclean "friendship" and "discord" with two aspects of "a plastic nature" he may have erroneously resolved a dualism, but he had discerned an analogue of God's drudge in his own system. Cudworth also insisted that Anaxagoras had referred the "motion in the universe" to active "incorporeal substance," and affirmed "an ordering and disposing mind." The Anaxagorean Nous and the Empedoclean Love or Hate are more closely analogous to Cudworth's Plastic Nature than the autokinetic Stoic "nature" if the emphasis falls on the separation of the agent from the matter. If the emphasis falls on the fundamental directive efficacy, then the great host of regulative agents falls into one great class under one concept. According to J. A. Stewart, the Cambridge Platonists corrected Cartesianism by the Platonic *Anima Mundi*. Cudworth may have taken a hint from this, but he had a

rich choice of cues. If there were nothing else there was the "Archeus" of the "Chymists and Paracelsians."

According to Cudworth, the old Moschical Philosophy discerningly solved corporeal phenomena by an atomic mechanism within a matter that was essentially impenetrably extended bulk, with the included attributes of size, shape, position, and motion or rest, and *nothing more.* Equally discerningly it identified sensible qualities, such as colours or scents or sounds, which were no attributes of purely corporeal substance, with fancies of the mind. Such sensible qualities seemed to Cudworth to be clearly a "landscape in the soul" that was "wisely contrived by the author of nature" to adorn and embellish the gaunt "corporeal world." This adorning addition was produced in the mind by corporeal motions. There was nothing in fire or flame but motion or mechanism in the corporeal world and fancy in the mental. The rapid subtle matter swept the particles of the flaming body into violent motions; when these motions were transmitted to the eye, and on to the brain, the mind had the sensible idea or phantasm called light; when they were transmitted to the nerves of touch they finally produced in the mind the sensible idea or phantasm called heat. The colours of the rainbow were as fantastical, as much phantasms in the mind, as the light and heat of flame, for where the bow touched the ground these colours did not stain the earth.

The phantasm of a triangle resembled the outward material object; phantasms of colours resembled nothing corporeal. Twelve years after *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* was published, Locke elaborated the distinction here noted by Cudworth, and imposed the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities as a temporary finality upon thought. Meanwhile the enlightened atomic physiology discerned impenetrably extended bulk, with the involved shape, size, position, motion or rest in bodies, and phantasms of colour, or other sensible qualities, in minds: this seemed to Cudworth to be quite intelligible and quite indisputable.

"Thought," writes Aldous Huxley, "has a life of its own independent of its thinkers": a notion may occur, obey "the laws of its notional being," and grow as irresistibly or inevitably as "a planted seed." The phantasmatical nature of sensible qualities presents all the appearance of an inevitable and compelling deduction. Whenever atomology was accepted, the notion of sensible qualities as "landscape in the soul" was inevitably adopted. It was at least implicit in the distinction by Democritus between atoms and vacuum "in truth" and sweet or bitter or colour "by convention." When Galileo prepared for the consummating Cartesian Corpuscular Mechanism by atomic expositions, he distinguished the spatial qualities of atoms from the subjective qualities that they produced by acting on the

senses. When Boyle, in 1667, formally welcomed the Mechanical Philosophy into science, he elaborated the distinction between "catholick" qualities in matter and "sensible" qualities in minds. This inevitable notion consummated its irresistible growth in 1690 when Locke wrote his famous Essay. Cudworth is one significant index of the compelling force in the concept: a wholly intelligible atomology demanded equally intelligible phantasms of the mind.

The phantasmatical sensible quality did science an important service. The corpuscular or atomic mechanism had too much expository power for science to refuse the proffered conceptual grip on material phenomena: Cudworth succumbed to the "experimental" powers of the atomology, and Boyle found the Mechanical Philosophy too expositorily powerful to refuse it. It could not be adopted, or it could only be adopted as a shameful makeshift, if colours and all other sensible qualities, which were not in the corporeal world, were obviously present and yet inexplicably nowhere. Their phantasmatical nature removed the difficulty, and science, without affronting reason, secured the expository power of the atomic mechanism. Cudworth himself, however, laid his stress on another significance of the phantasmatical sensible quality.

If colours, or other sensible qualities, were successfully distinguished from unembellished corporeal bodies by their phantasmatical nature, then sense was judged by a higher faculty. Even the sottish atheist, Democritus, had perceived this, though he muddled his interpretations. Mind, or soul, which was incorporeal substance, was self-active; but Cudworth distinguished within it a relatively passive part, or faculty, and a wholly active part, or faculty, which was the seat of the non-sensible, or intelligible, ideas. At this point, as the voyager first dimly glimpses the white cliffs of Albion through the mist, *the true intellectual system of the universe* appeared dimly in view. Copernicus had disclosed the true system of the "visible and corporeal world"; Cudworth now progressively disclosed "another orb of intellectual being."

The phantasms illumined the ontological step from corporeal body to incorporeal mind; they were also a source of misconceptions for Cudworth to remove. The term "phantasm," or any other equivalent word, meant for seventeenth-century minds either actual sensations or mental images in memory, anticipation, dream, or imagination. The phantasms of the visual domain, such as the redness of the seen rose or the visual memory of the flower, were impressive and misleading. The phantasms of visual imagination, the mental pictures or "visual images" of later terminology, were special sources of error. They deceived men about thought by their ubiquity in thinking. Cudworth himself recognized that they abounded during cogitations: when a "geometrician," for instance, thought of a triangle he would

doubtless have "a phantasmatical picture of some triangle in his mind." Hobbes even said, in one place, that "the perpetual arising of phantasms, both in sense and in imagination, is that which we commonly call discourse of the mind." This indicated a tendency to identify the phantasm, especially the visual phantasm, with the thought. Men inclined strongly to believe that they could not think at all without phantasms, and hence to suppose that the phantasms were the thinking. This was one error for Cudworth to disperse. Two consequences of this initial error also required special correction: the ascription of extension to incorporeal substances, even to God, and the Nominalist denial of general or universal ideas.

Many seventeenth-century minds found it difficult or impossible to conceive any substance, corporeal or incorporeal, and including the human mind or God himself, as unextended. Boyle complained that men would think of "spirit," however exalted, as *extended* incorporeal substance because their notion was accompanied by a phantasm of a thin subtle body which was extended though tenuous. John Smith, a brother Cambridge Platonist of Cudworth, remarked that the "deep stamps of material phantasms" from commerce with sensible things inclined men to suppose that their own being was material and divisible, though aetherial. Cudworth himself noted this habit of thinking that all things were extended like matter because the phantasms were. Locke could not deny that thinking substance *might* be extended. The Cambridge Platonist Henry More insisted that it was, and that God himself was extended too. Cudworth was compelled to defer to this inveterate prejudice instilled by the phantasms. Cambridge Platonism avoided the confounding of incorporeal with corporeal substance, of mind with body, without offending the prejudice, by recognizing two kinds of extension. Incorporeal substance, including Plastic Natures, the created souls of men or angels, and even God himself, differed from corporeal substance by being penetrable, contractile, and dilatable without separation of parts. The extension of matter was fixed: the divided body distributed its constant extension among its separated parts. The extension of soul was variable: it could expand freely or contract to a point, but it could not be divided. If the Cambridge Platonists had not all things in common, like the early Christians, they shared in a fund of ideas, and Culverwel described their symbolization of spirit by a shining point of light. Spirit could dilate as the orb of light proceeded from the shining point; it could contract as reflection could gather the rays to a focus.

Incorporeal substance was also self-active, it had, as Cudworth phrased it, *autokinesy*; corporeal substance was passive, it had, again in Cudworthian phrase, *heterokinesy*. Cudworth could, and did, insist on this vital distinction between autokinesy and heterokinesy

because it was admitted. He was then content to allow each man to decide for himself whether incorporeal substance had, or whether it had not, its own peculiar kind of extension.

Cudworth was less complaisant to the denial of universal ideas, and he conceded nothing to the Nominalist confusion of phantasms with cogitations. Hobbes had denied the existence of a general or universal idea of "man" because the phantasm in the mind was of one particular man, and single. Cudworth did not name Hobbes, but he did call it a "ridiculous conceit" of this "modern atheistic writer that universals are nothing but names, attributed to many singular bodies because whatever *is* is singular." Each man was one being because "whatever exists without the mind is singular"; such "conceptions in our minds" as the general idea of "man" were equally plainly "objectively universal."

The later nineteenth century was still trying to dispel the trouble of the general idea and the singular phantasm by the generic or universalized image. Galton deftly combined the portraits of many criminals, or of many philosophers, into a generalized picture of "criminal" or "philosopher." The notion that the appropriate phantasm, or visual image, for a general idea of "man" resembled a Galtonian composite portrait lingered long and died hard. Long before 1923, when McDougall expressed the now almost universal conviction that though generic images may occur they are no pathways to general ideas, Cudworth had understood that a "universalized phantasm" was no universalized idea. When men thought "of the nature of a rose in general," their thinking had "something noematical" as well as "something phantasmatical." Cudworth distinguished the "noematical" from the "phantasmatical" as clearly as any modern psychologist distinguishes the "meaning" or "thought-process" from the "image."

Some modern analyses accuse visual images of casual connections with thinking that are often irrelevant and may be distracting. For Cudworth the mind could "clearly understand a triangle in general," though it could only phantasmatically picture a particular instance, because the phantasm was the "corporeal vehicle" of the "intelligible idea." Such phantasms might be needed for cogitations about material objects, but Cudworth unswervingly insisted on the noematical item. If the human mind did require some "confused phantasms" to understand "sensible and corporeal things," it simultaneously exerted "noematical ideas," for the astronomer's "intelligible idea" of the sun differed from his phantasm of a circle one foot in diameter. This unswerving insistence took the next significant ontological step from the realm of sensible to the realm of intelligible, non-sensible ideas. The myriogonum, with its ten thousand corners and sides, was clearly understood, though no one

could form a "distinct phantasm" of it. Those atheists who denied the existence of God because they could frame no phantasm of him had missed a truth. The mind could have no sensible pictures of "justice" or "possibility" or "triangularity," and what proper or genuine phantasm could it have of "nothing" or of "cogitation" itself! There were wholly intelligible ideas, that were non-sensible, as well as phantasmatical or sensible ideas. "The orb of intellectual being" was now well in sight, though the ontological ladder was not yet topped.

The sensible ideas, sensations or phantasms, that were imprinted on the relatively passive part of the mind, were affections of the soul. The ideas or objects of intellection were modifications of the mind; they were also actively exerted as conceptions or intelligible ideas. When a learned man saw heaven or earth or "profound theorems of philosophy" in the "inky delineations" of a book, he understood by his own "inward anticipations," for the phantasms of black "inky strokes and figures" were meaningless "inky scrawls" without "the inward activity of his own mind." A "watch or horloge" was not merely the jumble of "colours, figures, protuberances, cavities, sculptures" and "local motions" presented to sense, but an ordered whole of harmonious parts such as only the intellect could comprehend. The eye did not properly see the watch, for sense only invited the intellect to understand, as "the book of nature, the whole visible and material universe," was "legible only to the intellectual eye."

The idea of a perfect circle, or of a superficies without depth, since neither of these things existed in nature, could not be stamped upon the soul by sensible things. All "the intelligible natures and essences" of "geometrical figures," and "all the necessary geometrical verities belonging to them," pertained to the intelligible world. "Another orb of intellectual being," far "above the orb of matter and body," contained the intelligibles, or ideas, such as wisdom, knowledge, sense or cogitation, and such "relative notions and ideas" as cause, order, whole and part, or genus and species. No sensible object could imprint these on the mind, nor could fancy picture them. These intelligible ideas were "domestic" to the intellect. They were exerted from the soul, as outward objects invited, for knowledge was "an active power and strength of the mind." They were unfolded, when occasion served and outward objects did invite, as the plastic power displayed the eye here and the ear there that it virtually contained within itself. They also became objects to the soul by inward reflection: in knowledge the intellect comprehended "its object within itself" and was "the same with it."

These intelligible ideas were beyond imagination, and unpresentable as sensations or phantasms; they were also eternal and immu-

table. It was quite inconceivable, for instance, that the three angles of a triangle should not equal two right angles whether there were any sensibly embodied triangles or not. If there were no corporeal world, it was still eternally true "that the cause is in order of nature before the effect." Hobbes had explained to the neophyte in philosophy that if the world around him were suddenly annihilated, he would still have phantasms and ideas of its vanished splendour. Cudworth added that if all created minds were annihilated with the world, "the orb of intellectual being," with its eternal and immutable ideas, would still survive. These ideas, intelligible, eternal, and immutable, or the abstract theorems in which they are terms, were the proper objects of science, or knowledge, for Truth *is*, though singular contingent propositions may depend upon external things and their vicissitudes. These intelligible ideas were within the mind itself, modifications of it, and were nothing but clear and distinct perception, for the essence of truth was "clear perceptibility, or intelligibility." They were eternal and immutable; they were also single and indivisible.

A next step to the top of the ontological ladder was now enforced, for a single and indivisible idea could not be finally domiciled in many minds, nor could eternal and immutable beings genuinely reside in created minds. Since they were modifications of intellect, they had their true being in the eternal and immutable mind of God.

God determined matter, or the sensible world, into existence by his Creative Will. He also, without exerting all his creative vigour at once, continuously created human souls in their due order for their "future immortality." If all created beings finally owed any perpetuity of existence to the Divine Will, brutes need not be immortal.

The constitutive essences of things, such as the ordered wholeness that was an ingredient in the "true nature" of the horloge, were stamped upon natural bodies from the Archetypal Divine Ideas, as seals are stamped from a die. Since created minds were stamped with the same archetypal seal, the constitutive essences of things were legible to the intellectual eye because it could recognize what was cognate to itself. Truth was one, and each eternal intelligible idea was one, because each created mind participated in the single archetypal mind. The "conceptions of the mind," such as of cause, effect, order, or whole and part, were formally in the human intellect itself, and ingredients in the "true nature" of the horloge, but each idea was, as it were, a reflection of the eternal idea, as many mirrors reflect one sun. Each created mind was a notional or representative world in which the ideas or images of all things existing in the real universe could be reflected or represented.

Such, in drastic summary, with many necessary or advisable omissions, and detached from a context that is always voluminous and often unwieldy, is *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* as Cudworth conceived it in conformity with an enlightened atomology.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

THERE has lately been published a posthumous work on "pure realism"[1] by an Italian philosopher who died a little while ago at an early age. He had been working on the book for some time with great concentration of energy, but did not live to finish it. In the form in which it has been edited for publication some parts of it have been developed almost to completion, while others are mere sketches and notes—though not wanting in interest, for they reveal the author's method of working, and expose doubts and difficulties in the immediate form in which they presented themselves to his mind and found the way to a solution. The most complete section is one dealing with the critique of idealism, a critique which, while it is not devoid of ingenuity, is in the main stringent and vigorous, and deserves particularly the consideration of idealists. The principal thesis is that there are two possible solutions of the problem of consciousness. It admits the possibility either that consciousness itself creates its own world, endowing it, thanks to the action of the mind on its own images, with those physical attributes that make it appear external to the subject or independent of the activity by virtue of which it is formed (idealism); or that consciousness is the immediate revelation of the world itself to itself, a revelation that can only consist in a unique act whereby the world establishes itself as identical with itself and as different from itself, as internal and external knowing and known, spirit and nature (realism). At the basis of idealism, according to RANZOLI, is the implied presupposition (of the philosophy of Empedocles) that like is conscious only of like, and at the basis of realism is the Anaxagorean presupposition that opposite is conscious of opposite. In the first, consciousness exhausts itself in a kind of phantasmagoria of the subject, without the possibility of any vital impact that might mark the entrance of anything new into the world of consciousness. In the second Ranzoli holds that knowing is really the apprehension of a world, of a reality, and implies therefore a vital exchange of action between man and nature. The author is drawn to prefer the second hypothesis by one fact, among others, that in every phase of spiritual life all perceptions are rendered possible solely by a contrast, or at least by a difference. Thus, for example, the quality of coldness is not perceptible if the object in which it resides has not a temperature different from that of the skin that feels it. By analogy, a ray of light that penetrates another of equal intensity is not visible, and so on. The moment of identity, of assimilation, is certainly not negligible; but by itself, without its opposite, it is not sufficient to determine the contact from which consciousness originates. In every perceptive act, therefore, it is necessary to consider the simultaneous presence of two moments—the immanence of the object in the knower, and the transcendence or irreducible value of its content with respect to the consciousness. Subjectivity or introversion and objectivity or extroversion are correlative terms that lose whatever meaning they possess when not in relation with one another. Ranzoli finds the first and most immediate exemplifications of this

[1] C. Ranzoli, *Realismo puro*, Milano, Società editrice Dante Alighieri, 1932.

polarity of subjective and objective in the composite nature of time and space. He attributes to Kant the merit of having confuted the purely objectivistic conception of these two forms, and of having emphasized their subjective importance; but he retains Kant's unilateral solution—time and space are at the same time subjective and trans-subjective, depending not only on the nature of the knower, but also on the qualitative nature of being and of natural becoming. "Time and space have their origin in the same fact, the qualitative multiplicity of the real that comes into action in both as a necessary extension of the real itself. If it is impossible to contract the real into a point without annihilating it, it is equally impossible to concentrate it into a single moment without destroying it. The multiplicity of coexistent points which corresponds to space is always a multiplicity of successive points which corresponds to time, and *vice versa*; because in reality nothing persists unchanged, and every event, however simple and elementary, always combines a greater or lesser plurality of events. Consequently time and space change into one another and continue one another, time being nothing more than fluid space, and space being motionless time."

It can be inferred from the incompleted sections of the book that Ranzoli proposed to give a similar interpretation of the intellectual forms such as causality, substance, and so on; so that we can imagine the complex structure of his thought as a compromise between idealism and realism, equally distant from pure subjectivism and pure objectivism, and distant also from every form of dualistic realism. The ultimate goal of Ranzoli's thought seems to be a single bipolar reality, not two heterogeneous substances that meet and unite in an incomprehensible manner.

Marcolongo[1] has condensed the results of his patient studies on the scientific thought of Leonardo da Vinci into a compact memoir. He naturally avails himself of the results of Duhem's fundamental work; but he has the advantage over his model of establishing more clearly Leonardo's own contribution to modern mechanics, as compared with his scholastic predecessors. Indeed, the section concerned with his historical antecedents is most opportunely treated in perspective so as to throw Leonardo's work into relief instead of submerging it, and this work is analysed in detail and rendered into modern language, to make it more accessible to us. Marcolongo's monograph is divided into two parts—one on statics, the other on dynamics. In the first part Leonardo's originality is revealed in a series of ingenious demonstrations on the lever, the composition of forces, equilibrium, centres of gravity, the pulley, and so on. The novelty of the premises, which are in great part common to ancient and medieval mechanics, is less noteworthy than the acuteness of the particular applications that diversify them and confer on them a great elaboration of development. The newest part, however, the part which really marks a break between ancient and modern science, is the dynamics. If the merit of having been a real pioneer in this field cannot be attributed to Leonardo, yet he certainly has the honour of belonging to the band of forerunners who, beginning with the Ockhamist school at Paris, have laboured most assiduously to eradicate the principles of Aristotelian physics and try new ways. The fundamental point, inexplicable by those principles, was, how could a moving object, once separated from the source of its motion, persist in its movement, as a thing can only act where it is? Interpreters of Aristotle had made many attempts to clear up the difficulty, but without success. In order to solve the problem

[1] R. Marcolongo, *La meccania di Leonardo da Vinci* (Atti dell'Accademia delle scienze fisiche e matematiche di Napoli, 1932, vol. xix, serie 2, n. 2).

it was necessary to assume the conception of a force that should unify in itself the Aristotelian duality of mover and moving object, a force, that is, that should make the power of persevering in movement intrinsic to the moving body. That concept was formulated by the Ockhamists, Buridano, Albertus Magnus, and others, under the name of "vis impressa," and was taken up again and fully developed by Leonardo. In illustrating these developments Marcolongo arrives at the conclusion that Leonardo, even if he did not expressly formulate it, undoubtedly presented clearly the modern principle of inertia as it was to be enunciated a century and a half later by Galileo and Descartes.

To write an essay on Descartes is a much more difficult undertaking than it appears at first sight. As long as one keeps to general matters, to schematic motives, everything goes smoothly, in the clearest and most convincing manner. As soon as things are scanned more closely, however, and one is forced to reflect on the particular problems of Cartesianism, everything becomes full of obscurity and uncertainty. The reason is that this philosophy was not moulded round a central nucleus, but, starting from a few clear and luminous intuitions, it grew by the aggregation of elements from diverse sources, mostly scholastic. To try to reconstruct the Cartesian system by the sole criterion of evidence or of *cogito* is like trying to understand Christianity from the Gospel alone.

In a recent essay on Descartes DE GIULI[1] shows that he is to a certain extent aware of these difficulties. The philosopher of clear ideas, he says, is in reality very obscure, and in consequence de Giuli has laid on himself the task of making him clear. Altogether he has succeeded in giving an exposition of some merit; it is ample, generally well-informed, and touches on all the aspects, even the secondary ones that are usually neglected, of Descartes' thought. In his interpretation, though, he has over-emphasized the idealistic theme, considering the realistic motive of Cartesian philosophy as a residuum to be expunged; but this realistic motive has its own importance, and where it encounters the idealistic one it gives rise to a multitude of problems rich in interest not only for idealism, but also for all the other philosophical trends of the modern age. The examination of these problems constitutes the principal worth of the rich contemporary Cartesian literature, especially of the writings of Liard, Hamelin, Brunschwicg, and others; and it is a pity that de Giuli, who knows those writings, should have skimmed over the more controversial points to which they have given prominence. It is enough to note this one point—concerning the Cartesian methodology de Giuli observes: "The clearest proof that Descartes did not wish to confine his method in a rigidly deductive or inductive scheme is afforded by the fact that in the *Regulae* he often uses the terms *inductio, deductio, illatio,* indifferently to mean the same process." And a little farther on: "As a curiosity more than for any other reason I shall note further that it has been claimed that there is a true dialectic rhythm in the two inverse processes of analysis and synthesis, completed by a third movement—enumeration—through continuous successive passages, during which the same road is not always traversed, but there is a continual progress towards the contemplation of truth." In support of this presumptive dialectic interpretation he quotes in a note an article by Gibson published in the number of the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* dedicated to Descartes (1896). He thus shows that he has not informed himself of the

[1] G. de Giuli, *Cartesio*, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1933.

state of the question, which is the following. The induction spoken of in the *Regulae* coincides with the enumeration described in the *Discours de la Méthode*, and has nothing to do with the Baconian induction, but is used to signify a specification of the deductive procedure, serving to connect with one another the links of a chain of deductions without omitting any (hence the warning that the enumeration must be complete). Descartes speaks of induction in the Baconian sense in another part of the *Discours* under the name of experiment. As for Gibson's penetrating article, far from pointing to a dialectic interpretation of the Cartesian method, it only stresses the fact that induction or enumeration, as part of the deductive procedure, enters as much into analysis as into synthesis, and he explains further in what way the connection is made in the two instances.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(*Translated from the Italian by* CONSTANCE M. ALLEN.)

NEW BOOKS

The Good Will: A Study in the Coherence Theory of Goodness. By H. J. Paton. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1927. Pp. 448. Price 16s.)

This review must begin with an abject apology from the reviewer for its late appearance. It is now some six years since Mr. Paton's book came out. But the book is so important and has received so much less attention than it deserves that a review, even so late, may be better late than never.

Professor Paton states his general position in a paragraph in his Introduction as follows:

"The ethical theory which I believe to be true has two main sides, indicated by the title and the sub-title respectively. The first is that goodness has its roots in the spiritual activity called willing; that it belongs to things, not in themselves, but as objects of some kind of willing; and that the apprehension of goodness is not merely an intellectual matter, but demands for its possibility the presence of a particular kind of will. The second is that goodness belongs to the coherent will; that different kinds of goodness, whether in actions or in things, are due to the different kinds of coherence in the will which wills them; and that moral goodness in particular belongs to a will which is coherent as a member of an all-inclusive society of coherent wills. Or, to put it more briefly, to be good is to will (or to be willed) coherently, and different kinds of goodness depend upon the different kinds of coherence and the different ways of willing or of being willed."

That short statement will show at once how very far removed Professor Paton's work is from a great deal of recent ethical discussion, especially from all the recent discussion about the right and the good. He begins and ends with goodness; he assumes that right is to be understood in relation to goodness and not *vice versa*; he holds that the different meanings attached to the word good have a common basis—in that good is always willing or what is willed. This last view implies Professor Paton's acceptance in some form of Croce's distinction between economic and moral good.

Now such an ethical theory offers at once, it seems to me, certain very great advantages. It takes into its scope all men's activities; it has not to make that very difficult and abstract distinction between morality and other forms of conduct which is so unsatisfactory in those who start with the right. Because it is concerned with an analysis of will, it does not fall into all the confusions which arise from talking as though there were such separate entities as desires and motives, operating in some mysterious way apart from willing. All such discussions Professor Paton dismisses, I think rightly, as mythology. He assumes that when there is willing, and only then, there is conduct, and good or evil. The result is a book which concerns itself with human life as we know it, and avoids much of that unreality which seems to haunt books on ethical theory. The reader is bound to feel that Professor Paton is discussing the conduct of real people and concerns himself with questions with which ordinary people are really troubled. What is perhaps more important, this type of theory can give an account of moral struggle and obligation, and yet make it possible to understand how the greatest of ethical teachers have been

able to present their teaching as though they were showing men what they really want. Nothing, for example, can be more austere and uncompromising than the moral demands of the Gospels, and yet they are accompanied by the promise that if men will lose their life they will find it. This apparent paradox, which is so central in moral experience, can only be explained by a writer who takes seriously what Professor Paton calls the self-transcendence of the will. Any theories which on the contrary take obligation as final and unresolvable are, it seems to me, condemned, because they make this experience inexplicable, just as are any theories, such as Hedonism, which find no real room for obligation.

But perhaps the greatest merit in Professor Paton's doctrine is his insistence on the rational nature of willing. He holds that we can only understand conduct if we distinguish willing from knowing, and realize that willing can be as willing rational. He will have nothing to do with that all too common error in ethical theory which supposes that conduct depends upon an intellectual or cognitive apprehension of what is right or good plus an irrational or mysterious drive or urge. The will, he insists again and again, is itself rational, and the rationality of the will is not the rationality of the intelligence, but its own. Both good willing and true thinking have, he holds, a common characteristic which he calls coherence, but the coherence of good willing is its own coherence —not coherent thinking taken over and adopted by the will. This does not, of course, prevent him from recognizing the part played by thinking in conduct or by willing in thinking, but he holds that the two activities can both be recognized as spiritual, and therefore rational and yet interdependent. In all this teaching Professor Paton has obviously, as he himself recognizes, got a great deal from Croce, but the treatment and elaboration is his own. He has given this central doctrine of ethics a masterly and illuminating exposition.

Any theory which holds that goodness "belongs to things not in themselves but as objects of some kind of willing" is ordinarily supposed to be subjective, or at any rate to have great difficulty in explaining the objectivity of moral judgment. This is as though it were easy to recognize a standard in things and hard to recognize it in ourselves, and with this general objection Professor Paton has no particular difficulty. Both thinking and willing have their own standards. It is no more sense to hold that because nothing can be good unless it be willing or what is willed, therefore all willing is good, than to hold that because nothing can be true except thinking or what is thought, therefore all thinking is true. The truth of the matter is clearly seen when we consider evil or error. There can clearly be no evil apart from will or error apart from thinking, and the difference between good and evil is clearly a difference in willing and between truth and error a difference in thinking.

So much for what Professor Paton has called the first main side of his doctrine. I find more difficulty in the second side—the view that "different kinds of goodness are due to the different kinds of coherence in the will." Here part of my quarrel with Professor Paton is with his exposition. There has been of recent years a good deal of criticism of the coherence theory of truth. Cook Wilson's criticism, for example, is known to most people. It would have helped very much in making one understand what Professor Paton means by coherence if he had said something about that criticism. He seems to assume that we are all satisfied with the coherence theory of truth and only want to be shown how coherence applies to willing. Or, to put the difficulty in another way, is the difference between the different kinds of coherence which make different kinds of goodness a difference strictly in coherence—as of a more or less comprehensive coherence or, as might be, a more loosely or closely knit coherence? To this Professor Paton might

reply that this is a verbal objection, that coherence is something whose different kinds we recognize, and that it is only another name for rational. But I cannot help thinking that there is in Professor Paton's doctrine a real ambiguity. Rousseau sometimes seems to mean that if a will is general (generality being a characteristic which can be checked by itself, so to speak) it is therefore good; and sometimes that we should call a will general because we know that it is good. There is something of the same ambiguity in Professor Paton's use of the word coherent. I can best illustrate my difficulty by reference to Plato, whom, with Kant, Professor Paton maintains he is following. Plato, I should agree, seems to start by analysing the simplest division in the will and to point out that on the one side of the division there is that which looks behind and before, which he calls the calculating element. Push this element of looking behind and before until it becomes a spectating of all time and existence—and what we should call simple prudence becomes the highest type of goodness. So Professor Paton finds economic good in the simple types of efficient or prudential willing—which becomes moral good when to the unity of the self is added the union or co-operation with other wills, and finally culminates in the saint, when we co-operate with the will of God. That ascent from ordinary prudential willing to sainthood is first described by Plato, and Professor Paton is at one with Plato in believing that if the principle of rationality implied in the simplest act of will be applied unflinchingly and to the end, perfect goodness will result. But the difficulty of describing this process as an attempt to make coherent all the facts or to apply the principle of coherency to an existing chaos or anything of that kind is that all the facts are not given. What we are to make coherent is our whole life, and we have to do it as we go on living. We are not presented with all our desires and inclinations and those of other people as though they were bits of a jigsaw puzzle and told to fit them together. We must have some principle to act on as we go along and that cannot be the coherence of all the facts, present and to come. What, of course, we might do is to take the advice of our elders or of society or tradition as to what actions produce the most harmonious and coherent life, and if by coherence we meant only coherence—that we should certainly do. But Plato at least will have nothing to do with such opportunism. He eventually gets to the good by recognizing that the interests of the bodily part of the soul are obviously worse than and to be subordinated to the interests of the spirited part as those in turn are to be subordinated to the interests of the rational. Plato knows perfectly well that it is easy to achieve coherence of a kind at a lower level. He has no doubt that that is achieved only by reason being put under the commands of the desiring element in a way we know to be wrong. But Professor Paton almost seems to hold that coherence gained at a low level is all right so far as it goes. There does not seem to be in him any room for the distinction which is all in all to Plato between the harmony which is achieved at a low level and the harmony achieved by following a higher principle. If the only principle which can come in is coherence, obviously that distinction cannot be satisfactorily explained. The trouble is that it is hard to see in Professor Paton's view why a man who has achieved such coherence should want to go any further. It is no answer to say that he will only go further if he has a glimpse of something which can only be made coherent with the rest of his life by completely re-shaping his life. That is no doubt the sort of thing which happens, but it only happens because it is taken for granted that this something glimpsed has to be accepted, disrupting though its acceptance may be, and "coherence" will not explain why it must be accepted. A coherence theory of truth finds itself in this same difficulty. Sometimes suggestions are repudiated because

they will not cohere with an accepted system—and there coherence seems at home—but sometimes the theories have to be remodelled to fit in some obstinate fact that has to be accommodated. It does not matter how high a line we may take about there being no such things as facts. The point is that the question of who is "to get off the pavement," the theory or the fact, soi-disant or not, is not settled by coherence. So a coherence theory of morals has got to deal with the message which comes "not to bring peace, but a sword."

These, no doubt, are elementary objections. They must be familiar to Professor Paton, and I presume he thinks he can meet them. But I can't find these difficulties met in his theory or even properly recognized, and it seems to me that this produces ambiguities in much of what Professor Paton has to say that are a set-off to the masterly nature of his treatment of his first subject. I am sure, *e.g.*, that there is something of first-class importance in the distinction between economic good and moral good which Professor Paton takes from Croce, but it is not easy to gather exactly how the distinction is conceived. I think if Professor Paton had been more critical of coherence he would have had to make that distinction sharper.

This criticism really amounts to saying that I am so grateful for what Professor Paton has given us in the first half of his thesis, that I wish he had given us more light in the second. In *The Good Will* I am sure he has set ethical theory on the right lines and on a fruitful path, and I am only anxious that he will go on and clear up some of the difficulties which still remain.

A. D. Lindsay.

Scientific Theory and Religion. By E. W. Barnes, Sc.D., D.D., LL.D., F.R.S. (The Gifford Lectures at Aberdeen, 1927–1929.) (London: Cambridge University Press, 1933. Pp. xxiv + 685. Price 25s.)

These Gifford Lectures, extensively supplemented since delivery, testify again to the immense scientific learning of the Bishop of Birmingham. They constitute yet another "Outline of Modern Knowledge," but one written with a purpose beyond that of outlining. Their "primary object," the Bishop observes, is "to show that the new knowledge of our era should not lead to scepticism or to religious indifference" (p. 654). In his introduction he suggests a very much closer relation between science and religion, which, however, does not appear to be sustained in his later elaboration of these two "loyalties of the human spirit." On p. 6, *e.g.*, we read, "from the concrete results obtained by the scientific method we can, I believe, draw conclusions valuable for theology," and (p. 10, my italics), "Science has freed itself from the sway of irrational fancy: we may hope to free religion from similar contamination *by linking it up with science.*" But their linkage turns out—unless I misread him—to be their common basis in an adequate philosophy, as the Bishop suggests in referring to "that view of the inner nature and meaning of the Universe which a general survey leads us to create" as sufficient to "repel superstition" (p. 11). The plan of this work, therefore, includes, in addition to the body of "scientific theory," a theory of science and of knowledge, a theology and a philosophy. This courageous undertaking, to whatever degree—either as a whole or in its parts—we may judge it successful, must command our admiration. That the scientific theory (about 520 pages) should so outweigh the epistemology, philosophy, and theology may—since the problems raised by his primary, or apologetic, purpose fall well within these latter spheres—move many readers to the opinion that the work is lopsided. This disproportion is emphasized by the presence of at least 200 pages

of elegant mathematical reasoning quite unintelligible to those "educated men and women who have no technical knowledge of science or philosophy" for whom the lectures are intended. Those who can follow the mathematics have certainly done so already (in other versions), and those who cannot will not do so here; furthermore, those who can understand that "the average life of the atoms of the radio-active substance is

$$\int_0^\infty Qe^{-kt}kdt \Big/ \int_0^\infty Qe^{-kt}kdt = 1/k,"$$

do not need to be told that "the bones of animals come out as dark shadows in X-ray photographs" (pp. 207–8). Because of this over-loading the Bishop's extremely interesting (if provocative) philosophical and theological discussions are brief and expensive. This criticism is anticipated, the author observing semi-seriously that "knowledge is measurement" (and hence needs the mathematics); a view which his developed theory of knowledge handsomely retracts, and his final philosophy, since it is based upon moral considerations, ignores.

Of the scientific portions (Lectures II to XVII) little needs to be said in this journal. Where general issues are raised they point forward to fuller discussion in the concluding Lectures. The Bishop's version of modern physical theories—I am competently informed—is a model of compact exposition. About 140 pages are devoted to the terrestrial story, including the evolution of man. No "supernatural" intervention need be postulated at the transition from non-living to living forms. The Mendelian theory and its developments are carefully traced, and the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characters is discussed, and finally rejected. It seems to me, however, that the discussion of the evolution of man assumes it; but the Bishop's use of now technical terms, such as instinct and habit, is too loose to give assurance either way. "Instinct," he writes, "develops when we have thoroughly learned a lesson, *e.g.* to drive a motor-car; and also when, *in our hereditary make-up, we carry knowledge which our ancestors have been able to transmit*" (p. 456, my italics). Also (p. 542), "Instincts are hereditary habits . . .," and " . . . the faculty of speech made possible that development of intelligence which separates a Newton from an ape." How, it may be asked, does this square with the doctrine of the fixity of the germ-plasm?

The evolutionary process as a whole is directed, the lecturer concludes, by the "Lord of Evolution"—a "power which willed the end before the earth was made." The Bishop repeatedly halts his exposition to stand back, as it were, and—surveying the process—point to its Intelligent Creator, without whom its characters of form, of unity, of upward emergence through mutations, of organism, and finally of intelligence and moral personality, cannot be accounted for. The whole appears to "take upon itself the appearance of having been planned—Divinely planned—for ends which must be worthy of the power and majestic unity displayed throughout" (p. 404; cf. pp. 409, 419, 518, 598–9). This type of "argument from design" runs through the whole work. The Bishop does not suggest that it is finally probative, but insists, and surely justly enough, that it is very impressive. Concerning it two questions may be asked. (*a*) Impressive as the spectacle which the "new knowledge" affords manifestly is, does it really contribute a jot—as the lecturer thinks it does—to the force of this type of feeling and argument, above that which it had for the Psalmist, who felt that "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth His handiwork," and for Plato, who thought it an abominable heresy to teach that the heavenly bodies moved irregularly?

(*b*) Is it really "because throughout the physical Universe I find thought and plan and power that behind it I see God as creator?" (p. 409). Or is it because (as Professor Kemp Smith has argued in his Herz lecture) I believe in God on other grounds that I see "thought and plan" in His creation? (This view is undesignedly supported on p. 623.) The Bishop—while rejecting—magnanimously recommends the respectability of naturalism, but does not appear to read the lesson of the perennial possibility of naturalism, which is that the world presents differing aspects when viewed with different eyes. The very general belief in the presence of design in the world flows from the (happily) very general belief in God. But the exceptions are of great theoretical importance. It is neither impossible nor particularly perverse to see "a blind Nature . . . pouring forth from her lap, without discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children." Indeed, the Bishop sees just this spectacle with one eye; and if his other eye sees intelligence and morality instead, it is because he is a religious man. And, as Hume pointed out, in a manner immensely strengthened by modern evolutionary theory, a simply "vegetative principle" is as strongly suggested as a "Cosmic Intelligence," neither being a whit less mysterious than the other. Furthermore, the lecturer's account of things is plainly a "supernaturalism"; but he is strangely scornful of the word, fearing, perhaps, that it has something to do with "superstition."

While insisting on the manifest presence of intelligence in the world, the author stresses the *prima facie* a-morality of nature—a "grave difficulty to which I feel forced," he writes, "to direct attention," since it "has hardly yet come above the horizon" of "theologians and professional apologists" (p. 520). The difficulty is surely grave enough, but the reflection upon his fellow "apologists" is regrettable, and forcibly suggests that its author is not fully abreast of the literature of the field, in which it has bulked—for several generations—more largely than almost any other single obstacle to religious faith. He reaffirms the general (and in my belief acceptable) conclusion that the gulf between "evolution and ethics" cannot be bottomless, but must be brought together by the wise goodness of the (his own phrase) "kindly guardian of our destinies." The ultimately moral character of the apparently a-moral universe is convincingly shown, Dr. Barnes maintains, by the fact that beings have emerged with a sense of the absoluteness of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. It is upon the "intuition, derived from and confirmed by all rightly interpreted experience," that these "values are of supreme importance in the cosmos," that "any faith in God worth having will be based" (pp. 607–8, cf. p. 180 *et. al.*). "The Source," it is also argued, cannot be less than its products. If a sense of the absoluteness of these values "emerges," then the values themselves must be "objectively valid of reality." Throughout this section the author follows the line taken by Sorley and Rashdall; the objections to this type of argument (carefully discussed in the Gifford Lectures given at St. Andrews almost contemporaneously) are not fully treated. The reference to the "Source" and its "products" seems to fall formally under the causal type rejected by the Bishop in § 453. He appears—in this connection—to accept the objection first put by Hume, that an argument to God as a cause will inevitably argue beyond Him; but surprisingly enough we find him observing (p. 410) that "causation, apart from the Will of God, is, as Hume found it, obscure." Did Hume find causation by the Will of God any less obscure? (It may be here remarked that the lecturer's attitude to Hume is unusual. He is impressed by certain of his positions, and apparently accepts them, but simply ignores their equally applicable consequences and connections. In his further account of causation (§ 439) he declares that "one of Hume's great contributions to thought was to make clear that we do not get efficient causation in the physical realm." But did

not Hume straightway apply the same argument to the psychical realm? But the Bishop ignores it, remarking that "Whenever conscious agents are active, efficient causes exist." If the latter is true—and it may very well be—must we not show Hume's error in this case, if we are accepting his conclusion in the other? And if we do so, will it not have repercussions upon the Humian theory of knowledge on the basis of which—being derived from no "impression"—causation is denied of the physical realm?

The argument for the existence of God upon which the author rests most confidence, however, is one which may inspire the least among many readers, since it is practically that by which Bishop Berkeley ekes out his sensationalist idealism. The doctrine that positive knowledge is only of "subjects and their ideas" is common to both. The world of nature falls only intermittently within the finite "subject-object" relation, and so, the two Bishops agree, the "fundamental subject-object relation" is required to establish a world "independent of any finite mind." (See p. 588.) But if we reject the phenomenalism to which Berkeley's view of knowledge leads, because, without any evidence, we believe in a world independent of our "ideas," then that such a world requires God for its support is no proof whatsoever that He exists. Because of this advance upon solipsism the Bishop calls his philosophy a "moderate realism," but in the modern epistemological sense it is definitely idealist, and shades into sheer phenomenalism. How cold he has remained to the essentials of the realist position is shown by his declaration that "we cannot pass outside what we may term the extended solipsism of human consciousness in general"; for according to the realist, that consciousness carries with it a reference to realities outside even this wider solipsistic circle. This epistemological argument (following Rashdall) he regards as fundamental to Theism. But if an *obiter dictum* may be allowed, it seems to me that this or any attempt to hatch an account of God's relation to His creation by brooding upon the "subject-object" relation in our human knowledge can succeed in nothing but in adding to one mystery another mystery which darkens what little light we have by which to view the created world. It involves both nature and man (with *his* subjectivity and will-power—to which the Bishop attaches great importance) in the plight of Alice who was nothing more, said Tweedledee, than "a sort of thing in a dream." "If that there King was to wake," added Tweedledum, "you'd go out—bang! just like a candle!"

"I shouldn't!" Alice exclaimed indignantly. "Besides, if *I'm* only a sort of thing in his dream, what are you, I should like to know?"

"Ditto!" said Tweedledum.

"Ditto, ditto!" cried Tweedledee.

Alice's indignation is profoundly right. Objects in dreams do not enjoy subjectivities and indignations *of their own*, and we have no analogy for objects of thought doing so. And the nature from which man has emerged—the "incandescent orbs," the Cambrian strata and the rest—is simply repudiated, or at best viewed as the perverted interpretation of the Divine visual language as read by scientific observers and converted into a "conceptual scheme." No Theist doubts for a moment that both nature and man are dependent upon God; but he may fail to see that the manner of this dependence is illuminated by this sort of simplification.

This idealist tendency is expressed throughout the account of nature, of space and time, though not without the recurrence of enigmatic observations such as the following: "In denying the existence of substance we do not of necessity take the pure phenomenalism of Berkeley's idealism and deny the existence of matter. Matter is, in a sense, the logical residuum of corporeal bodies (*sic!*) . . . it has the primary quality of inertia. . . ." (p. 573). With this

(surely unintelligible) passage compare (p. 640): "Matter for us is a mental construction." The two Bishops further agree that space and time are somehow products of or characters of experience—that they have no "external reality." Hence a circle arises. We are led through seas of figures to the conclusion that matter (or energy) are "manifestations of the warping of space-time," that there is "no reason to think of matter as more than a symptom of singularities or acute warpings in space-time" (pp. 191, 308 *et. al.*). Further, "We seem . . . to see "in the beginning" a process by which form or structure was given to the void of space-time. As the many complex forms . . . arose . . . the material world took shape." From this material world, after a *very long time*—the Bishop is willing to guess how long—man arose from "ape-like forms." This man eventually concludes that space-time is not an "objective reality," but a "construct derived from the collective experience of humanity," and that "space-time is an expression of mind" (p. 561). Perhaps this glaring circle is only my mistake, as it is surely too bad to ascribe to anybody else! Following this Dr. Barnes observes that "time is real" because the moral struggles of man are real. But is this (to me) true and important judgment compatible with the foregoing? The whole difficulty in this connection arises from the confusion of an "isolate" reached in the process of scientific analysis with something concretely real.[1] Space and time, or space-time, are not "independent," as the author rightly insists, but it is of entities and events (or crudely, of things), not of minds or of "experience," that they are the formal characters, and from which their reality cannot be disjoined.

As will have been gathered, the lecturer's theory of science is "low," in that he accepts the view of Mach and others that it is simply descriptive of sequences, and states only statistical laws. This theory is too widely discussed in contemporary circles to warrant further criticism here. But it is strange company in the system of one who, not unfrequently, bludgeons "miracle-mongers" with Natural Law! It is connected with his acceptance of Hume's criticism of causality. But as the Bishop explicitly rejects the atomistic sensationalism upon which the criticism of particular judgments of causal connection is based, we may wonder, perhaps, that this rejection has not led to a less sceptical theory of science. Since there is no philosopher more fatal to science than Hume, his peculiar attraction for scientists (from Huxley downward) is an interesting phenomenon. Dr. Barnes does not decide whether or not the Heisenberg uncertainty-relations really imply "spontaneity within the atom," or rudimentary free-will in the "simplest elements," but he inclines to the opinion that they do. "Statistical laws," he writes, "cannot be expected to apply to processes involving comparatively few units of action. Physiologists may in due course discover that some of our primary mental processes are so fine that they are associated with small multiples of Planck's constant. If such discovery be made, volition will be free; and the feeling that we are free to act, which belongs to our normal experience, will no longer be irreconcilable with the postulates of physics" (p. 310). Against this whole attitude the positions of Planck himself are a useful antidote. "Explanations," he declares, "by popularizers, who speak of spontaneity in the inner world of nature . . . must be dealt with . . . to keep the lines of communication clear between serious science and the seriously thinking public." And "In my opinion the question of the human will has nothing whatsoever to do with the opposition between causal and statistical physics. Its importance is of a much more profound character and is entirely independent of any physical or biological hypothesis."[2]

[1] See *e.g.* Professor Herman Levy's discussion of the point in his recent book *The Universe of Science.*

[2] *Where is Science Going?* pp. 102, 110.

'What view,' it will be asked, "of the nature of religion does Dr. Barnes advocate?" "For civilized men and women," he writes, "the religious view of the cosmos is based upon belief in the validity and sovereignty of these values" (Goodness, Beauty, and Truth) "as attributes of God" (p. 609). In yet more specifically Kantian terms he asserts that normal religious experience is the "recognition of the Divine source of the moral law." In view of this narrowly moralistic theory the Bishop might be expected to be somewhat embarrassed by the "mystical element of religion." He treats it, however, as a "supernormal" degree of insight. He describes it as a "richer, stronger intuition into the Divine" (p. 624). But intuition of or insight into what? Into the sovereignty of the moral law as such? This is clearly not true. In short,the Bishop's moralistic theory must be stretched at the upper limit to include that which is not merely moral; and also it must be stretched to include at the lower limit the religion of the "uncivilized" (who, I fear, according to the author's view must include the bulk of contemporary Christians, who indulge in "decadent" practices). The religion of the Hindu has "no moral content"; primitive religion is a "non-moral mixture of myth, magic, and ritual." But if it *is* religion at both of these extremes, then the differentia of religion is not contained in the Bishop's theory of "civilized" religion. But he repeatedly refers, more or less loosely, to the "religious intuition" and the "religious instinct." I would suggest that it is here, in the something covered by these terms, that religion lies. The awareness, or sense of the sublime and supernatural penetrating but transcending the natural realm, which, crudely enough at first, but with progressive refinement and closer and more helpful integration with the rest of our experience, makes itself felt, in greater or less degree, in virtually all men, is the real "basis of religion."

Refined religion is no more wholly moral than primitive religion is simply non-moral. These radical distinctions, useful as they are, are nowhere directly applicable to life. In the complex unity of primitive life certain characteristics which, in the retrospective light of later conditions may be called rudimentarily moral, may be distinguished from others rather religious than moral, but there is no hard and fast line between them. Their development is a mutual interaction, or rather an organic evolution, in which the parts become more distinct as they become more fruitfully connected.

Concerning immortality Dr. Barnes reaffirms the (surely only healthy) view that "Belief in God and belief in immortality must in the long run stand or fall together" (p. 638). Without reference to moral considerations, the belief cannot be effectively defended. Man's possibilities must, if reason and justice are regnant, be afforded the scope of another life beyond this. His argument may seem to some to stress unduly the side of desert and realization, rather than of "grace" and transformation; of continuity of existence rather than the fundamental qualitative change suggested by the doctrine of a "second birth" and a "supernatural life" superimposed upon the "natural."

In conclusion, several minor points may be raised. Is it still good history to say that the inquisition developed from "regard for the safety of a Church"? Should Plato and Platonism be called Pantheistic? Its adoption by Hegelians, and the thought of some of the later Platonists gives colour to the charge; but of Plato I do not think it true. His problem was, surely, to resolve the impasse set by the rigid monism of Parmenides. The orthodox Christian doctrine of the creation (so far as there is any consensus among the doctors) tends rather to say that time is a feature of the creation—of that which becomes—than that the "creation is in time" (pp. 1 and 191). The points discussed in this brief account give but a scanty sample of the many touched upon by Dr. Barnes. The theological questions—often provoking enough—I have not mentioned.

On their scientific side these Gifford Lectures are wholly admirable; if they are less satisfactory in their philosophy they are still of high value and interest, if only as compelling clarification by the reader. It is true that the Bishop explicitly directs them toward non-technical readers, but as a Gifford Lecturer he cannot but expect to be read by all and sundry.

The printing and proof-reading of this immense volume are extraordinarily good. The few slips I have noted are as follows: p. 309—37, insert *the*; p. 310—2, for *initia* read *initial* (?); p. 422—5, read *contemporaneous*. On p. 419—50 the sense seems to require *embryo* for *infant*. There is a very full index.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

A Study of Religious Thought in England from 1850. By CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, D.Litt., LL.D., D.Th. (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. 192. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

This volume consists of the Claus Petri Lectures delivered at Upsala in 1932. These lectures were intended to familiarize a Swedish audience with the cause of religious thought, not in a technically philosophical or theological, but in a general popular form. The accurate knowledge, the exact thinking are there, and are vivified by a real personal interest. To those who have thought and lived through this development, as I have, this account has a strong appeal. Within the limits of space available it is discerning and adequate. In the Introduction the author describes the situation in 1850. He reckons as the outstanding assumptions of English religious thought the four following: "(*a*) the transcendence of God; (*b*) the origin of the material world in an act of creation in time; (*c*) the claim of Scripture to be an authoritative revelation of truth otherwise unobtainable by man; (*d*) the happiness and salvation of individual souls as the supreme concern of religion" (p. 9).

Next follows a *General Sketch of the Period*, including the European background as well as the situation in England. As illustrative of the former the author mentions four names—Spinoza, Kant, Goethe, and Hegel. The *immanentism* characteristic of these thinkers he finds as a drift in England in 1850, and offers, in illustration, Carlyle, Matthew Arnold, John Ruskin, "George Eliot," in all of whom the ethical interest prevails. "The advance of immanentism," he says, "while it might alarm those who shrank from any free handling or criticism of traditional dogma, for a long while seemed innocent of any tendency to endanger those ethical principles which it was characteristic of the national way of thinking to regard as the most substantial and most widely acknowledged part of religion, in affording security to which lay the undeniable value of the rest" (p. 43). This advance of immanentism was early in this century checked by the opponents of naturalism on the one hand and of idealism on the other, and by those who sought a wider basis for their "self-realization" than the current moral code. As an opponent of naturalism, and such immanentism as might be implied in it, A. J. Balfour is mentioned, as an opponent of idealism A. S. Pringle-Pattison. The reaction against the Victorian morality was literary rather than academic, and it gained a great impulse from the war.

The third chapter gives a just account of the effects of Biblical Criticism on Religious Thought, and need not be discussed in detail. Among the representatives of Non-Religious Immanentism, dealt with in the fourth chapter, special attention is given to John Stuart Mill, who was influenced by Auguste Comte and Thomas Huxley, who illustrates an agnostic, and not positivist,

attitude. An immanentism, opposed to this naturalistic type, appears in Frederic Denison Maurice; but his empirical theology provoked a reaction to a dogmatic in H. L. Mansel dependent on Sir Wm. Hamilton. His scepticism in a theological interest was the basis of Spencer's agnosticism in an anti-theological. The anti-dogmatic movement of Maurice is continued in the *Essays and Reviews*. An appreciative account is given in Chapter IV of the British Idealists, and here, as in Chapter III, the title so clearly indicates the contents that detailed reference is not necessary except to call attention to the distinction recognized between the earlier type, J. H. Green and Edward Caird, and the later Bradley and Bosanquet. The denial by Bradley and Bosanquet of the ultimate reality of personality provoked a reaction in *Personal Idealism and Kindred Positions* (the subject of Chapter VI). In a volume of essays bearing that title, *Personal Idealism* was opposed to the *Absolute*.

One of the writers, Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, became the champion of Pragmatism. Dr. Hastings Rashdall contended for the independence of human and divine personality, but admitted the creation of man by God, a position denied by McTaggart, who on the basis of Hegelianism denied the existence of God, and affirmed as ultimate a society of individual souls. In this reaction the influence of Hermann Lotze must be recognized. An eminent theological representative was James Martineau, who, with Kant, based religion on ethics. To what is said about Ritschlianism on p. 129 I must offer a dissent. It does not deny *the existence of the objects*, the mode of apprehending which is the *value-judgment*. I say this confidently, as I have given special study to this subject. With what is said about pragmatism and Roman Catholic Modernism I entirely agree. So also do I share the author's admiration for Baron von Hügel. The author shows how this immanentism, without intending it, did deprive morality of its theistic support, and so prepared for the present revolt against the Christian tradition in morals.

Chapter VII continues the discussion of the Reaction from Immanentism since the war, which the author holds has affected religious thought in three ways, the one just mentioned, "the revolt against the Christian ethical tradition," and with it the rejection of the "optimistic religious immanentism." The third is "the quest of a revelation from without of values which men despaired of discovering within a process of civilization which had issued in so tremendous a catastrophe" (p. 149). This third consequence is responsible for some reactionary tendencies, a depreciation of science and philosophy, a reliance on authority. Balfour, Ward, Sedgwick, and Tennant illustrate a return to older methods of theistic thought. The author is anxious that in this reaction against immanentism the gains of the development should not be lost. These gains he states as follows: "The revelation of the unity which is present in the widest differences, and the elimination from religion of that character of sheer arbitrariness which has so often been attributed to it during its history by friend and foe alike. Both these gains" he continues, "are such as Christianity in particular is bound to welcome, as congruous with its fundamental conviction that there is *one* God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and one Lord Jesus Christ, His *only* Son" (p. 164). Then follows an expansion of this statement.

In the conclusion (Chapter VIII) the author refers to the necessary omissions in his record, and in closing contents himself with presenting some contrasts between the beginning and the end of the period he has dealt with. (1) "The institution of religion" was "taken for granted as part of the accepted environment of the life at least of the educated classes"; and (2) "there was the habit of assuming a future life conceived according to the popular Christian tradi-

tion" (pp. 172–3). That is altogether gone from literature generally. In the attitude of the Churches to the changes, the author thinks that there is ground for "hope for the future of religion in England from the immense progress which within what in the lifetime of a nation or a Church is but a very short period has been made in two respects of the highest importance"—*candour* and *charity*. While there is less hostility to religion, there is more secularization of thought and life; and the Church can meet the present danger only as it aims at the redemption of the whole of human life, and as it speaks and acts as a united body. I can very heartily recommend this valuable and interesting contribution to the understanding of the religious thought, and consequently also life, of our own land in our own time.

A. E. Garvie.

The Tree of Good and Evil. (The Presidential Address to the British Institute of Philosophy). By Sir Herbert Samuel, G.C.B., G.B.E., M.A., M.P. (London: Peter Davies. 1933. Pp. 37. Price 2s. 6d.)

Philosophy has a bad name as a disheartening study. Dr. Johnson, who was no friend to it, liked to tell of the man who had tried it for six weeks, but found that cheerfulness would break through. In these days of general depression it is apt to justify its bad reputation. It is all the pleasanter in this Address to have an entirely different note powerfully struck and wittily sustained through its forty pages by the President of the British Institute of Philosophy. Sir Herbert Samuel is one of the few public men of the day who, like Lord Balfour and Lord Haldane, have sought to combine philosophy with politics—the "contemplation of all time and existence" with the active effort to bring something of the inspiration there found to bear on the problems of our own world here and now. The address is a summons to take a wider, more synoptic view of the things usually accounted evil, in order that we may see them in their true perspective and perhaps discern the soul of goodness that is in them. In this spirit, starting with the immensities of space and time which modern science has revealed in the physical universe, it pillories the mistake of attaching importance to mere astronomical size as "a kind of cosmic snobbery." The least in the kingdom of *life* is greater than these, for it is the bearer of values they know nothing of. *A fortiori* "we have a right to believe that a human mind is as significant as anything else and far more significant than any merely material entities irrespective of their vastness." Passing to more positive evils, such as pain and death, famine and disease, the writer shows in a few brilliantly written pages that it is not death itself that is evil. Death is the price we pay for birth and regeneration. "There is pathos in things that pass; but in things that never passed there would be despair." Similarly pain, disease, accident are the price we pay for freedom of physical and moral adventure. "Pain," he quotes from Ray Lancaster, "is not in the great scheme of the universe 'cruel,' but the beneficent guide of the development of sentient beings." If there are categories of physical evils which are difficult or impossible to escape, they are the exceptions. Apart from these, "every evil is somebody's fault." Moreover, in confronting it man is never alone, but united with his fellows in groups which may be as small as the family or as large as mankind. It is in the eloquent sentences in which he develops this point that Sir Samuel comes nearest to practical applications. He disowns any desire to seduce philosophers into politics. But he insists that "if we are

to follow wherever the argument may lead—and that is what philosophy tells us to do—it is certain that that is where we shall find ourselves. If the local council, the State, the League of Nations are well advised, efficient, and successful, if they help to develop populations who are intelligent, healthy, and free, if, in addition, the other social units function well—the family, the churches, the schools, the universities, the trade unions, trade associations, and all the rest—then with the gradual improvement and transformation of society which will ensue, many, perhaps most, of the evils from which the individual still suffers will go the way of those that are past." But it is in the last sentences that he brings together what he has written in the form of what he calls his own "creed." "We may see Time rather as a sower than as a reaper, a youth with a spade and a basket of seed rather than an ancient with a scythe; and if he keeps his sandglass, it is a sandglass that when it runs down can be turned over and started again. And we may believe that those whose ears are really in tune with the chant of Nature can hear a music swelling from her innumerable voices which is not a dirge but a paean, a song of life abounding and triumphant."

The Address contains a welcome counterblast to the political defeatism that is sending so many of the younger generation either to the oversimplifications of revolution or to one or other of the older forms of other-worldliness. If I raise a question at the end of this notice it is one that (as becomes a writer in *Philosophy*) refers rather to its philosophical setting than to the text of the creed itself.

Nothing is more admirable in the discourse than the absence of polemical negations. But there is one to which the writer commits himself at the beginning in his rejection of the view that values—the goodness and badness in things—are more than human inventions. And the reason why this gives rise to a question in my mind is that this denial does not seem to be altogether in line with the general argument that follows. If, as that argument is directed to show, there is that in the world which not only calls out effort towards betterment but yields to its persistent pressure, with the result that good grows and evil, if never annihilated, is progressively ameliorated and robbed of its brutality and grossness, can we say that the ideal values, which, in the case of man, are the spring and principle of this *nisus* are no more than human inventions, and are not in some sense inherent in the nature of things? That they are so is at any rate a very old philosophical tradition that has run through the thought and action of Western civilization, kindling here into art and poetry with their belief in the fundamental reality of beauty, there into science and philosophy with their like belief in the reality of truth, there again into self-sacrifice and religion with their faith that goodness is not only real but in the end the only real thing. How far the belief in such a *nisus* has been the inspiration of modern statesmanship Sir Herbert has better opportunities of judging than a mere student of philosophy. But in my own time I seem to remember that it was the belief of the men who, like Lincoln and Gladstone, Woodrow Wilson and General Gordon, with all their failings, accomplished most. This would not, of course, except to a pragmatist, prove the belief to be true. But taken with its persistence and its enormous fertility in every field, and with arguments like Sir Herbert's, it does give us to think before rejecting it as altogether founded on delusion. If in man we have a being who has eaten of the "Tree in the midst" and knows good and evil, may it not be because there is a real good and evil to know and that his salvation depends on his knowing it?

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy. By GEORGE SANTAYANA. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1933. Pp. 121. Price 5s. net.)

This slight volume of five essays, which have already appeared elsewhere, possesses all the literary charm and vigour for which Santayana is noted, and, with a certain amount of knowledge of the originals discussed, the reader will find it both entertaining and illuminating. There are valuable and penetrating judgments, such as that concerning the distinction between Bradley and his opponents and the limitations of each, which should not be ignored either in favour of or because of the intellectual sparkle and lightness of touch.

As becomes a true philosopher, however, Santayana is not obsessed by an undue reverence for supposedly great philosophies or philosophers; and likes and dislikes, whether idealism, Protestantism, Bradley, or Bergson, are permissible to him as to lesser mortals. German idealism is a "mighty pose." Locke is "omnivorous, artless, loquacious," and his philosophy is "habitable and not too inharmonious," comparable to a rambling mansion which, no longer fit for occupation because of contemporary impoverishment, has become a national monument. Bradley was unfortunate in that the composite monster he opposed had no forehead in which his smooth, polished little stones could lodge. The vain and pretentious efforts of philosophers, engaged often merely in "a war of words," like Bradley with the positivists and utilitarians, provoke amusement, irony, and even derision.

But this is possible because Santayana has confidence in his own philosophy of materialism, which he sees implicitly present in the presuppositions of opposing philosophies and which, after a review of modern scientific developments, often hailed as a breakdown of that philosophy, he continues to assert. That a critical mind should refuse to trust science anew, all mystery and paradox, when before, clear, confident, and fruitful, it has, on its own confession, been guilty of a betrayal, is understandable. The affinity, nevertheless, between Santayana's philosophy and the older science may explain his perturbation. In the essay on "The Prestige of the Infinite" he surrenders his former attitude and expresses his readiness to share in the respect for Infinite Being; and in the essay with the curious title "A Long Way Round to Nirvana," he develops certain "interesting suggestions" of Freud which constitute "an admirable counterblast to prevalent follies," even though they are expressed in myths and though they seem to many full of mystery and paradox. Is it possible that Santayana is seeking in Freud and the Infinite that support which modern science has taken from him?

B. M. LAING.

The Eternal Values. (Riddell Memorial Lectures, 1932.) By the VERY REV. W. R. INGE, D.D., D.Litt. (London: Oxford University Press; Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. 39. Price 2s. 6d.)

The Dean of St. Paul's has his detractors, but none can say his pen has lost its power. Like the Pied Piper's pipe, it lures us to follow willy-nilly. Here once more are those winged and barbed shafts that we have learned to expect. "The notion that a town must be a blot on the landscape is quite modern." "The animals might differ as to whether the Deity has two legs, or four, or six; but they would all agree that the devil is a biped with a white skin, between five and six feet in height." "I am not prepared to substitute for 'God is Light,' 'God is a photon.' " We learn that Gifford lecturers may do as they please so long as in the last lecture the Deity emerges, "like a rabbit out of a hat," but "the peculiarity of Alexander's God is that he never

does emerge. He is the evermore about to be, the to-morrow that never comes." The familiar dislikes are equally prominent, Americans, pragmatists, democracy, "the acquisitive apparatus" of politicians, profiteers, and trade unionists, all come under the lash, whilst ultra-modern art is "blasphemy." We smile, sometimes we smart, but we read on.

There are two lectures, the first on the idea of value, and the other on God and the World. The Dean rightly recognizes that the separation of fact and value is false, and is even pragmatist enough to admit there are no facts without values. Yet he speaks of the pure desire to know, and declares that pragmatists cannot admit any but instrumental values without sacrificing their principles. If the distinction between psychological values or interests and metaphysical or final values had been made more explicit, it would have made the matter clearer. A primary value may be a purely subjective and instrumental interest. What has no conceivable interest is in no sense a fact for us. I should add to the sum of my knowledge if I worked out the cube root of the numbers printed on my railway tickets and subtracted it from that of the numbers printed on my bus tickets, but is any sane person likely to do such arithmetic? What, then, of the pure desire to know, of the increase of knowledge just for the sake of its being knowledge? Can we ever spend time seeking for any truth, any knowledge, that does not lead to the fulfilment of some other purpose? If so, is not the value of truth instrumental, not absolute? In a certain sense all values are instrumental towards the attainment of the *summum bonum*, if such there be, and that alone represents intrinsic value.

The Dean does not attempt to prove that our ultimate values are objective and permanent. Like Dr. Johnson when he declared, "Sir, we know the will is free, and there's an end on't," he simply states that these values are known to be fundamental and underived. He quotes Varisco, "value will or will not be permanent, according as the divine Personality does or does not exist." But though our human values may be guaranteed by the nature of God, their permanence would seem to depend on our permanence. The Dean seems somewhat exercised in his mind as to the unfavourable prognosis of science for the whole of the cosmos, by the conception of entropy, and warns us we must not assume our values will be conserved through all future time. If his philosophy were more idealistic he would regard the fate of the physical universe as a matter of indifference. Spiritual values need no physical background. Human immortality rather than the eternity of God or of the world process seems to be the presupposition of the permanence of our human values.

The second lecture is marked by a rather surprising attack on the philosophy of Pringle-Pattison, and by the statement that Christianity is incompatible with the idea of a non-omnipotent God, a remark that seems unjustified in the light of the entire absence of the omnipotent Super-Ruler of the universe from the teachings of the Founder of Christianity. But the lectures are extraordinarily suggestive and interesting, and one is glad to know they are the forerunners of a book in which they are to be amplified.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Causality. A Law of Nature or a Maxim of the Naturalist? By L. SILBERSTEIN, Ph.D. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1933. Pp. viii + 159. Price 4s. 6d.)

The title of this book is attractive. It assures us in advance that the author sees clearly the issue that has been raised by recent developments in physics.

I think that the book fulfills the promise of the title, and that the actual state of the problem is clearly reasoned out. Many points are well explained; if anything, the explanation is rather overdone and sometimes wanders too far away from the main thread of the argument.

I do not know why Dr. Silberstein is disinclined to say straight out that he disbelieves in the law of causality. He decides that it is not a law of nature, but perversely adds "being to all purposes but a maxim of the naturalist and not a law of nature, it is palpably incorrect to either assert or deny its validity" (p. 78). This seems to me like saying that since King Arthur is a myth and not an historic personage, it is incorrect either to assert or deny his existence. Moreover, it is a maxim which need not necessarily be followed; it is advice, but not always good advice. "Situations can arise in which the principle of causality ceases to be a useful guide, and conceivably may even become an obstacle to further progress. (Such, *e.g.*, is the situation in the world of electrons and protons as viewed by the youngest generation of physicists.)" (P. 73.) To hold that the principle of causality is out of the question as a law of nature and not always useful as a maxim, stamps the author as one of the most extreme indeterminists.

Yet Dr. Silberstein seems to think that in some way Heisenberg and other indeterminists have gone too far and are premature in their conclusions. I have not been able to make out the cause of offence; but in the last half of the book, notwithstanding a fair-minded and interesting account of indeterminism in modern physics, his attitude towards indeterminists is rather captious, and he inclines favourably to the theories of Klein and Einstein as hopeful attempts to re-establish causality. I do not think Einstein would agree with the statement, "Of course, the question is not one of validity or non-validity of the 'law' of causality . . . but one of the *advisability* of adhering to the maxim of causality as a guiding principle" (p. 116). If Einstein succeeds in embodying causality in differential equations, it will signify a great deal more than a pious maxim.

Silberstein does not think that the indeterminacy in modern physics has any bearing on the problem of free-will. His only explanation is that "a moment's introspection into a few actual instances of one's own "free-will" exertion will convince everybody of the emptiness of such speculations" (p. 154). This is not very illuminating.

A. S. Eddington.

My Philosophy, representing my views on the many functions of the Ether of Space. by Sir Oliver Lodge, F.R.S. (London: Ernest Benn Ltd. 1933. Pp. 318. Price 21s.)

It is well known that, though Sir Oliver Lodge is primarily an investigator and teacher in the special department of mathematical physics, his interests extend much more widely than this. It might almost be said of him, as Francis Bacon perhaps too rashly claimed, that he has taken all knowledge for his province. Hence it is not surprising that he should now seek to crown his more special scientific investigations with a comprehensive statement of his general philosophical outlook. It is, no doubt, true that most of what he has to say in the present work is based upon his more purely physical investigations; but they are dealt with as leading up to a general interpretation of human life in relation to the material Universe within which it is, at least temporarily, carried on.

We are all aware that, in his more purely scientific work, he has been led to attach more importance to the conception of a pervasive ether than is usual with other scientific writers; and it is consequently not surprising that this conception is taken as the foundation of the general philosophical interpretation that is here set forth. The discussion of this must be left to experts in physical science. I believe it is true, however, that the general conclusions to which we are led with regard to the nature and destiny of human life are not necessarily dependent on any particular theory about the ether. What seems to be essential is the recognition of a possible mediation between mind and matter, such as to render intelligible the view that, in the last resort, self-conscious spirit may be regarded as the ultimate creative principle in the Cosmos. The postulation of a pervasive ether is a very obvious way of giving definiteness to the mediating principle by which the transition from pure mind to a material universe may be brought about; but, in view of the uncertainty that seems still to exist among the most competent scientific investigators with regard to the nature of the ether, it may be best simply to postulate the possibility of a creative power in Mind. That the human mind is in some degree creative is very obvious, not only from the existence of works of genius, but also from the whole structure of what we know as the civilized world. Sir Oliver Lodge may be right in thinking that the postulation of a pervasive ether is the best way of representing the mediating principle. He has probably as good a right as any other living person to hold a definite view about it. Those of us who are not experts in physical investigation must be content to say that, without the recognition of some such mediating principle, it seems impossible to give any clear account of man's place in the Universe.

Once this is granted, however, it seems to be comparatively easy, not only to understand the general place of human life on earth, but also to believe that that life may be carried on independently of the existence of a material body. Everybody recognizes that human life on earth has two sides, mental and physical. Sir Oliver Lodge adds that there is a mediating aspect between these two sides; and he calls this the etheric body. He supports this view by the experimental evidence that is supplied by psychical research, which seems to show that human life persists after the death of the body, not simply in the form of pure mind, but also not in the form of material embodiment. The recognition of the existence of a subtle body—which may or may not be rightly characterized as "etheric"—enables us to give more definiteness to the way in which such survival may be conceived than would otherwise be possible. It seems to be at least a quite intelligible hypothesis, and it is now supported by a considerable mass of experimental evidence.

It is obvious that a view of this kind supplies a ready means of interpreting much that would otherwise seem incredible in several types of religious belief—very notably in Christianity. Accordingly, in the concluding chapter, Sir Oliver expresses his wholehearted acceptance of the Christian tradition, even in its most literal interpretation. A review of this kind is hardly the right place for a discussion of this; and indeed Sir Oliver himself can hardly be said to provide any material for such a discussion. It is evident, however, that many occurrences that have been regarded as incredible may be rendered intelligible by the recognition of the reality of a subtle or etheric body.

J. S. Mackenzie.

The New Background of Science. By Sir James Jeans, D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1933. Pp. viii + 303. Price 7s. 6d.)

This latest book of Sir James Jeans is to a certain extent an amplification and clarification of parts of his earlier book, *The Mysterious Universe.* It is meant to serve a serious scientific purpose, and to be of value not only to the general reader but to students of physics as well. In this endeavour Sir James Jeans has succeeded admirably. The chapters on the Methods of Science, Space and Time, and Mechanism are admirably presented, and in his treatment of Matter and Radiation and Wave Mechanics the author is at his most brilliant.

Many will feel, however, that the more brilliantly and clearly the views of the advocates of the new quantum mechanics are expounded the more unconvincing they become, and this, of course, is no fault of the expositor. The author's idealistic views on these complex matters are peculiarly his own, and few readers will pretend that they can understand them. For instance, the waves of probability are said to be subjective; but then so also are light waves, they are only waves of knowledge; and yet when we haven't any knowledge the waves of an electron become objective; and even so, objective does not mean physically real, because they cannot be represented in the time and space of our perception. This is a very difficult position.

Although the Great Architect is not explicitly mentioned, the reader gets the impression that Sir James Jeans still maintains that the events of this world are but thoughts in this mind. But whether the indeterminism which we are now asked to believe in is due to mental confusion in the mind of the Great Architect or is only apparent, is a question on which the author seems undecided. Perhaps he believes with Joseph Conrad that "great achievements are accomplished in a blessed warm mental fog."

G. Burniston Brown.

The Philosophical Approach to Religion. By Eric S. Waterhouse, M.A., D.D. (The Fernley-Hartley Lecture, 1933.) (London: The Epworth Press. 1933. Pp. 231. Price 5s.)

This outline of philosophical theology is intended for the "general reader of theology" and for theological students. Its author would not, I judge, commend it to the serious student of philosophy. In nine chapters Professor Waterhouse discusses the origin and nature of religion, its relation to philosophy and the cardinal themes in which both philosophy and religion are interested. His general method is to summarize alternative positions and briefly to recommend his preference.

Not a sense of the supernormal simply, but of a relation to this supernormal power, is the root of religion (p. 19). Religion, further, is to be distinguished from science in that it "interprets" the world or "seeks the meaning of existence," where the latter merely "explains" it. He would not, I gather, have "study," "interpret," "deduction" read in their narrow intellectual sense; but I am not sure in what sense they should be taken. At any rate religion is not simply philosophy—with which it has much in common—for it involves a "personal relationship with the object of its search" (p. 32).

In criticism I shall confine myself to one point, namely, the idealism (and the argument for it) which underlies his work. The argument (to put

it brusquely) seems to me extremely confused. The scent of a rose and the scratch made by a thorn are, we are informed, "both alike *brain processes which the mind has perceived*" (p. 131, my italics). But the object of perception, whatever it may be, is certainly not a brain process. And this brain, it is argued, being known only by means of sensations, is itself somehow mental. Electricity also "is known only by the mind that perceives it," and is likewise mental or "mind-dependent." This kind of argument—which, by the way, Mr. H. H. Price has recently called "extraordinarily naïve" and "stupid"—can surely convince nobody. Again, "There exist also relations between objects, relations of space, time, likeness. . . . Yet these relations do not belong to the objects, but to the mind that compares them . . . it" (the space between two objects X and Y) "exists only for a mind that can grasp X and Y and their relations" (p. 132). But why *theirs* if so obviously *not theirs*? Eddington and Jeans are cited in support of the conclusion that "We have seen matter . . . disappear into a complicated set of mathematical equations" (p. 223). But have we? Because it is found by physical experiment that certain sets of mathematical equations express isolated features of the behaviour of things, is this justification for the denial of the existence of the things? or for the assertion that they have disappeared? or are mental? The really interesting question is not whether such arguments are successful, but why theologians should suppose that they are in any way helpful to them. The plain counsel given—among others—by Baron von Hügel, against all such idealisms, goes unheard. But, to my mind, any spiritual philosophy which tries to do justice to *human* personality must do more justice to *nature* than is open to these theories.

Professor Waterhouse (in good company among contemporaries) accepts the Cartesian *Cogito* as a short cut to the establishment on an independent basis of spiritual reality. But surely the alternative view ought at least to be considered, namely, that there is no experience of a "self" or "thinker" logically or temporally prior to experience of a "not-self" or a "thought-about." (It should be remembered also that Ward's position, which brings the two sides of the cognitive situation *within* the *ego* is radically different from that of Descartes.) The Cartesian dogma, however, continues to crop up with all its original self-confidence. But the end of this short cut is not a spiritual universe, but—as history and Hume have shown—complete scepticism. It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that Professor Waterhouse evinces more than a little sympathy with "pragmatism" and its "obsolete," "up-to-date," "emotional," and "instrumental truth" (pp. 54–58 and *passim*). He seems, indeed, whether consciously or contentedly one cannot say, almost to have cut himself off from any other.

RALPH E. STEDMAN.

The Six Ways of Knowing. A critical study of the Vedānta theory of knowledge. By D. M. DATTA, M.A., Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1932. Pp. 351. Price 15s. net.)

Dr. Datta has succeeded in writing that rare thing, a book on Indian philosophy which is throughout interesting and intelligible to students of philosophy who are not Sanskritists. It is the plain duty of European philosophers to acquaint themselves with Indian thought, but they cannot be blamed for ignoring presentations which fail to make it intelligible or which are of interest only to specialists in a particular branch of Sanskrit literature. And it has not been easy to point to books on the subject which could honestly

be recommended to philosophers, as such. Dr. Datta is to be congratulated on having written a book which they can read and ought to read.

The Indian schools are divided by a difference of views as to the number and nature of the *pramāṇas*; a term loosely translated 'proofs,' but more accurately rendered by Dr. Datta 'ways of knowing.' "Some hold that perception is the only ultimate source of knowledge. Some accept both perception and inference. Others add a third, testimony or authority, to these. Still others hold that comparison is an additional independent source of knowledge. . . . Others, again, contend that there is a fifth kind of knowledge, postulation, which is not reducible to any of the preceding. A few others, finally, hold that there is also a sixth type—non-perception—from which primary negative judgments are derived and which cannot possibly be reduced to any of the above." The school whose epistemology is the subject of the present work, the Advaita or monistic Vedānta, holds the doctrine of six *pramāṇas*. This explains the title and arrangement of the book, although Dr. Datta departs from the usual sequence in order to group close to perception the two ways of knowing which Western thought might connect more closely with it, namely, 'comparison' (*upamāna*) and non-cognition, and close to inference 'postulation' (*arthāpatti*), which seems essentially inferential. The concluding book is devoted to *śabda-pramāṇa*, the way of knowing by words, which covers not merely the purely logical doctrine of testimony but also the valuable and little-known teaching of Indian thinkers on the significance of the word and the import of the proposition.

Dr. Datta sometimes gives the impression that he is more concerned to make out a case for the Advaitin view than to follow where the argument leads, but on the whole the treatment is fair and thoroughly competent, from the point of view of both Sanskritist and philosopher.

H. N. Randle.

On Being Creative, and Other Essays. By Irving Babbitt. (London: Constable & Co. 1932. Pp. xliv + 266. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

Mr. Babbitt reprints these essays in the hope that they may serve "to dissipate certain current confusions on the subject of humanism." In his Introduction he goes on to explain that the humanism he advocates is "a positive and critical humanism": it is one that insists on the need of measure and discipline, of humanity and self-criticism, if durable results in art or in life generally are to be achieved. It is thus in direct opposition to that naturalism or primitivism, which looks to feeling, emotion, or instinct as the creative principle, endangered rather than assisted by the dissections of reason, and conceives art primarily as the release of these non-rational forces. Of this primitivist tendency, which certainly flows strongly at the present day, Rousseau is taken as the prototype and fountain-head, and all the essays in their different ways consist mainly of polemic against it. Incidentally light is thrown on the function of criticism, on the conception of creative imagination, and on the aesthetics of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Schiller. The essay on "Schiller as an Aesthetic Theorist" is probably the best in the book: it should suffice by itself to ensure the book a warm welcome.

The chief weakness of Mr. Babbitt as a literary critic is the icy coldness of his judgment. He appears to have no affection for the authors whom he discusses, even perhaps to select for discussion by preference those on whom he can make the most telling attack. At times the reader begins to wonder whether Mr. Babbitt has any direct interest in Wordsworth, Coleridge, Schiller, and the other great historical figures whom he discusses with such learning and acute-

ness. Is he not rather a critic of critics, searching among the records of the past to find sticks with which to beat the backs of certain persons, not named, alive and practising criticism among us to-day? There are many conceptions of criticism; but one would hardly go to Mr. Babbitt for that kind of criticism which sends one back to the re-reading of the author discussed with a feeling that new doors have been opened in his works. Mr. Babbitt's own point of view is too persistent, his polemic is too prominent, to allow of this. One feels that he cannot write quite freely of the author of his choice, because he always has to keep one eye on what the other critics may be saying about him. . . . But these doubts are ungracious. Mr. Babbitt is an accomplished student and writer. What he writes is always worth reading, and his message is one that is much needed in some quarters to-day.

J. L. Stocks.

The Affective Consciousness. By Halbert Hains Britan. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1931. Pp. 391. Price 15s.)

In the Preface the author states that no systematic treatment of the affective aspect of mental life has been made since the appearance of Ribot's *Psychology of the Emotions* in 1889. The present volume is evidently written to supply that want, but it is extremely doubtful if it fulfils that function.

The book covers a wide field, as is seen by the headings of its sixteen chapters: The Motives of Men, The Motive Value of Knowledge, Habit, Pain, Pleasantness and Unpleasantness, The Differentiation of the Affective Consciousness, The Emotions, The Function of the Emotions, Fear, The Affective Significance of Language, Imagination and the Emotions, Social Stimulation of the Emotions, The Ethical Emotion, The Aesthetic Emotion, The Religious Emotion, and Emotional Attitudes. At the end of each chapter are appended four or five questions as problems for further study, and also a similar number of references is given relevant to the subject-matter of the chapter.

The book as a whole is a disappointing one. As the reader reads page after page, he gets lost in a mass of superficialities, for the author never seems to treat his subject-matter with any great depth, but merely skims the surface throughout. In the chapter on Fear, for example, the author discusses how new fears arise, and sets down two causes, the increase of fear through knowledge on the one hand, and through conditioning on the other, each being dismissed in one short paragraph. Then unconditioned fears are mentioned, again a short paragraph is sufficient for these. The rest of the chapter deals with the many fears to be found in man, such as fears of physical, social and economic ills, which are discussed at great length, and the chapter concludes with a lengthy discourse on fear as a means of control. The schema of this chapter may be taken as typical of others. The treatment of the various topics reveals a lack of balance in that the more important aspects do not receive weighty enough discussion, whereas other less important aspects are accorded undue consideration.

Apart from these criticisms, the book can be recommended as a popular treatise on what, after all, is a very difficult subject.

Mary Collins.

Philosophy in Educational Theory. By C. M. Attlee. (Birmingham: Cornish Brothers, Ltd. 1932. Pp. 172. Price 5s.)

The author of this little book, who is a Lecturer in Education at the University of Liverpool, rightly believes that theory and practice are inseparable, in Education as in any other pursuit. In a series of essays he enlarges upon and

illustrates this thesis. The general finding is that the meaning of Education is "that which puts us in a position to understand the world in which we have to live, to discover the part we have to play, and to realize why we must and how we can play this part to the utmost of our capacities." The fundamental presuppositions are two: "firstly, that man's peculiar prerogative is Reason; and secondly, that his actions and thoughts have no meaning apart from an intimate relationship with social purpose." It is interesting to note that the second view coincides so closely with that of thinkers to whom, philosophically, Mr. Attlee is diametrically opposed. In a supplementary chapter the author offers a most acute discussion of the "Legitimate Scope of Psycho-Analysis." The *theory* of psycho-analysis is a well-flogged if not a dead horse; but a few more strokes of the whip are always welcome. Mr. Atlee's conclusion follows naturally from his previous position: "If our argument that rationality is the peculiar prerogative of human beings is sound, then any doctrine which undermines it must go the way of all discredited hypotheses, and until psycho-analysis can reinstate reason and give to it its own high office of initiative and command it must expect to meet with suspicion." Such a statement would, one fears, leave the withers of Freudians (and Behaviourists) unwrung: they would dismiss it as a *petitio principii*. But some of Mr. Attlee's detailed criticisms they would find harder to fend off. The book is well written, and enriched with many apposite quotations, in the number of which Aristotle predominates.

F. A. Cavenagh.

The Nature of Learning. By George Humphrey, Ph.D. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method). (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd. 1933. Pp. vii + 296. Price 15s. net.)

At the end of this long and, in many respects, deeply interesting book Professor Humphrey makes a very gallant attempt to sum it all up in a few words. Two things are regarded as evident: first, that there are in the world various "complexes" both inorganic and organic; and secondly, that the world itself is in ceaseless change. If such complexes are to persist, each must possess its special sort of organization, and in particular a complex will be the more successful as it possesses an "organization-for-constancy." Inorganic complexes, as an atom, or a molecule, are highly stable and have mostly been studied with a view "to the investigation of their properties without reference to the possibility of disturbance created by external change." But biological systems ("system" being nearly, if not quite, the same thing as "complex") are much more mutable, and so anatomy and physiology are full of studies of the compensatory adjustments made by such systems to outside stimulation. All such adjustments may be conceived as a change from one state of equilibrium to another, and the study of transitional states from one balance to another is the special concern of the psychologist. These considerations give Professor Humphrey his rather high-sounding definition of learning: "When the four-dimensional organized manifold we call the living system makes an adjustment to a four-dimensional situation containing similar spatio-temporally distributed elements, such as successive presentations of the maze complex, and establishes a new equilibrium to such an extended situation, then we say that learning has taken place."

There are, however, plenty of cases in which a four-dimensional system is confronted by a four-dimensional complex and yet no learning takes place. This may be either because the four-dimensional complex is chaotic or

because the four-dimensional system lacks the organization to treat it as anything but chaotic. If learning occurs it is because the system concerned, face to face with what at first appears a "chaotic spatio-temporal manifold," is able to achieve "recognition of certain similarities in the protean phenomena of nature."

To many people learning seems to be a very special sort of event which requires a very special sort of hypothesis in explanation. But this is because "in our inveterate habit of tri-dimensional thought, we are isolating a three-dimensional slice from a four-dimensional event and contrasting it with other three-dimensional slices." A reaction learned is never something separate and qualitatively different from the learning series. Learning is, at all levels and in all cases, just simply a "unified process of attaining equilibrium."

Now all this sounds very high and dry indeed; but this final chapter is preceded by ten others in many of which the discussion proceeds on a much more concrete level. Perhaps it is natural, seeing that in the name of "learning" Professor Humphrey is casting the very widest net possible, that he should begin by a long discussion of the concept of system and of vital systems. But there follow discussions of the general problem of learning, habituation, association, conditioned reflex, and the problem of the maze. In all of these the author shows an astonishing range of knowledge of detailed experimental investigation and admirable powers of exposition. He has, perhaps, rather a bent towards "the latest thing," and it is fairly evident that in many of the realms he deals with he is rather the omnivorous reader with general ideas than the skilled practitioner. Thus he collects rather a strange troup of good companions. Hecht, Granit, Adrian and Matthews, Sherrington, Pavloff, Tolman, Hunter, and a great many more seem to agree harmoniously. It is not clear who are the lions and who the lambs, but Professor Humphrey is the excellent trainer who can induce them all to lie down together. As would be expected, in view of the general theoretical background adopted, there are many references to Gestalt psychology. The treatment of this point of view is sympathetic, though several very good criticisms are made.

Most psychologists will probably feel that something important is almost bound to be lost when an excessively wide criterion of learning is adopted. No doubt all instances of adaptation, of the acquirement or maintenance of states of equilibrium in a world of change, *can* be treated as learning. But the learning of animals and men seems to involve special ways of acquiring or maintaining equilibrium, and these ways do not look to be very adequately described as "the recognition of similarities" in changing phenomena.

Yet it would not be fair to Professor Humphrey to leave criticism at this point. He himself claims only to have set the stage for a full and concrete study of learning. He himself states that he has left off just where many of the most interesting problems begin. Any student who reads this book will be introduced to a vast range of important investigations, clearly and sympathetically described; he will be stimulated to think about numerous difficult but attractive problems, and he will find himself in the company of an author who has ideas and knows how to use them.

F. C. BARTLETT.

The Psychology of Animals. By F. ALVERDES. Translated by H. Stafford Hatfield. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1932. Pp. viii + 156. Price 9s.)

"The man of science," writes Professor Alverdes, "is not infrequently accused of devoting too much attention to details, and so losing sight of broad

generalities in a maze of single facts." To avoid such a charge was, no doubt, one of the author's chief preoccupations in the writing of this book. Professor Alverdes, known to English readers as the author of *Social Life in the Animal World*, has here endeavoured to present a simple introduction to the study of animal behaviour, an introduction well founded on fact, but informed with a lively consciousness of the broader problems of the philosophy of his science. The conception is excellent and the execution is in large measure appropriate to the conception. In each chapter a few essential facts are presented economically selected for their relevance to points of general theory. The reader is given facts, but he is not swamped with them. His attention is directed to the trees one by one, and then the wood is pointed out. This procedure is adopted in relation to such topics as individuality in the animal world, tropisms and tropotaxis, instinct, and some of the more important concepts relative to behaviour in the higher species.

Unfortunately, the author was not content to discuss the general principles, or even the philosophy, of his science. He has exploited his subject in the interests of an epistemological theory. On his view it would appear that most of the problems commonly regarded as important in animal psychology are wholly insoluble. We cannot know whether animals are conscious, we cannot even know whether our fellow-men are conscious. Nor can we know whether our wills are determined or free, and we cannot know whether behaviour requires to be explained in a mechanistic or in a vitalistic way. The reason why we cannot know these things is the very general one that knowledge depends less upon the nature of the object to be known than upon the nature of the knower. The possibility of knowledge being thus excluded, we must set up "fictions." Mechanism is a fiction, causality is another. The law of logic and some of the most important principles of biology are fictions. The fictions we set up are, it appears, determined by our nature, and that is all that can be said about the matter.

There is that view, of course. It has been held by some philosophers. But surely if it is to be asserted it requires also to be defended. It cannot properly be presented as a dogma, still less as an incidental dogma in an introduction to the study of animal behaviour. When Professor Alverdes can so obviously write good books on animal psychology, it is a pity that he should write others, not quite so good, on the theory of knowledge.

C. A. Mace.

The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers. By Carl L. Becker, Professor of History in Cornell University. (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1932. Pp. 168. Price $2; 11s. 6d.)

This attractive little book reproduces a series of four lectures delivered in the School of Law at Yale University. Their subject, as the title somewhat obscurely indicates, is the survival in changed form among eighteenth-century philosophers of the underlying preconceptions of mediaeval thought. With appropriate quotations from Diderot, Montesquieu, and the rest the author shows how the *philosophes* substituted for faith in orthodox Christianity an equally irrational faith in Nature and the Principles of Morality, how their historical judgments were no less tendentious than those of the tradition they were attacking, how they pulled down the Heavenly City of St. Augustine only to rebuild it on neo-classical lines for the habitation not of the resurrected faithful but of a wiser and more fortunate posterity. There is nothing surprisingly original in the demonstration, but Professor Becker writes gracefully

and handles his theme with an engaging irony, proper to one who believes that Logic is "a hocus-pocus designed to give formal validity to conclusions we are willing to accept if everybody in our set will too." He is indeed a relativist of the most absolute kind, for whom, as Aristophanes has it, "Whirl is King, having deposed Zeus"; and it is from the expression of this attitude of his that the philosophic reader is likely to draw his chief profit and entertainment. But perhaps the most piquant thing about an amusing book is that the device of the Yale University Press should be stamped upon its title page —so at least it seems to me, and so I think it must to Professor Becker.

ADRIAN COATES.

Albert Schweitzer. My Life and Thought. An Autobiography. Translated by C. T. CAMPION, M.A. (London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. 1933. Pp. 288. Price 10s. 6d.)

The Faiths and Heresies of a Poet and Scientist. By RONALD CAMPBELL MACFIE, M.A., M.B., C.M., LL.D. (London: Williams & Norgate. 1932. Pp. 184. Price 7s. 6d.)

Bewilderment and Faith. By F. E. ENGLAND, Ph.D., M.A., B.D. (London: Williams & Norgate. 1933. Pp. 91. Price 3s.)

None of these books is a work on philosophy. One is the story of a man's life, another the story of a man's last thoughts, the third a short series of essays for the perplexed. Yet a man's philosophy springs from his heart, and the arguments by which he supports it are seldom the grounds upon which he came to believe it. In that sense, therefore, all are expressions of a philosophy of life. Dr. England's little book may serve to introduce the other pair. It is a diagnosis of "the malaise of the modern world." This arises out of the lack of individual adjustment to life, out of social and industrial relations which are perilously near the breaking-point, and out of international problems which threaten the very existence of civilization. It is a time of bewilderment, social and religious. Dr. England holds that the most hopeful sign of the times is the belief in the possibility of betterment, yet that possibility requires a new faith in God for its realization, which can come through a new realization of the message of Christ. A courageous little book, cleanly and clearly thought out, modern and free from pulpit platitudes, a book that will stir thought.

Schweitzer found his way from bewilderment to faith by service for his fellows. Some twenty-five years ago he threw a bomb into the entrenchments of theology by his *Quest of the Historical Jesus*, a book as novel as it was "unorthodox." In addition to being a theologian of great powers, Schweitzer is also a musician of note, but at the age of thirty he left his organs and his theology to study medicine, with the avowed purpose of going to Africa as a medical missionary. He sailed in 1913, but had hardly got into his task when the war intervened, and Schweitzer and his wife were at once stopped from continuing their work. With characteristic energy he started upon his studies, planning a work on the philosophy of civilization. He resumed his medical duties later under special permit, but in 1917 was sent to internment in France, where he once more found occasion for his medical skill, amidst intervals given to the philosophy of civilization and the organ. Finally he was "exchanged" and returned to Strassburg. In 1924 he went back to the primeval forest where this gallant doctor of philosophy, theology, medicine, and music still labours. It is a book to be read, not characterized, the story of one of the most remarkable personalities of the modern world.

A pathetic interest attaches itself to Dr. Macfie's book, as it represents the work of his last weeks on earth. There is bewilderment and faith in these pages, the outlook of a medical man and a poet. Unfortunately Macfie took the fundamentals of Christianity to be fundamentalism, and one need not be surprised that he found himself unable to believe in them. But he believed passionately in God, in Christ's ethics, and in immortality, and his "heresies" are little more than a revolt against Victorian orthodoxy. The whole book is an extraordinarily interesting study in psychology. Never quite hidden is the old Scottish training of his childhood, overlaid with the temperament of a poet and the training of a physician. Such a man can never be very far from the kingdom of God, and Macfie's faith is a much stronger thing than the beliefs of many of undoubting orthodoxy. Taken together, these three books are significant of the quest for a new philosophy of life and religion, not upon the stereotyped lines, but perhaps nearer to the essence of Christianity. All that Dr. England says was felt by both Schweitzer and Macfie. In their own ways both have solved the problems, and their solutions, different though they are, do not appear to be far removed from that of Dr. England. They have proved in life what he sets out in thought.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

Systematic Sociology. By LEOPOLD VON WIESE. Adapted by HOWARD BECKER. (New York: J. Wiley & Sons. London: Chapman and Hall. 1932. Pp. xxi + 772. Price $6; 37s.)

This is an American rendering of von Wiese's *Beziehungslehre* and *Gebildelehre*, which together make up his *Allgemeine Soziologie*. It is an adaptation rather than a translation. There are interpolations from other works by v. Wiese, numerous illustrations are added, and comparisons are made with American authors which do not appear in the original text. In a prefatory note v. Wiese expresses himself satisfied with the adaptation, but it may be doubted whether for the non-American reader, at any rate, a more faithful rendering of the text would not have been more helpful.

The school of v. Wiese seeks to provide a systematic scheme for the investigation of social phenomena. It conceives of sociology as the study of social relations whose first duty is clarification and classification. The fundamental concepts employed are those of social process, social relation, and social structure. The most general forms of social processes are those of approach or withdrawal, association or dissociation. They are occurrences resulting in a change in the "distance" between human beings. Their two most important properties are their "direction," i.e. whether towards or away from, and the degree of association or dissociation. The notion of social relation is not clearly defined. It is conceived as the result of social processes, as something brought about through the activity of approach or withdrawal. Social structures are complexes of social processes so interwoven that they come to be regarded as unities. The business of theoretical sociology is to provide: (i) an analysis and classification of social processes, (ii) an analysis of social structures in terms of their constituent social processes and a classification of their main forms. The analysis of social processes is conducted behaviouristically, and consists in breaking them up into the individual attitude and the environmental situation, physical and social. The classification consists in an enumeration of the processes and sub-processes of association and dissociation and their combinations. Very elaborate tables of human relationships have thus been compiled by v. Wiese and his pupils. Social structures are classified on the basis of the closeness with which they serve

to tie (or separate) individuals, and the directness of the influence which the mass exercises upon the individual. In this way are handled such entities as the State, the Church, the various economic orders. The intention is to bring out their relational character and to prevent them from being regarded as substances. Methods are suggested for the study of the symbols employed by them, the behaviour of the individuals and the groups inside them, and the fundamental processes that go to their making.

The value of this scheme as an instrument of investigation has not yet been sufficiently tested, and though there is a great parade of formulae it is doubtful whether really workable units of measurement or even of qualitative comparison have been provided. Nevertheless, as an outline of a programme of investigation the scheme is impressive, and the formal classification of relationships must in one way or another constitute a part of theoretical sociology.

MORRIS GINSBERG.

History, Psychology, and Culture. By A. GOLDENWEISER, Ph.D. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. xii + 474. Price 18s.)

Students of the social sciences will welcome cordially this collection in a revised form of Professor Goldenweiser's papers. With the exception of the miscellaneous essays in Part VI, which are somewhat slight and professedly popular in exposition, most of the studies are valuable contributions to social theory. The most substantial is the account of totemism which gives a full survey of facts and theories and handles its subject both analytically and historically. The whole volume is important to the student of method, but special attention may be drawn to the first essay which discusses the fundamental categories employed in the social sciences, and to the paper on the principle of limited possibilities in the development of culture, which throws valuable light on the problem of diffusion and independent development in anthropology. There are also critical studies of the views of Wundt, Frazer, Durkheim, Lévy-Bruhl, and Freud, which will prove very helpful to those interested in the history of the social sciences. The discussion throughout is well documented, constructively critical, and stimulating.

MORRIS GINSBERG.

A Critical History of Modern Aesthetics. By the EARL OF LISTOWEL, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1933. Pp. 288. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

The purpose of this book is succinctly described on its dust cover. It is intended to be a continuation and an amplification of Bernard Bosanquet's famous work *The History of Aesthetic.* It picks up in the first part the historical thread where it was dropped by the earlier philosopher, and tracks in general outline the main trend of reflection on art and beauty as it has been formulated in America, France, Italy, Germany, and England between the close of the last century and the present day. The second part of the book, which is critical and constructive, defines the author's attitude to the various theories he has expounded, and also contains chapters on the minor arts, on the genetic aspect of aesthetics, and on certain fundamental aesthetic categories (Sublime, Tragic, Comic, Beautiful, Ugly). Both the first and second parts of the book deal in turn with "subjective" and "objective" theories of aesthetic, that is, those which are respectively preoccupied with psychology, and with the struc-

ture of material in external works of art. On the "subjective" side, among the topics considered are the theories of Expression, Pleasure, Play, Psycho-analysis, Einfühlung, and of the Experimental and the Phenomenological schools. The most important of the "objective" theories dealt with are those of the "allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft" group, sponsored by Utitz, Dessoir, and others; of the sociologists, represented by Hirn in Finland, Wundt in Germany, and Lalo in France; and of the "formalists," of which the best known exponents in England are Roger Fry and Clive Bell.

There are difficulties in the way of writing of any satisfactory short history of ideas, particularly where the ideas concern aesthetics, which is not only an involved subject, but one where the use of language varies greatly from author to author (*e.g.* the miserable word "Expression"). And when one finds that Lord Listowel has dealt with some sixty to seventy writers (some of them authors of several works) by page 148, squeezing fifteen into the first fifteen pages, one wonders whether the difficulty is not insuperable and whether such a short history could ever be written sufficiently accurately to justify itself. One's general unease is increased in particular by the "Critical" portion of this book, where careful and elaborately developed theories which are unsympathetic to the author are sometimes hastily and occasionally contemptuously dismissed in a sentence or two. I feel a little that it is unfortunate that Lord Listowel has himself challenged the comparison with Bosanquet, though perhaps this impression is increased by the (to my mind) rather too rigid division between exposition and criticism, which gives an effect of scrappiness which closer investigation shows to be partly unreal. (Some views—the Einfühlung theory, for example—are fully dealt with.)

Were this, however, the main tenor of my review, I should be ungrateful indeed. If Lord Listowel's book were simply a very well-informed guide (usually correct) to the twentieth-century authors, it would fulfil a purpose. But it is infinitely more than this. It is a shrewd, balanced, and at times an eloquent evaluation of opposing theories of aesthetics. Many points one may question: whether "embodiment" is not a more fundamental, more inclusive, and more central conception than Einfühlung; whether it is not misleading to treat Einfühlung as if it were just sympathy; whether the author does not assume too easily the relativity of values. But there is much more to admire than to belittle. I can warmly agree with nearly all of what Lord Listowel writes about Croce, about pleasure, play, appearance, psycho-analysis, experimental aesthetics, and objectivism and subjectivism (with reservations[1]). And in his short conclusion, which shows (among other things) how man and inanimate nature are unified and fused through artistic sympathy, there is a touch of real inspiration.

One slip. On page 47, the discovery of appreciative "types" should be attributed to Bullough, not Valentine. And one personal query. I don't think I ever have said[2] or implied that Einfühlung was an example of "ordinary fused association"? And I do distinguish carefully in my book between ordinary ("psychological") and "aesthetic" fusion.

LOUIS ARNAUD REID.

Authority and Reason in the Early Middle Ages. By A. J. MACDONALD, D.D. (Oxford University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. viii + 136. Price 6s. net.)

These Hulsean Lectures, delivered at Cambridge in 1931, may be of use to students of the interesting problem with which they deal, in supplying a great

[1] See Arist. Soc., *Proceedings*, Supp. Vol., 1932. [2] P. 179.

number of references to books which are worth consulting, but otherwise they throw little light upon their subject, and the accuracy in detail of the information which they contain is not to be depended upon. Dr. Macdonald has chosen a theme which cannot be adequately treated without a knowledge of the background of mediaeval thought which his references to "the *Categoria* and *Organa* of Aristotle" as among books translated by Boethius, to Boethius's own *Consolations* (in the plural), to a commentary by Macrobius on Cicero's *Topica*, to the "similar works on dialectics" "left behind" by Martianus Capella, his frequent misunderstanding of familiar philosophical distinctions (*e.g.* of primary and secondary substance on p. 80), and again such peculiarities as the use of "accidence" for "accident" as the name of Porphyry's fifth predicable, sufficiently prove him not to possess. Moreover, he does not appear to have envisaged the question of the relation of authority to reason in religion in its generality, apart from the special problem of the relation in Christian theology of Scripture to other authorities, nor perhaps clearly to have distinguished "authority" *cited* (the most frequent use in the writers with whom he is concerned) from "authority" in the sense of coercive jurisdiction. Again and again verification of his references has revealed misinterpretation or even mistranslation of the texts quoted; and that not only when they are dealing with the philosophical or quasi-philosophical topics with which Dr. Macdonald is probably less familiar than with the external history of the period. Two instances will suffice. On p. 78 we are told that "S. Cadroe, Abbot of *Waliadorensis*" (the use of the adjective at once excites suspicion) "near Metz . . . traced Plato's conception of God to the influence of Jeremiah in Egypt." Here the name and locality of the abbey are wrongly given, the assertion that it was near Metz being due to careless reading of the statement that Cadroe was afterwards Abbot at Metz, and there is no importance in Cadroe's adoption of the well-known story about Plato and Jeremiah, which only shows that he had looked at Augustine's *de Doctrina Christiana* without noticing that in his book *de Civitate Dei* and in the *Retractationes* that Father had withdrawn (on sound chronological grounds) his earlier assent to the tale. On p. 107 we learn that, according to Rabanus Maurus, St. Paul, for lack of Greek, "was a mere interpreter" (it is not said of whom) "like Mark the interpreter of Peter." On looking up his reference, we find that what Rabanus says is that Paul used Titus for his interpreter, just as St. Peter used Mark.

One cannot but feel that these lectures do not reach the standard of scholarship which one expects from Hulsean lectures at Cambridge published by the Oxford Press.

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB.

Spinoza (An Address in Commemoration of the Tercentenary of Spinoza's Birth). By S. ALEXANDER, O.M., F.B.A., Honorary Professor of Philosophy in the University of Manchester. (Manchester University Press. 1933. Pp. 20. Price 1s. 6d.)

This is one of the numerous addresses given in honour of Spinoza's tercentenary. Undoubtedly it is one of the most charming of them. But it is illuminating as well as charming. Professor Alexander makes it clear that the philosophy of Spinoza is not of historical interest only, but "represents a type of thought which is highly relevant to our present condition." For Spinoza was "at once a man of science, a philosopher, and a believer, and so far from there being dissension or discrepancy in his mind between these three things, his science and his religious faith fell naturally into their places within the scheme of his philosophy." His philosophy "is very near our own

problems. It exhibits the science of the physical world as one part of a system whose method, applied to human affairs, interprets for us morals and religion not only so as to secure their value but in an exalted expression." The common identification of naturalism with materialism, which has misled even some admirers of Spinoza to convert his philosophy into a kind of Platonism, is, implicitly at least, rightly repudiated by Professor Alexander. Spinoza's naturalism "establishes the ideals of good life, and maintains religion without excuse . . . and at the same time without affirming that either morals or religion, as so many suppose to-day, supplies us with directer knowledge of reality than physical science. For all things alike are modes of God and have both the mind which the human sciences investigate and the extension which is the subject of the physical sciences." One is tempted to reproduce the whole address. But enough has been quoted to show that there is little in contemporary philosophical literature that contains so much thought in such small space.

A. Wolf.

Bentham's Theory of Fictions. By C. K. Ogden. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1932. Pp. clii + 161. Price 12s. 6d.)

Mr. Ogden has already done much to revive our interest in Jeremy Bentham. His *Jeremy Bentham, 1832–2032*, shows him in the rôle of historian and prophet of Benthamism; his edition of the *Theory of Legislation* and the volume now before us show his sustained interest in his subject as well as his erudite knowledge of it. To those who are not, or not yet, partially interested in Bentham, Mr. Ogden's enthusiasm may appear to savour too much of Boswellian hero-worship. That is the common lot of biographers and expositors. But it is not a weakness to be ashamed of. After all, people understand best what they love most. And the present reviewer, if he cannot fully share Mr. Ogden's enthusiasm for Bentham, certainly understands and appreciates the enthusiasm.

Bentham is described by Mr. Ogden as "one of the most original thinkers England has ever produced." Few people will question this claim. But some of the reasons given by Mr. Ogden are not convincing, and appear to rest on a misunderstanding. The exposition of Bentham's account of the use of fictions in everyday life, and more especially in law, is very interesting; so is all that Mr. Ogden has to say about its bearing on linguistic psychology. But the view that Bentham's theory of fictions was "an anticipation of the entire philosophy of 'As If' " does not seem to be correct. Vaihinger's philosophy of "as if" was derived partly from Kant and Lange, but mainly from Nietzsche. Its full significance is seen most clearly in Nietzsche. What it amounts to, as regards epistemology, is this. Truth is beyond human grasp. Every kind of being has its own peculiar way of apprehending reality; and each of these forms of apprehension is more likely to conceal than to reveal the nature of reality. We may well distinguish *useful* beliefs from *useless* or injurious beliefs; but we have no right to discriminate between *true* beliefs and *false* ones. Now Bentham does not appear to have gone so far. While recognizing fictions in many departments of thought, he retained his faith in physical science, as seems clear, for instance, from the passage quoted by Mr. Ogden on p. xix. Moreover, Mr. Ogden probably exaggerates the value of what he describes as "a flourishing new movement in philosophy." The "fictionism" associated with the name of Vaihinger is an extravagance to the lengths of which Bentham did not go. Bentham deserves credit not only for his theory of fictions, but equally for the moderation

with which he kept it within proper limits. And Mr. Ogden appears to be over-anxious for the reputation of his hero when he exaggerates Bentham's originality at the expense of his common sense, which is assuredly one of the common features of the greatest and most typical British philosophers. Mr. Ogden, of course, may have considered all this, and may have an answer to this criticism. In any case all who are interested in the philosophy of fictionism, and in the correlated problems of linguistic psychology, must be grateful to Mr. Ogden for this carefully documented and very full study of Bentham's theory of fictions.

A. Wolf.

The Socratic Problem. By A. K. Rogers. (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. Pp. 200. Price $2; 12s.)

Mr. Rogers is to be heartily congratulated on a fresh and stimulating treatment of this eternal problem. "It has been my purpose," he writes (p. 162), "to attempt to show that only by rendering to Plato the things that are Plato's and to Socrates the things that are Socrates' are we likely to get a clear and consistent picture of either Plato the scientist and metaphysician or of Socrates the moralist and mystic." As these words indicate, the author's position is nearer to the nineteenth-century conception of Socrates than to that of Burnet and Taylor. The earlier chapters are mainly, though by no means wholly, concerned with the negative side of his thesis, namely that Socrates was neither scientist not metaphysician; and here we may specially welcome the justice done to the evidence of the *Apology*—so often slurred over—and the admirable evaluation of the *Clouds*. It is well said that "the real question is not whether the picture is historically true, but why Aristophanes should have felt free to offer it as one which his audience would not reject."

But it is in the fifth and sixth chapters, on "Socrates the Mystic" and "The Theory of Forms," that Mr. Rogers develops his main thesis, and here his arguments and conclusions seem more dubious. Starting from Stewart's recognition of a twofold aspect of the Ideal Theory, he contends that the "mystical" aspect, in which the Ideas are objects of "aesthetic contemplation," is genuinely Socratic. This thesis requires, amongst other things, that the speech of Socrates in the *Symposium* and the *μυθικὸς ὕμνος* of the *Phaedrus* should be, at least substantially, a record of Socrates' own beliefs; and it can hardly be said that the author gives conclusive reasons for this view, or allows due weight to the difficulties it involves. In particular it does not seem easy to ascribe the *Phaedrus* doctrine of soul as self-moved, immortal and tripartite to the agnostic Socrates of the *Apology*; yet if this part of the myth is "Platonic" what right have we to single out another part—the vision of the Ideas in the supra-celestial region—as "Socratic"? And does not Plato hint at 262D that the real Socrates has not been speaking, even as in the *Symposium* he invents Diotima for the same purpose? Doubtless it is true —and Mr. Rogers rightly insists on this—that Socrates was in some sense a "mystic." What is and must always be doubtful is the extent to which his mysticism has been Platonized in the dialogues.

The final chapter on "The Socrates of Xenophon," though it contains nothing very novel, is a reasonable and lucid re-statement of the case. There are three appendices: the first is a welcome argument for the spuriousness of that *facinus indignum*, the Second Platonic Epistle; the second holds both the *Hippias* dialogues to be non-Platonic; while the third, most sur-

prisingly and unconvincingly, challenges the accepted interpretation of the tripartite psychology of the *Phaedrus*; the argument rests in part on a misinterpretation of the words *τὼ ἀκολάστω αὐτοῖν ὑποζυγίω* at 256c, which of course refer to the "base" steeds in each of the *pair* of lovers, not to two base steeds in one soul.

Of the work as a whole it may be said that the first half is the more valuable, but that throughout it is a careful and temperate investigation, deserving the attention of all students of Plato.

R. HACKFORTH.

Rationalist Evaluations and the True Direction of Civilization. By AUSTIN VERNEY. (London: Heath Chambers & Co. 1932. Pp. xi + 212. Price 7s. 6d.)

"Conscious Will directed towards a defined goal is the very essence of the philosophy we are out to promote" (p. 50) is a declaration that may repel those who believe that philosophy, though much concerned with conscious will, should fight shy of "a defined goal." But this exposition of humanist rationalism is very valuable as an effective expression of the intellectual and moral liberation which is in many quarters to-day dismissed so lightly as nineteenth-century "bunk." Man is an animal who has shown himself capable of rising into an elaborate though imperfect civilization by employing reason and good will. If he can keep that reason at work, cleansed from passion, interest, and error, he can set himself successfully to the task of making the new material, political, and moral world that lies ahead. Mr. Verney gives a most knowledgeable account of this task, the parts that should and should not be played by the State in the new organization of mankind, and the urgent need of a rationalist faith for moving the mountains that still block the path of human progress towards free and full personality.

J. A. HOBSON.

The Individual and the Community. By WEN KWEI LIAO, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, University of Nanking. (International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. xv + 314. Price 15s.)

The author of this book describes his aim in several ways. It is "to make a systematic study of the interactions of the individual and the community with special reference to the problem of morality against legality" (p. xii); "to make a proof of the proposition that the individual is essentially a product of the community, and yet may by chance become a guide of it" (pp. xiii–xiv and *passim*); and "to bring together into a unity the analyses of the motivating factors of social conduct made by eminent thinkers, Chinese and Hindu, as well as Hellenic and Semitic" (p. xiv). And perhaps the last of these remarks, at least if it is supplemented by the second so as to allow for the frequent historical discussions, and expanded so as to explain the prominent place allotted to the medieval and modern thinkers of the West, describes most accurately the contents of the book. But Professor Liao can hardly be said to bring anything into a unity, still less to make a proof or a systematic study of it; and any intentions he may have entertained in these directions are rendered somewhat difficult of fulfilment by the necessity he feels himself under of discussing, in a way apparently unrelated to his main topics, the general ideas as well as the historical circumstances of the authors of whom

he treats. So what he offers is really only a series of studies, not connected together by any obvious continuity of argument or outlook, or confined at all carefully to the issues which are presumably most important to him, of the principal thinkers of the East and West who have concerned themselves with social theory. He is not, of course, ignorant of the matters with which he deals, and his discussions of Chinese thought may have some value to those who desire information about it; but all his discussions are inevitably brief and compressed, and his method of treatment is not likely to appeal to anybody whose interest in the problems of social theory is philosophical rather than historical. And though it would not be just to blame him for his inadequate mastery of our language, it is permissible to regret that he has not sought more assistance in this important matter: the American teachers who guided his researches, not to say his English publishers, could with very little trouble have done much to make the book more presentable.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

New Light on Fundamental Problems, including the Nature and Function of Art: being a Critical and Constructive Study of the Problems of Philosophy from the New Point of View of Henri Bergson. By T. V. SESHAGIRI ROW, M.A., Ph.D. (University of Madras. 1932. Pp. xv + 273. Price 12s. 6d.)

This is a competent exposition of Bergson's philosophy, but it depends too much on mere extract and quotation, and is somewhat lacking in speculative adventure. Except for a criticism of Absolute Idealism, which, even where it is apt, is not new, it accepts M. Bergson's contentions without serious examination. Even the ample section on art is mainly an enlargement of a few pregnant suggestions in *Le Rire*. Perhaps the most original section is that dealing with ethics, in which the author, writing apparently before the publication of M. Bergson's views on the subject, develops a criticism of the ethics of purpose which may be of interest to those who do not share his philosophical loyalties.

A. BOYCE GIBSON.

Philosophy of Hindu Sādhanā. By NALINI KANTA BRAHMA, M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in the Presidency College, Calcutta. With a Foreword by SIR SARBAPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN, Vice-Chancellor, Andhra University. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1932. Pp. xvi + 333. Price 12s. 6d.)

Sādhanā is a technical term denoting the practice or means for the attainment of Siddhi or "perfection" in the sense of the *summum bonum, i.e.* Liberation. "Sādhanā includes all the religious practices and ceremonies that are helpful to the realization of spiritual experience, and therefore may be regarded as the practical side of religion which is its most important aspect, as distinguished from the discussion of theories of the relation of God to man and the universe and other such topics constituting its theoretical aspect which belongs more or less to the province of philosophy" (pp. 13–14). The book before us discusses with great erudition, yet in plain and pleasant language, in its first part Sādhanā in general (five chapters), and in its second part the special forms of Sādhanā (fifteen chapters). It is intended for the general reader, excepting a few technical discussions indicated in the Preface. The Western philosophical reader, even though on the whole the book cannot have for him the same attraction as for his Indian colleague, will still find his trouble of going through it amply repaid. In this respect we specially recommend a study of Chapters I, II, IX, and X, where the Western and

Indian points of view are very aptly confronted, especially with regard to epistemology and metaphysics. Of Western philosophers taken into account here we find Spinoza, Kant, Hegel, Bergson, etc., and Bradley, Royce, McTaggart, Alexander, and others, and of the Indian ones not only Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, but also prominent later authors, such as Citsukhācārya, and the great champions of other schools, as Nimbārka, Vallabha, Jīva Gosvāmin. As to the practical side, it abounds, of course, in peculiarly Indian problems, among which stands first the question whether "works" (or, resp., what sort of works) are to be continued or abandoned after "wisdom" has been reached. A curiously unorthodox problem is raised on pp. 284 ff., viz. whether the linguistic occultism of the Tantra Sādhanā is not reduced *ad absurdum* by "the modern science of Philology" and the "differences in various languages." Our author says it is not, but his argumentation is hardly convincing. So far as we know, there cannot be a Mantra Śāstra, according to the general Indian view, but the one based on the Sanskrit language with its "fifty" letters.

The transliteration of Sanskrit words is not everywhere as it should be. There are some ugly traces left of the author's provincial pronunciation of Sanskrit (such as *bibhūti* and *vahiraṅga*), which must disappear in a future edition of this original and useful work.

F. Otto Schrader.

Outlines of Indian Philosophy. By M. Hiriyanna, M.A., formerly Professor of Sanskrit, Maharaja's College, Mysore. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1932. Pp. 419. Price 15s.)

The history of Indian philosophy has never before received so much attention as since the War. Besides the two great works in progress, viz. those of Dasgupta and of Belvalkar and Ranade, there are the two volumes, each of some 800 pages, of S. Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy*, and now we have in addition to these the handy volume under review. This book may be looked at as a substitute of the long antiquated *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, by Max Müller, and can henceforth be recommended as the one book giving a reliable and concise first introduction to the subject. It is written in an excellent English and in a fluent style characterized by short and clear sentences, and it bears throughout the stamp of the long experience of the retired University professor who gives us, with severe restriction to the essential, the last result of his often repeated and constantly improved college lectures. The author has realized that a history of philosophy, worth the name, must be more than a mere series of monographs on systems or philosophers; we find him constantly endeavouring, and as a rule with success, to show the threads connecting the present with the past and the future, special attention being paid, in this respect, to epistemology and logic. Criticism is not aimed at, yet wisely used where it helps the interpretation. The book is, in short, the ideal one for the beginner, while instructive in many ways also for the advanced student. It has three parts, viz. (1) Vedic Period, (2) Early Post-Vedic Period, and (3) Age of the Systems, the third including the later Buddhist schools and restricting Vedānta to Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita. Later Buddhism is shown "as it was understood by Hindu thinkers and found set forth in their works." Consequently, the Mādhyamika Buddhism appears as "pure nihilism" (which undoubtedly it was not to the majority of its adherents). The chapter on

Early Buddhism (in Part 2) is based on too scanty materials and not up to date; Nirvāna, *e.g.* is not sufficiently characterized as "not annihilation but the state which precedes it" (p. 153), and Mrs. Rhys Davids has written a good deal in recent years to establish a totally different view of the Buddha's psychology from the one expressed in those of her works referred to by our author. The latter would, however, probably be justified if his intention was to depict the Buddha also not as he was but as he was imagined to have been by Hindu thinkers when they began to find Buddhism worth while refuting. There are a few minor defects in other chapters, such as the silence on the function of *prāṇa* in Śankara's system, and the word "mind," elsewhere used as a translation of *manas*, applied instead of "spirit" to the *puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhyas (p. 283). But on the whole, we repeat it, the book deserves warmest praise.

F. Otto Schrader.

Books received also:—

Susan Isaacs, M.A., D.Sc. *Social Development in Young Children: a Study in Beginnings.* London: George Routledge & Sons. 1933. Pp. xii + 480. 15s.

E. Holmes. *The Headquarters of Reality: a Challenge to Western Thought.* London: Methuen & Co. 1933. Pp. x + 207. 5s.

F. M. Earle, M.Ed., D.Sc. *Psychology and the Choice of a Career.* London: Methuen & Co. 1933. Pp. 103. 2s. 6d.

C. Delisle Burns. *The Horizon of Experience: a Study of the Modern Mind.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. 372. 12s. 6d.

A. C. Mukerji, M.A. *Self, Thought, and Reality.* Allahabad: The Juvenile Press. 1933. Pp. xiii + 410.

J. T. Addison. *Life Beyond Death in the Beliefs of Mankind.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. x + 309. 8s. 6d.

R. Knight, M.A. *Intelligence and Intelligence Tests.* London: Methuen & Co. 1933. Pp. ix + 98. 2s. 6d.

Albert Einstein. *On the Method of Theoretical Physics.* (Herbert Spencer Lecture 1933). Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. 16. 1s.

R. L. Patterson, Ph.D., B.D. *The Conception of God in the Philosophy of Aquinas.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1933. Pp. 508. 21s.

Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Edited by C. Hartshorne & P. Weiss. Vol. III. *Exact Logic.* Cambridge U.S.A.: Harvard University Press. London: Oxford University Press. 1933. Pp. xiv + 433. $5; 24s.

W. A. Hammond. *A Bibliography of Aesthetics and of the Philosophy of the Fine Arts from 1900 to 1932.* New York: Longmans, Green & Co. 1933. Pp. viii + 183. $3.

G. R. Malkani, R. Das, and T. R. V. Murti. *Ajñāna.* London: Luzac & Co. 1933. Pp. iii + 226. 10/6.

H. McLaurin. (Preface by F. Yeats-Brown.) *Eastern Philosophy for Western Minds.* Boston, U.S.A., The Stratford Co. 1933. Pp. xii + 282. $2.50.

Various. *Modern Theories of Law.* London: Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1933. Pp. vii + 229. 8s. 6d.

R. C. Cabot, M.D. *The Meaning of Right and Wrong.* New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1933. Pp. x + 463. 12s. 6d.

Anonymous, *Splendor in the Night: Recording a Glimpse of Reality.* (Foreword by Rufus M. Jones). Portland, U.S.A.: The Mosher Press. 1933. Pp. 65.

I. Cohen. *The Jews in Germany.* London: John Murray. 1933. Pp. 20. 3d.

The Persecution of the Jews in Germany (Supplementary Bulletin). London: Anglo-Jewish Association. 1933. Pp. 45. 3d.

VARIOUS. *College of the Pacific Publications in Philosophy*. Vol. II. Stockton: California. 1933. Pp. 136.

VICTORIA HAZLITT, D.Litt. *The Psychology of Infancy*. London: Methuen & Co. 1933. Pp. ix + 149. 5s.

T. H. PEAR, B.Sc. *The Psychology of Effective Speaking*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. xiii + 232. 6s.

C. G. JUNG. *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1933. Pp. ix + 282. 10s. 6d.

SIDNEY HOOK. *Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx*. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd. 1933. Pp. 288. 5s.

P. A. CAMPBELL. *Consciousness: Brain-child*. East Cleveland, Ohio. Published by the author. 1933. Pp. 109. $1.50.

J. MARITAIN. *Some Reflections on Culture and Liberty*. University of Chicago Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1933. Pp. 51. 2s. 3d.

W. R. INGE, K.C.V.O., D.D., F.B.A. *God and the Astronomers*. (Containing the Warburton Lectures, 1931–33). London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1933. Pp. xiii + 308. 12s. 6d.

R. E. LACOMBE. *La Psychologie Bergsonienne: Étude Critique*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1933. Pp. 324.

M-M. GORCE. *Premiers Principes de Philosophie*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1933. Pp. 180. 15 frs.

J. BENRUBI. *Les Sources et les Courants de la Philosophie Contemporaine en France*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1933. Tome I. Pp. viii + 541; Tome II. Pp. 512. 100 frs. 2 vols.

H. SÉROUYA. *Initiation à la Philosophie Contemporaine*. Paris: La Renaissance du Livre. 1933. Pp. 312. 15 frs.

CH. SERRUS, D. ÈS L. *La Méthode de Descartes et son Application à la Métaphysique*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1933. Pp. 125.

CH. SERRUS, D. ÈS L. *Le Parallélisme Logico-Grammatical*. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1933. Pp. xvi + 514.

ALF ROSS. *Kritik der Sogenannten Praktischen Erkenntnis*. Kopenhagen: Levin & Munksgaard; Leipzig: Felix Meiner. 1933. Pp. 456.

E. CONZE. *Der Satz vom Widerspruch. Zur Theorie des dialektischen Materialismus*. Hamburg. Published by the author. 1932. Pp. 489.

W. VON HUMBOLDT. *Philosophische Anthropologie und Theorie der Menschenkenntnis*. (Herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Fritz Heinemann.) Halle: Max Niemeyer. 1929. Pp. lxxviii + 159. RM. 9.

G. DE RUGGIERO. *Storia della Filosofia. Parte Quarta. La Filosofia Moderna. 1. L'età Cartesiana*. Bari: Gius. Laterza & Figli. 1933. Pp. 365. L.25.

Elof Åkesson. *Episoden i Theaitetos*. Goteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag. 1933. Pp. iv + 109. Kr. 3.

DR. SJOERD HOFSTRA. *Differenzierungserscheinungen in einigen Afrikanischen Gruppen*. Amsterdam: Scheltema & Holkema. 1933. Pp. viii + 214.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of *Philosophy*

McTAGGART

Sir,

I am editing for publication a volume of philosophical papers by the late Dr. John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart of Trinity College, Cambridge, and am unable to trace a MS. entitled "The Empirical Element in Metaphysics." This was the last address he delivered to the Moral Sciences Club at Trinity in 1923 or 1924.

Might I be permitted to ask of any reader who possesses the MS., or knows what became of it, that he kindly communicate with me?

Yours, etc.,

S. V. Keeling.

University College,
University of London,
July 10, 1933.

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MICHAELMAS TERM begins on October 4th and ends on December 13th.

Members are urged to propose new names for membership.

The following courses of lectures have been arranged to begin in the Michaelmas Term of the Session 1933–34:—

"PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES," a course of seven weekly lectures by The Rev. Leslie J. Walker, S.J., M.A. (of Campion Hall, Oxford), on Mondays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, beginning October 9th. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

"THE PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH TO KNOWLEDGE," a course of six weekly lectures by J. D. Mabbott, M.A., B.Litt. (of St. John's College, Oxford), on Fridays, at 6 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, beginning October 13th (and omitting October 27th). Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

"INTRODUCTION TO SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY," a class by The Director of Studies, on Wednesdays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, in the Michaelmas and Lent Terms, beginning Michaelmas Term, October 18th; Lent Term, January 17th. Fee for the session £1 1s. Terminal, 12s. 6d. Members free.

The full syllabus for the Session can be obtained on application to The Director of Studies, University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1.

The Evening Meetings for the Michaelmas Term of the Session will be held at University College, Gower Street, W.C.1., at 8.15 p.m., on the following dates:—

October 17th: "The Philosophy of Physics." Professor E. A. Milne.
October 31st: "Materialism." Professor J. B. S. Haldane.
November 14th: "Bergson's Ethical Teaching." Professor N. Kemp Smith.

December 12th: "Plato and Aristotle in Relation to Modern Thought." Professor W. D. Ross.

It is hoped that one or two reading circles may be formed at University Hall, Gordon Square, during the Session. Those desiring to join one of these should communicate with The Director of Studies.

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PHILOSOPHY

The Eighth Congress of Philosophy will be held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, between September 2nd and 7th, 1934. Besides papers sent by individuals, the following main problems introduced each by two Lectures will be proposed for discussion: The Limits of the Natural Sciences; The Meaning of Logical Analysis for Epistemology; Normative and Descriptive Sociology; Values; Religion and Philosophy; The Crisis of Democracy; The Meaning of Philosophy for our Times. British Philosophers proposing to go to the Congress or to send papers are requested to communicate with either Professor G. E. Moore, 86, Chesterton Road, Cambridge, or Professor J. H. Muirhead, Dyke End, Rotherfield, Sussex.

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HARTMANN PRIZES

ALTERATION OF DATE FOR RECEIVING ESSAYS

Two Prizes of £50 each have been offered by a member of the British Institute of Philosophy for the best Essays of Nicolai Hartmann's ETHICS (English Tr. published by George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London) under the following conditions:—

1. One prize to be open to men and women of British birth, wherever resident, under the age of 28; and one to men and women of American birth, wherever resident, under the age of 28.

2. The Essays shall be of not less than 100 typewritten quarto pages.

3. They must be sent in before January 1st, 1934 (not June 1st, 1933, as stated in the former announcement), addressed to the Director of Studies, The British Institute of Philosophy, University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, London, W.C.1, with addressed stamped envelope enclosed for their return to the writers.

4. The prizes shall only be assigned on condition of the attainment of a certain standard by the selected Essays.

5. The selection shall be made by the Academic Committee of the British Institute of Philosophy.

J. H. MUIRHEAD,
Chairman of
The British Institute of Philosophy.

UNIVERSITY HALL, 14 GORDON SQUARE
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